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SUMMARY 
THE 1978 METHODIST SCHISM IN TRANSKEI: 
A MISSIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
In 1977 the Annual Conference of the Methodist Church of South Africa (MCSA) decided to 
discontinue its practice of sending messages of goodwill to the Heads of State of the Southern 
African region (including Transkei). The Prime Minister ofTranskei interpreted this resolution 
as implying the non-recognition ofTranskeian political independence, obtained from the Republic 
of South Africa in 1976, and expressed his intention to ban the MCSA in Transkei and replace it 
by the Methodist Church of Transkei (MCT) 
The thesis presents, in narrative form (Chapter 2), a detailed description of the process of 
the schism ( 12 January 1978 to 2 June 1978). Chapter 3 analyses the political and ecclesial 
context of the schism comprehensively by examining three main issues: the Methodist tradition 
in the Eastern Cape and Transkei, the Methodist tradition of pledging loyalty to the Head of State 
and the emergence of Transkei as a geo-political state. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the reaction of the Transkeian Methodists to the dispute between 
the Transkeian Government and the MCSA. The loyalties which influenced their reaction are 
identified and analysed. In this study the whole process of the schism is seen as an interplay 
between and clash of different loyalties. 
Chapter 5 reviews the different models and typologies used to explain and interpret the 
African Independent/Initiated Church movement. The aim is to identify the elements in these 
models which are relevant for an understanding of this schism. 
Chapter 6 concludes the study by considering five areas of missiological importance 
highlighted by the 1978 Methodist schism in Transkei, namely: ( 1) the research questions, (2) 
mission and unity, (3) mission and ethnic issues, (4) prophetic mission, and (5) prophetic 
ambivalence. 
Key 1vords: 
Methodist Church ofSouth Africa; Methodist Church ofTranskei; schism; ChiefK.D. Matanzima; 
Black Ministers' Consultation; letters of greetings; Transkeian independence; homelands policy; 
loyalists; nationalists. 
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 GENERAL BACKGROUND 
The South African Government formulated a policy of creating Black ethnic states which would 
ultimately attain "independence". In 1976 Transkei became the first of these states to gain its political 
"independence". In 1978 the Prime Minister of the Republic of Transkei, Paramount Chief Kaiser 
Daliwonga Matanzima, banned the Methodist Church of South Africa (MCSA)1 in Transkei. The 
reason given for this action was that the MCSA was refusing to recognise the "independence" of 
Transkei, which it had obtained from the Republic of South Africa (RSA). The MCSA and 
particularly the Transkeian Methodists had to take a position in the face of the impending banning of 
the MCSA in Transkei. 
The banning led to the formation of the Methodist Church of Transkei (MCT), which was renamed 
the United Methodist Church of Southern Afiica in 1979. Most of its ministers and members returned 
to the MCSA in 1988 when General Bantu Holomisa lifted the ban on all organisations, including the 
MCSA, that had previously been banned by the Matanzima regime. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the dynamics that led to this schism and it focuses on the 
period 12 January to 2 June 1978; that is, from the time when Chief Matanzima first mentioned his 
intention ofbanning the MCSA and replacing it by the MCT to the time when the MCSA was actually 
banned and the MCT was formed. 
1.2RELEVANCE 
The 1978 Methodist schism in Transkei is a fairly recent event (which for some is still a very painful 
one). Although a large section of the United Methodist Church of Southern Africa 
2 
(UMCSA), formerly the Methodist Church of Transkei (MCT), was reabsorbed by the MCSA in 
1988, it continues to exist even today ( 1995) and disputes between the MCSA in Transkei and the 
UMCSA over church buildings in some areas have not yet been settled by the Supreme Court. The 
1978 episode is therefore not a closed book yet even though Transkei itself no longer exists as an 
"independent state" as it was reabsorbed by the Republic of South Mrica after the first democratic 
elections in South Mrica on 27 April 1994. 
Even if the disputes were settled, however, the episode will never be a closed book because it 
involves personal experiences which can never be wished away and a church experience which, for 
better or worse, whether recognised or ignored, has made the MCSA a different church from what 
it was in 1978. It was never the same after that experience. 
The issues which precipitated the schism are part of the broader South Mrican political and church 
tradition. The incident should therefore not be isolated as something that could only happen in 
Transkei and the MCSA. All South Africans should be charitable enough to identify themselves with 
the Methodists who were caught up in the less charitable political and ecclesial traditions of apartheid 
South Mrica. 
This study was undertaken not to preserve a fading history on record but as part of the stuff of which 
living human and Christian traditions are made. It is the author's belief that, had similar studies been 
undertaken timeously on the previous Methodist schisms in the South Mrican tradition, the 1978 one 
might not have taken place. 
1.3 THE MISSIOLOGICAL FOCUS OF THE STUDY 
Missiology, by its very nature, 'is an interdisciplinary field, making use of insights from systematic 
theology, church history, anthropology and communication science, amongst other things and yet, 
as Luzbetak (1988: 14) points out, it 
is not a mere conglomeration of disciplines but a network of disciplines that systematically 
interact with one another. Missiology is, therefore, more properly 
regarded as a field rather than a discipline. It is a field that studies the expansion and 
growth of the mission of the Church in all its dimensions - communal, sacramental, 
kerygmatic, diaconal and institutional. 
Consequently its themes are of interest to other academic disciplines, even those which fall 
outside the theological family, like history, social anthropology and political studies. 
The theme chosen for this thesis, namely the formation of the MCT, could be of interest to 
the Institute of Social and Economic Research at Rhodes University or the Abe Bailey Institute 
of Inter-racial Studies at the University of Cape Town - as was the schism of Nehemiah Tile 
and the Thembu Church. Saunders ( 1970) was funded by these Institutes for his research on 
Tile and the Thembu Church. This suggests that different perspectives distinguish the 
approaches of various academic disciplines and institutions to themes of common interest. To 
situate this study of the Methodist schism in Transkei (MCT) in the discipline of missiology, 
what is considered missiological about it will now be presented. 
Although, in simple terms, missiology as a discipline is about the study of mission, various 
definitions and models of mission have been developed with the result that its very definition 
has become a problem. Endorsing Neill (1976: 57), who said "If everything is mission, nothing 
is mission", Bosch ( 1980: 11) says "Mission is today a greater problem and more disputed 
than ever". 
Perhaps the problem is not so much a dispute over the definition of mission but rather the 
different emphases. For instance, the Jerusalem Conference of the International Missionary 
Council (IMC) in 1928 defined mission as a "comprehensive approach" while its Whitby 
Meeting ( 194 7) did so in terms of ke1ygma (preaching) and koinonia (fellowship) and the 
Willingen Conference ( 1952) added marty ria (witness) as the overarching concept (Bosch 
1991: 511). 
Because of this wide range of models and definitions, it seems that ,an operational definition 
of missiology should be determined by the context or situation in which a specific missionary 
--... __ -. 
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activity is called into question or challenged. 
As indicated above, the MCT was formed during a period in the evolution of a different political 
dispensation in Transkei. An operational definition which seems applicable therefore is one which 
concerns itself with the relationship between the church and the state in the light of the Gospel. 
This was not a new problem for the church. It dates back to the Constantinian era when Christianity 
became a religio licita and later the state religion. The first person to work out a Christian rationale 
for this relationship was St Augustine in his twenty-two-volume work, De Civitate Dei (''City of 
God"). St Augustine's solution to the problem of the relationship between the church and the state 
was a compromise (give and take) situation in which the "regime would be blessed by the church, in 
exchange for which the state guaranteed to protect and support the church" (Bosch 1991 :221 ). In 
the end the church has been the loser ever since because "he who sups with the devil had better have 
a longer spoon" (Berger 1973:3 7). This close link between the church and the state led to the 
development of a Christian tradition in which "if loyalty to the state meant loyalty to the church, the 
obverse was also true" (Bosch 1991:221 ). 
Against blaming the Constantinian dispensation and the Augustinian solution for the compromised 
standing of the church in the world, Lesslie Newbigin (1986: 1 OOt) asks, "But could any other choice 
have been made? When the ancient classical world ... ran out of spiritual fuel and turned to the church 
as the one society that could hold a disintegrating world together, should the church have refused the 
appeal and washed its hands of responsibility for the political order? ... would God's purpose ... have 
been better served ifthe church had refused all political responsibility?" 
Although Newbigin is talking here of a state in trouble and in this study we are dealing with a church 
in trouble, the end result is the same: it is the question of Christian presence in the state. In the case 
ofthe Transkeian Methodists, the prospect ofthe ban on the MCSA was 
5 
perceived as posmg a choice between a marginalised presence and the elimination of the 
Methodist Church in the Transkei; between rejecting the formation of the MCT and a 
compromise that would ensure a continued presence. These options brought their loyalties into 
the spotlight and this, in turn, generated tension and conflict For some Methodists what was 
uppermost in their response was what they stood to gain by making a compromise while for 
others it was what they stood to lose by a compromise. 
Since this is a problem for the church in general, a study of the MCT may provide an 
interesting case study. It is therefore a relevant missiological project. It focuses on the tension 
in the relationship between the missionary activity of the church and the programmes of 
political powers. 
1.4 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
In the broad context of the South African apartheid system, the study is an examination of the 
impact of the homelands policy on the church and the response of the church to it This study 
concentrates mainly on. investigating why and how the 1978 Methodist schism in Transkei 
came about. To do this, the study answers the following questions: 
( l) How did the 1978 Methodist schism in Transkei unfold? 
(2) What factors played a role in this schism in Transkei? 
(3) How did different loyalties interact in the process of the 
schism? 
(4) What type of church schism was the MCT? 
1.5 RESEARCH APPROACH 
In missiology, as in other disciplines, various methodologies can be used depending on the 
nature of the data and the problem to be investigated (Leedy 1989: 139). If one is interested 
in observing a particular phenomenon occurring in a specific group, an empirical methodologx 
6 
can be used. This involves analysing findings in the field. If one is interested in historical figures or 
events, a historical research methodology should be employed. This, as Leedy ( 1989:223) points out, 
involves rationally explaining the causes of events and logically interpreting the effects of such events, 
with the main objective of evaluating the significance of the historical figures or events. 
Since the present study concerns a historical event, a historical research method will be used. A 
historical event can be approached in two ways. First, the event can be seen as epitomising a concept, 
an idea or a theory which the researcher has already formulated. For instance, Mosala uses the 
concept "struggle" as the hermeneutic key in his approach to African Independent Churches (1985) 
and Biblical exegesis (1989). Although no academic or scientific study can be approached without 
some preconceived idea(s) or external theory, such bold preconditioning becomes controversial. Both 
West (1990) and Bosch (1991) thus criticise Mosala (1989) for approaching Biblical hermeneutics 
from a perspective of"struggle". 
In my approach I have decided to explore the historical facts without any preconceived theory so that 
my interaction with data may generate appropriate theories. In this regard my approach is similar to 
the "grounded theory" approach suggested by Glaser and Strauss (1967). They ( 1967: 1-2) were 
reacting to the excessive concern of some sociologists with y:eritying rather than generating theories. 
They observed that this concern led to attempts to fit or even force data into an already formulated 
theory. Their call is for a move towards generating a theory which explains data instead oftesting 
how the data confirm or disconfirm an already existing theory. This grounded theory approach can 
prevent driving data towards a "tacked-on explanation taken from a logically deduced theory" (Glaser 
& Strauss 1967:4). This practice "arises from the fact that generally a sociologist has been trained 
· only to research and verity his facts, not also to research and generate his explanation of them" and 
yet the interpretive framework should be generated from data in the course ofthe research (Glaser 
& Strauss 1967:4,6). 
Grounded theory research allows for a more open and creative approach to the study of social 
processes. Because grounded theory does not mean that one can work without an interpretive 
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framework at all (Steyn 1994: 12), four analytical procedures have been used in the historical research 
methodology in this study. This approach of using several theoretical frames of reference or 
perspectives is called triangulation (Duffy 1987:130-133). The aim is to obtain a deeper 
understanding of the research problem by approaching it from different perspectives. The other 
methods emerged from the narrative descriptive method used in chapter 2. Their relevance had not 
been anticipated but their use was generated by the narrative method which, .in a way, became the 
"mother" ofthe other methods. This is already an indication ofthe validity of the grounded theory; 
it has a capacity to generate its own theories. 
Chapter 2 employs a narrative method to "tell a story" of the formation of the Methodist Church of 
Transkei; chapter 3 undertakes a contextual analysis of the issues precipitating the MCT; chapter 4 
offers a conflictual analysis ofthe different loyalties that interacted during the formation of the MCT 
and chapter 5 uses the typology drawn up for analysing African Independent Churches (AIC) to 
categorise the nature of the MCT schism. These analytical procedures and their relevance for the 
MCT will be explained briefly. 
1.5.1 The narrative method 
Western approaches to historical study/research have often been dominated by rationalistic 
explanations and theories which were thus imposed on historical material. Much the same approach 
applies to theology. This overemphasis is now being questioned. For example, Belden ( 1982: 17-21) 
asks, "Why have we in the traditional classical Christian theology been so often dependent on 
discursive reasoning alone? Why is our theologizing so often ethereal, cerebral and ahistorical, afloat 
with abstract definitions and practically unrelated to our selves as whole beings rooted in history?" 
Theology is rooted in stories, the biblical stories of creation, the covenant, the story of Jesus the God-
man, and so on. According to Weinrich (1973:45-56), story "is the method by which Christianity 
transmits itself from generation to generation in an endless chain of telling stories". But, as Weinrich 
points out further, this fact has been overshadowed by the 
-~-.:"- --
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theoretical and propositional language in which theological discourse is usually conducted. 
At present there is a move to reinstate story as another legitimate method of theological 
discourse. Ironically, this move has been initiated in Europe and North America, the main 
culprits in reducing theological discourse to what Belden ( 1982: 17-21) calls an "academic and 
bloodless affair - a cerebral exercise with rational analysis, dissection and systematization". 
The rediscovery of the importance of narrative theology has, of necessity, led to the 
rediscovery of the richness of the narrative method, of a story - especially a historical story 
as against a fable or myth - because it conveys the "historical facti city of persons and events" 
(Goldberg 1982: 214). The story is now recognised as giving order to certain events with a 
rational structure of a plot, conflict and resolution (Williams 1986: 24). 
The narrative method has been used in this study not only to satisfy enquirers who want to 
know what happened, but also as a way of providing data based on the role of different 
participants in the drama as well as their mood, motivations and actions as the drama unfolds 
as a single movement. In the story there is a story-teller and those who act in the story. In the 
story of the MCT in this study the author is the story-teller and is telling his own story 
because he was personally involved. He himself is therefore inside the story. It is not his story 
alone because there were many others who were also involved so it is their story, too. Then 
there are others who were not involved but who, through reading and hearing about this story, 
will find echoes of their own stories in their own situations and circumstances and those 
echoes make this their story, too. Through this story we can all see the participants with whom 
we can identify. This identification makes the past event a present human reality because a 
true human story depicts a present reality which is characterised by plot, coherence, movement 
and climax (Fackre 1983: 343). Although a story is cast in a historical framework, as if it 
depicts what happened in the past, its significance is in depicting a present human reality. 
This story method is relevant not only to the MCT but also to most theologising in the African 
context, as Hollenweger (1967; 1976: 77) points out: "Western Christianity and Judaism are 
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religions of the book. In Africa the medium of communication is not the definition but the 
description, not the statement but the story, not the doctrine but the testimony, not the book 
but the parable, not the summa theologica but the song .... " 
A narrative approach does not, however, exhaust the significance of an event. Particularly in 
an academic study, other underlying dynamics of the event have to be teased out by giving 
attention to context, conflict and typology. These methods are explained briefly below. 
1.5.2 Contextual analysis 
The inadequacy of a narrative method is that it does not provide sufficient information about 
the historical circumstances in which an event took place. For an academic study, then, it does 
not adequately answer questions such as why people acted in the way they did. 
The debate on the contex.tuality of theological formulations highlights the importance of the 
context. The main problem in contextual theology concerns its status What is debated is 
whether this refers to the content of theology or a method of doing theology. The question is 
whether it is another type of theology "like political theology, theology of liberation, theology 
of the world, black theology, white theology, theology of reason, theology of hope" (Konig 
1981: 37-43). 
Konig (1981: 37-43) dismisses the idea of contextual theology as another type of theology 
because "all theologies are contextual - each theology lets the questions which are put to the 
Bible be (co-)determined by the situation in which the theology is practised. Contextual 
theology is therefore a characteristic of all theology." 
Mosala (1985: 104) follows the same line of argument when he says that the claim that 
"contextual theology [is] an attempt to do theology differently is simply tautological and 
theoretically bankrupt. This is because all theology is contextual theology. To claim to do 
theology contextually is therefore not to claim to do anything new." 
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If contextual theology refers neither to the type nor to the method of theology, then what is 
the debate all about? The answer to this problem may be found in Kritzinger's (1991: 219) 
suggestion that "a contextual theology is not merely influenced by its context; it is a theology 
in which conscious analysis of the context is correlated with the interpretation of the Christian 
tradition." This definition suggests a very close relationship between theolO.!:,')' and context 
analysis so that theology is not seen as distinct from its context. 
But then, what is meant by "context"? The term is used to refer to the total human situation 
from which people derive their meaning system. An approach that focuses only on some 
aspects of the human situation would not be the total context. Earlier theological concerns with 
the human situation tended to focus only on the cultural dimensions and were therefore not 
the total context. Such concerns led to the introduction of the concepts of indigenization or 
inculturation. 
Bevans (1992: 20-22) argues for the case of replacing both indigenization and inculturation 
by the term contextualization. He maintains that contextualization has a broader meaning, 
which includes culture, cultural change and popular religiosity. Torres and Fabella ( 1978: 269) 
make the meaning of "culture" even much broader by including in its meaning both the 
political and economic systems. 
This broad meaning of context to which theology should be applied raises objections from 
some quarters, particularly the fundamentalists, who see contextual theology as an attempt to 
make theology subservient to the historical situation (Kritzinger 1991: 219). But a theology 
which does not address people in their cultural, political and economic condition would be the 
poorer. A conscious analysis of these human situations is therefore an imperative in order to 
formulate a relevant theology. 
This study employs contextual analysis in order to provide a more adequate understanding of 
the issues that precipitated the MCT schism. This approach answers the second research 
question of what factors played a role in the 1978 Methodist schism in Transkei by 
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considering its political and ecclesial contexts. Knowing that enables one to look at the 
conflicts generated among Transkeian Methodists by those contexts. 
1.5.3 Conflictual analysis 
The conflict which occurred between the MCSA and the Transkeian Government in 1978 
could not have taken place in a South African region which better epitomised the conflict 
inherent in South African apartheid society than Transkei. This inherent conflict could be seen 
in the political, cultural, religious, economic and other spheres. Transkei represented a 
confluence of these spheres of conflict. For instance, one could see the missionary domination 
in the church and at the same time the rejection of that domination expressed by the rise of 
the indigenous church movement (see de Gruchy ·1985: 89), and the political ideals of self-
determination which were manipulated by ideological experimentation and led to the 
"independence" of Transkei in 1976. 
Clearly, then, an analysis of the MCT that did not take up the matter of conflict would be 
inadequate. Conflict is an inherent component of the story of the MCT. This study employs 
a conflictual analysis to show how different loyalties and interests divided the participants in 
the story of the MCT. The structural development of the conflict occurred in three stages. 
( 1) First stage: At this stage the Transkeian Government was interacting with the international 
community in an attempt to gain recognition of its independence. The United Nations' 
Organisation (UNO) met on 26 October 1976 and adopted a resolution rejecting the 
Transkeian independence (see 3.3.4.3). The Central Committee of the World Council of 
Churches (WCC) adopted a similar position (see 3.3.4.3). 
(2) Second stage: By adopting the 1977 Conference resolution to discontinue the practice of 
sending letters of greeting to the Heads of the Southern African states, the MCSA was 
perceived by the Transkeian Government to have identified itself with the international 
Community (especially the WCC) in its campaign to deny Transkei the recognition of its independence. 
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(3) Third stage: This occurred when the Transkeian Methodists were divided: one section 
identifying itself with the wishes of the Transkeian Government and the other with the MCSA. 
Chapter 4 of this study does a conflictual analysis of the role played by the clash of different 
loyalties and interests in the process of the schism. 
1.5.4 Typological analysis 
Chapter 5 provides a typological analysis drawn from the study of African Independent 
Churches (AIC) schisms as an aid to understanding the nature and type of the MCT within 
the broad movement of African church independency. 
The African church independency movement in South Africa started in 1883 with the 
Nehemiah Tile schism. In 1948 Sundkler's Bantu Prophets opened the missiological debate on 
this movement. 
The question of whether the typological framework of interpreting the AICs schisms is 
relevant for the MCT will be considered next. The inconclusive debate on the relevant terms 
to be used when referring to the African Christian Churches makes it necessary to do so. The 
most popular term, which has been used since interest was first shown in this phenomenon, 
is "independent". That this debate is inconclusive is shown by the fact that Sundkler ( 1961: 
18), the very man who introduced it into missiological circulation, later had reservations about 
its continued use (Turner 1984: I 04 ). 
Originally the official designation given to them was "the Native Separatist Churches" 
(Sundkler 1961: 18 ), but because of the unacceptability of the terms "native" and "separatist", 
missiologists replaced them with "African" and "independent", respectively The problem with 
the use of the term "independent" is that it defines these African Churches in relation to and 
in terms of "mainline" or "historical" churches. Pato (1990: 24) suggests that this is no issue 
to be ashamed of because the term "independent" defines these churches correctly in the South 
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African political context and says that the "notion of 'independence' [is] a reincarnation in 
ecclesiastical terms of what had been lost in political and cultural terms". In his view, the term 
"independent" ought to be retained when referring to these churches not in spite of but 
precisely because of its political connotation. It is a declaration that the Africans who are not 
politically independent are, at least, ecclesiastically independent. 
According to Sundkler ( 1961: 70), there was an ecclesiastical connotation to the original 
intention of the term and this was to describe a church which was "independent and free from 
direct and effective European control" This definition was given a political context with the 
intention of restricting the registration of (African) marriage officers and the right to address 
(African Church) meetings during the Bambata Rebellion of 1906 (Sundkler 1961: 70). 
To load the term with political connotations, as Pato suggests, may create some problems: Is 
the term still relevant in the 1994 South African political situation? Who still lacks political 
independence? If lack of political independence is all that is in the AIC movement, surely at 
least some of the African Independent Churches should have started returning to the 
mission/mainline/historical churches since 27 April 1994? And would the term not have been 
dropped long ago in other Southern African states like Swaziland and Zimbabwe? 
Daneel (1987: 31-32) suggests that the term "independent" should be retained, even if only 
provisionally, because it is not pejorative nor does it imply a value judgement. For him, 
"independent" refers to churches that never had links with the Western-oriented historical or 
mission churches. This would therefore exclude the "protest movements" within the historical 
churches. This approach arises from Daneel's ( 1974: 13) earlier research findings that the 
majority of the members of the African Independent Churches never had links with the 
"historical" or "established" churches. Hayes (1992: 44) points out that Daneel's use of the 
terms "historical" and "independent" creates some problems. The African Independent 
Churches are not ahistorical; the Ethiopian Church is as independent from the Methodist 
Church as the latter was from the Church of England. Hayes ( 1992: 45) proposes to designate 
the AICs as African Initiated Churches (still abbreviated AICsl ), a designation which should 
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eliminate the idea of reaction to mission but, as Hayes admits, "the problem remains" because 
even when we designate such Churches as "African Initiated Churches", the context and 
motivation for su~h initiatives may be a form of reaction to the contact with the historical 
churches. 
Attempts to eliminate the element of negation are a futile exercise because both negation and 
affirmation are essential elements in theological discourse. One cannot use only one of them 
and ignore the other. Kritzinger (I988) has shown this in his evaluation of Black Theolob'Y· 
Maluleke (1994: 253) even goes so far as to argue that the Western theology which defends 
itself against the "negative" Black Theology is itself "negative in relation to the Christian 
Gospel". It would therefore seem that Daneei's suggestion (I 987: 3 I) of retaining the term 
"independent" (in spite of its negative connotation) should be accepted, even if only 
provisionally. 
Since Chief Matanzima wanted a Transkeian Church that would be run by Transkeians, this 
places the MCT in the category of churches which are "free from direct and effective 
European control", a definition that does not exclude prote-st movements within the "historical" 
. or "established" churches. For this reason, the typology of African Independent Churches is 
certainly relevant to the present study and will be employed in chapter 5 as one of the 
complementary perspectives. 
1.6 SOURCFS 
Since this study deals with a past event the maJor source of data has been the pnmary 
documents in an attempt to go back as closely as possible to the original event. To retrieve 
relevant information, minutes of meetings and newspaper reports were among the ·primary 
documents consulted. The four main sources of data are described below. 
~ 
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1.6.1 Printed mass media 
The Daily Dispatch ofEast London and !mvo ZabaNtsundu ofKing William's Town were the two 
main media sources as these newspapers usually give adequate coverage of events in Transkei. The 
official Methodist documents used were Dimension, a monthly Methodist newspaper printed in 
Johannesburg, and the Minutes of the various Methodist Conferences. 
1.6.2 Personal archives 
Here "personal archives" means church documents, like minutes of meetings, which have not been 
deposited in the church archives but kept by individuals as personal collections. Three sets of personal 
archives were used as sources. 
1.6.2.1 Fikeni Papers 
These are Rev. F.H.T. Fikeni's personal notes on some church meetings which he has kept as he was 
the Chairman2 of the Clarkebury District at the time of the schism (1978). In the study the reference 
"Fikeni Papers" is given to indicate information obtained from this source. 
1.6.2.2 Wilkins Papers 
Reverend Cyril Wilkins was the Secretary of the Conference (MCSA) at the time ( 1978). To keep 
the ministers of the MCSA well informed on the state of the Church, he periodically issued church 
circular letters from his office in the Methodist Connexional Office in Durban. This source is referred 
to as "Wilkins Papers" in the study. 
1.6.2.3 Lungu Papers (BMC and LSC Minutes) 
As Secretary of the Black Ministers' Consultation (BMC) (as it was called at the time before being 
changed to Black Methodist Consultation in 1980), Clarkebury District Branch and 
"?. 
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Secretary of the Lindikhaya Steering Committee (LSC), the author took notes, which he has 
kept. This source is referred to either as "BMC Minutes" or "LSC Minutes" followed by the 
date of the meeting. 
1.6.3 Inteaviews 
Additional information was obtained by interviewing people from the different groups which 
emerged during the process of the schism. This information was used to supplement what was 
obtained from primary documents. For instance, the researcher found that copies of MCSA 
press statements are no longer available at the Methodist Connexional Office. 
1.6.4 Oral sources 
However, much more information was obtained from general interaction with people who had 
been involved and were now able to stand back and reflect on what happened. Although it is 
not possible to mention any specific people in this regard, this interaction was found to be 
more informative than the interviews on specific issues. The MCT episode has become part 
of Methodist folklore for the laity and the ministers in Transkei. 
As the researcher was personally involved both as secretary at some meetings and as one of 
the participants in others, certain things are part of his memory. In the study use has been 
made of his personal recollection of events, debates and personalities where this has been 
deemed to furnish "missing factors" in matters of detail. Such information is acknowledged 
by the reference "Oral sources". In some cases remembrance and interpretation were checked 
by general interaction with other participants in the process of the schism. 
1.7 A REVIEW OF RELATED RESEARCH ON mE MCf 
To date (1995) only two academic research projects have been written on the subject: one at 
the University of Cape Town (Mahlasela 1986) and the other at FedSem3 (Makalima 1989). 
These study projects will now be reviewed i,n an attempt to determine how the researchers 
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categorised the MCT and how their approaches differ from this research. 
1.7.1 J.F.M. Mahlasela (1986) 
Mahlasela's study on the MCT was an "extended essay" in partial fulfilment of his BA (Hons) degree 
at UCT. The aim ofthe study was to examine the causes of the schism of the Transkei Church from 
the MCSA and the response of both Black and White members of the Methodist Church to the 
formation of the new Church (Mahlasela 1986:2). 
Mahlasela begins by probing into the Methodist missionary policy, especially Rev. William Shaw's 
"chain of mission stations" by which Methodism was established in Transkei. He concludes this 
section by noting (or agreeing with Mears 1973: 15) that it was a fine missionary effort (Mahlasela 
1986:4). However, he does not indicate whether the missionary policy contained within itself seeds 
for a later schism or whether the MCT was a betrayal of that missionary effort. 
He then identifies the deeper causes of the schism as: 
1. 7 .1.1 The MCSA 's acceptance of the viability of the homelands policy 
Mahlasela ( 1986:4) accuses the White Methodist Church of tacit admission of the viability of the 
homelands policy. This assumption or accusation is not argued in the essay. It would need to be, 
however, especially in the face of various Methodist Conferences' consistent rejection of the South 
African Government's homelands policy. For example, the 1977 Conference Resolution (MCSA 
1977: 192-193) states: "The Conference Is of the opinion that this policy is divisive and disrupting the 
mission and the unity of the church. The Conference calls upon the Prime Minister to reconsider the 
Homelands Policy before the consequences of this policy result in devastating effects on the nation 
as a whole." 
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1. 7. 1. 2 The triumph of "Xhosa ism" 
Mahlasela (1986:43) interprets the creation of the MCT as a triumph for ''Xhosaism". He uses this 
term to highlight the dominance of the Xhosa-speaking people in the MCSA and sees a connection 
between this "Xhosaism" in the MCSA and the fact that the Methodists who seceded are 
predominantly Xhosa-speaking. 
Mahlasela (1986:43) argues that "the fact that Transkei was the first Black National State within 
South Africa to opt for independence is another possible hypothesis which played not a minor role 
in the decision to opt for religious independence, which was inevitable for the so-called political 
independence". 
1. 7. 1. 3 Black aspirations for leadership 
Mahlasela ( 1986:3) notes that by 1971 "the idea of an indigenous, self-propagating, all African 
Christian Community within Methodism became a reality in Transkei". This was when the last White 
missionary had left the Clarkebury District. 
He then offers a detailed analysis of the administration ofthe MCSA, highlighting issues like the racial 
imbalances in leadership positions, racial representation in the District Synods and the Annual 
Conference, racial stipend scales and even the theological literature prescribed for probationer 
ministers. All these racial imbalances show a bias in favour of the White section of the MCSA. These 
racial imbalances are highlighted in order to argue that they could have contributed to the schism. 
However, he does not commit himself by stating categorically that this was, indeed, the case. It was 
not the intention ofthe Transkeian Methodists to "reform" the Methodist Church in Transkei (see 
2.14.5). 
1. 7. 1 . 4 Re.sponses 
Mahlasela then reviews the different responses by both the Black and the White Methodists 
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to the MCT. 
The responses of the Black members are contained in the resolutions taken by the Black 
Ministers' Consultation (BMC). In the BMC some expressed a sympathetic understanding of 
the schism while others denounced the action of the Transkeian Methodists for having "gone 
it alone" thereby damaging Black solidarity, which had a common experience of oppression 
within the MCSA (Mahlasela 1986: 28). The statement (BMC Minutes 1978) reads: 
... the banning of the Methodist Church of South Africa and the. forming of a 
Methodist Church of Transkei, failed to find sympathy and acceptance from Black 
Brethren. For: 
(a) In our opm10n, the action was taken too quickly and without sufficient 
opportunity for reflection by all concerned. 
(b) An action taken so precipitately would not give scope for inclusion of truly 
indigenous ingredients in the re-formed church. 
(c) Not sufficient consideration to the financial implications involved in the running 
of the envisaged church could have been given in such a short time. 
(d) It was felt that the move would lead to a severance of the solidarity and 
fellowship of Black people in their struggle for a meaningful place in the church. 
About half the volume of Mahlasela's essay deals with the MCT!UMCSA after 2 June 1978. 
This period is outside the scope of the present study. It would therefore not be proper to 
engage him in some issues which have not been addressed here. However, his study is quite 
informative on some issues. He highlights that the policy of the BMC was to work for the 
return of the MCT to the MCSA rather than for the creation of a Black Methodist Church and 
that the BMC also committed itself to work for the complete transformation of the MCSA into 
a truly non-racial Church (Mahlasela 1986: 31 ). 
With reference to the response by White members, Mahlasela (1986: 32) highlights the 
involvement of the top Executive of the MCSA (the President, ex-President, Secretary, and 
others) in the negotiations with the Transkeian Government for the lifting of the ban on the 
-------
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MCSA. The BMC Consultation felt that this kind of structure excluded "a meaningful Black 
representation in attempts at resolving this issue (the banning ofthe MCSA)" (Mahlasela 1986:29). 
From Mahlasela's presentation, three images of the MCT can be clearly identified: 
( 1) It is a quest for a Black Methodist Church which was shared by some BMC members as one 
delegate suggested, "Let us speak about the Black autonomous Methodist Church of South Africa 
... We will not say (to the Prime Minister ofTranskei) that we do not want the Methodist Church of 
· Transkei. What we will say to the Transkeians is that they must wait for us because we want to create 
a Black Church in S.A." (Mahlasela 1986:27). 
(2) It is an expression of Transkeianism (Mahlasela 1986:27). This image is presented in order to 
counter the first image. In Mahlasela's presentation this image is formed by the creation of "an 
indigenous ... all Afiican Christian community within Methodism", the Clarkebury District (Mahlasela 
1986:3) and "the first independeryt Black National State within South Africa", the Transkei 
(Mahlasela 1986:43). 
(3) It is an expression of "Xhosaism" (Mahlasela 1986:43). This represents Mahlasela's own views 
while the first two images represent views of some BMC participants. 
The author's assessment of these images is that Mahlasela's presentation could at best be characterised 
as showing the MCT as an attempt to promote Transkeianism. This image was ignored by both the 
BMC and Mahlasela; the BMC almost endorsed the formation of a Black Church but was deterred 
by the fact that the Transkei State had taken the initiative; Mahlasela belabours the point of the Xhosa 
dominance in the MCSA and yet all his Xhosa interviewees were Transkeians. Xhosaism should 
extend beyond the borders ofTranskei and that is exactly what ChiefMatanzima did not want except 
to include only the Transkeians. 
Mahlasela's essay does not adequately provide what it promises: an analysis ofthe response 
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of both Black and White to the formation of the new Church (1986:2). He succeeds in giving an 
analysis only ofthe BMC. How far the views of the BMC were an indication of the general feelings 
of the Black Methodists is difficult to ascertain. Equally problematic is his equating the "official" 
Church response (which he gives) with the White response. 
1.7.2 S.N. Makalima (1989) 
In the introduction to his study, which was an AFTS (Associate of the Federal Theological Seminary) 
essay submitted at Fedsem, Makalima (1989:1) declares that the "expectation in the minds ofmany 
was that the Methodist Church in Transkei would, for some time at least, continue as part of the 
Methodist Church of South Africa : .. as has been the case with Methodist Churches in Lesotho, 
Swaziland, Botswana and Mozambique. This expectation was shaken by the banning of the MCSA 
in Transkei in 1978." This statement indicates the perspective from which Makalima approaches the 
subject, namely to investigate why the Transkeian Methodists opted for breaking away from the 
MCSA. 
Makalima (1989: 1 0) is of the opinion that the MCT was orchestrated by some Methodist ministers 
who prevailed upon the Prime Minister to ban the MCSA even at the stage when ChiefMatanzima 
was prepared to drop the matter. 
In his dissertation Makalima approaches the subject from a historical and a biblical perspective and 
although he covers it fairly comprehensively, his review of the ten-year period is rather superficial and 
there are several inaccuracies. 
1. 7 .2.1 Historical approach 
Much use is made of the comparison between Henry VIII of England and ChiefMatanzima in their 
attempts to manipulate the church for their own personal gain (Makalima 1989:18, 38). Both had 
marriage problems and used the church to legitimise their matrimonial position. 
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The Transkei Marriage Act of 1978 was intended to legitimise Chief Matanzima's position. 
This issue will be taken up again in 2.14.4. 
1.7.2.2 Biblical approach 
The whole event is seen as a modern replica of the Babylonian captivity of the Jews. 
Makalima sees the ten-year period ( 1978-1988) as a period of suffering for those who had 
remained in the MCT/UMCSA. 
In his re-unification sermon on 31 July 1988, Rev. K.E. Mgojo used the same paradigm of the 
Babylonian Captivity, but to denounce the "prostitution" of the Methodist tradition by those 
who had remained in the MCT/UMCSA and refused to return to the MCSA. 
1.7.2.3 Makalima's review of the ten-year period 
This period (1978-1988), which (as he concedes) he was not able to penetrate sufficiently, 
receives very superficial treatment. He devotes more space to the talks for the reunification 
of the MCSA and the MCTIUMCSA than on what happened during the ten-year period. This 
superficial treatment of such an important period suggests that he had little sympathy for those 
who had formed the MCT in the first place, because (according to him) they had been 
motivated by personal ambition and self-interest (Makalima 1989: 8, I 0) but many people who 
suffered, especially some ministers, had not even been in the forefront during the period of 
the schism. His study seems to have been circumscribed by investigating the roles played by 
some individuals, like Gaba, Fikeni, Dabula and Lungu. His sympathy is for the lay people 
who had no option but to become part of the MCT/UMCSA and for those ministers who left 
Transkei when the MCT was formed (Makalima 1989: 14-16). 
Had Makalima taken more pains to research this period, his treatment of "the suffering during 
the period" would have enriched his study. He could have investigated the circumstances 
leading to the sacking of Rev. Gaba as the Secretary of the Conference, the church and civil 
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court cases against Revs Mavuma and Zweni, both of whom were Chairman of the Mfundisweni 
District but at different times. In terms of subject coverage, Makalima's study is fairly comprehensive, 
covering events from 1978 to 1988. However, several inaccuracies need to be pointed out. The 
following should be noted: 
1. 7.2.4lncorrect details 
Although most of the pertinent issues are dealt with, Makalima did not take enough pains to check 
some facts so that he could put them in their correct context. Consequently, there are several 
inaccuracies and this inevitably leads to faulty judgement. A few of these could be mentioned. 
First, Makalima uses what was said in June 1978 to explain Rev. Gaba's behaviour in April 1978. This 
anachronism is then used to support the view that the MCT was formed as a result of some Methodist 
ministers in Transkei who rejected the discipline of their Church (Makalima 1989: 10-11 ). 
Secondly, he (1989: 1 0) refers to a clandestine meeting which was held on 21 March 1978 in the 
village of Ngqeleni. In fact, the meeting held on 21 March 1978 was of the BMC and was not 
clandestine at all (see 2.7.7). IfMakalima wanted to refer to the meeting which the Daily Dispatch 
regarded as "secret", that one was held in Buntingville on 14 February 1978 (see 2.7.3). 
Thirdly, he states ( 1989: 12) that Rev. Fikeni claimed on 25 April 1978 that "in the New Church he 
was made Treasurer which amounted to little more than a Bookkeeper.. .. Thus from a position of 
authority in the Church as Chairman of the Clarkebury District he had been reduced to nothing but 
a mediocre status." Reverend Fikeni could not have said that on 25 April 1978 because at that time 
he was still the Chairman of the Clarkebury District and the new Church of which he later became 
Treasurer, had not yet been born. 
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Finally, he (1989: 16) says that "Rev. Mbabane's belongings had to be moved out of the manse and 
Lungu's furniture [moved] in.:. His entire property was seized by the Transkei Police and later by the 
New Church". 
Reverend Mbabane remained in the main manse for some days after the arrival of Rev. Lungu, who 
occupied the second manse (which had previously been occupied by the Church agricultural officer). 
When Rev. Mbabane eventually moved out, the removal truck with his personal belongings was 
intercepted by the Transkeian Police, who ordered it to return to the Lay Centre because its load 
included 17 wardrobes, cutlery and other property ofthe Centre. 
Reverend Mbabane's belongings were finally released to Mr Guzana in October 1978 when he 
produced Rev. Mbabane's personal inventory (Oral sources). Makalima's weakness seems to have 
been his failure to interview relevant people on specific issues. Nowhere in his paper is a specific issue 
attributed to a particular interviewee. The names of interviewees appear only in his bibliography. 
1. 7.3 A general assessment of the two research projects 
The MCT schism is a very important episode in the history of the Church in South Africa and 
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particularly of the MCSA. Any study, from whatever perspective, should therefore evoke some 
interest. Both Mahlasela and Makalima's studies provide this quite sufficiently. 
Mahlasela focuses on the responses of both Black and White Methodists to the schism in Transkei 
and sees the schism as an indictment on the racial practices of the MCSA. Makalima focuses on the 
personal interests of both ChiefMatanzima and some Transkeian Methodist ministers _who sacrificed 
the unity of the Church. 
Studies ofthis nature should involve more than focusing on the perceived harm done to the Church 
and should also investigate the contexts in which actions take place. The two researchers, especially 
Makalima, seem to have simply arrived at their conclusions without 
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first analysing the dynamics at play. Although both researchers are interpreting the Methodist 
schism in Transkei, they approach the issue from perspectives which are outside Transkei and 
therefore out of context. Since Mahlasela's approach was intended to be so, his deficiency on 
the Transkei perspective is understandable. 
One of the main aims of this study is to give a detailed account of how the schism happened 
and to analyse the factors contributing to the process of the schism. This should also serve to 
fill in some of the missing elements in the studies of Mahlasela and Makalima. A Transkei 
perspective should (hopefully) throw more light on the issue. 
1.8 STRUCfURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is organised around the four research questions formulated in 1.4. Chapter I Is a 
general introduction to the scope, approach and method of the study. 
Chapter 2 addresses the first research question: How did the 1978 Methodist schism in 
Transkei unfold? This is answered by means of a detailed historical description (narrative) of 
the process of the schism. 
Chapter 3 addresses the second research question: What factors played a role in the schism? 
This is answered by considering the ecclesial context of the Methodist practice of church 
greetings to the Heads of State and the political context of the Transkeian Government's need 
for the recognition of Transkeian independence. 
Chapter 4 addresses the third research question: How did different loyalties interact in the 
process of the schism? This is answered by identifying and analysing the different loyalties 
which emerged during the schism and divided the Transkeian Methodists. 
Chapter 5 addresses the fourth research question: What type of church schism was the MCT? 
This is answered by considering the causal and typological models of the AIC movement to 
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see into which model the MCT fits. 
Chapter 6 concludes the study by considering some missiological issues raised by the Methodist 
schism in Transkei. 
ENDNOTES 
1. The Methodist Church of South Afiica was renamed the Methodist Church of Southern Africa 
towards the end of 1978. 
2. The episcopal designation of Bishop was introduced in the MCSA towards the end of 1988. 
Before then the highest official iri a Methodist District was designated as Chairman of the District 
presently the District Bishop and the highest official of the MCSA was the President of Conference 
presently the Presiding Bishop. At the time of the study there were no women ministers in the MCSA 
and the Chairman of a :Oistrict who was not a male was therefore unthinkable. The sexist language 
will therefore be retained to conform with the ideas of the time. ·· 
3. Federal Theological Seminmy of Southern Africa 
This institution was established in 1963 in Alice. It trained ministers of the Anglican (CPSA), 
Methodist (MCSA), Presbyterian (PCSA, Tsonga P.C. etc.), and Congregational churches. In 1975 
the South African government expropriated the FedSem property in Alice, ostensibly because it 
needed more land for the expansion of the University of Fort Hare. 
The FedSem was then moved to Umtata where it was temporarily accommodated in the glebe of St 
Bede's Theological College (CPSA). In 1974 the Seminary students held a pro-Frelimo rally to 
celebrate Mozambique's independence from Portugal. This rally offended Chief Matanzima who 
accused the FedSem of spreading dangerous leftist ideologies in Transkei and threatened to take 
action against St Bedes Theological College unless it expelled the FedSem from its grounds (Streek 
& Wicksteed 1980:274t). The FedSem was then re-located to Imbali Township near 
Pietermaritzburg. 
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CHAPTER2 
A STORY OF THE SCHISM 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
As indicated in 1. 7, this is the third research project to date (1995) on the 1978 Methodist schism 
in Transkei. The main difference between this study and the earlier projects by Mahlasela ( 1986) 
and Makalima ( 1989) is that my intention is to "tell a detailed story" of the process of the schism 
in this chapter while chapters 3, 4 and 5 will be analytical in nature. 
In telling this story a narrative approach (see 1. 5. 1) will be used to describe the actual process 
ofthe schism. It is essential to tell the story ofthe 1978 Methodist schism in Transkei since no 
detailed account has been given before. Any interpretation of the schism (including this one) must 
be based on a detailed description of what actually happened, analysing the role of different 
parties and the issues debated. 
The story in this study begins, then, with the press statement of the Prime Minister of Transkei 
on 12 January 1978 in Umtata and ends with the ultimate banning of the Methodist Church of 
South Africa in Transkei on 2 June 1978 and the formation of the Methodist Church of Transkei 
on the same day. This was a very active period with different parties interacting on a number of 
issues at different meetings. Appendix I provides a diagram to facilitate an understanding of the 
sequence of events. 
2.2 THE POSITION STATEMENTS 
The process of the schism was triggered off on 12 January 1978 when the Prime Minister made 
a statement to which the top executive1 of the Methodist Church of South Africa (MCSA) 
reacted by its own statement on 16 January 1978. The two statements will be juxtaposed below 
so that the issues involved can be seen together from both points of view. 
Prime Minister's Statement: 
12-01-1978 
I: The Dimension (November 7, 1977) reports that "a 
Conference of the Church (MCSA) ... had decided to 
discontinue sending messages of goodwill and loyalty 
to the State President of South Africa because it would 
involve sending similar messages to the Transkei 
President. This would militate against the views of the 
Methodist clergy who were opposed to and did not 
recognise the independence ofT ranskei." 
2: The decision the Govemment has taken (to ban the 
MCSA) only concems the Methodist Church of South 
Ati·ica and will have no bearing whatsoever on the 
other churches in Transkei. 
3: It was clear that the Methodist Church of South em 
Afiica was taking instructions from the World Council 
of Churches which had openly declared its opposition 
to the recognition ofTranskei 2 
4: "The Govemment has no intention whatsoever of 
inteifering with the religious activities of its subjects 
but has a duty to protect the integrity and dignity of the 
Head of State, Govenunent and the people of 
Transkei." 
5: ... the Cabinet has resolved to pass a law tlu·ough 
Parliament banning the Methodist Church of South 
Ati-ica in Transkei. An Act would also be passed to 
establish the Methodist Church of Transkei which 
would have circuits in Transkei and in South African 
work centres where Transkeians were employed. A 
meeting will discuss the ways and means of takjng over 
U1e assets and liabilities of the church in Transkei, and 
taking control by drawing up a constitution !or the 
church . . . members of the Methodist Church of 
Southem Africa would be expelled ti·om Transkei. 
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MCSA Statement: 
16-01-1978 
I: The growing complexity of the political situation in 
the nations served by this church has made it more and 
more difficult for the Conference to send letters of 
greetings in their traditional fotm. The Conference, 
therefore, decided to discontinue the practice of 
sending these letters. In the debate on this issue, some 
of those who spoke said that they themselves did not 
recognise Transkei. This, however, was not the issue 
before the Conference and the independence of 
Transkei \Vas not debated. 
2: The Methodist Church of South Ati·ica has a long 
and very honourable histOI)' of loyal service m 
Transkei and other parts of Southem Africa. 
3: We strongly reject suggestions that the Methodist 
Church of South Ati-ica takes instructions from the 
World Council of Churches or any other body. The 
Methodist Church of South Africa is completely 
autonomous, making its decisions in the light of its 
understanding of the will of God as revealed through 
Holy Scripture. 
4: Let us continue to serve our Lord Jesus Clu-ist and 
to proclaim His Gospel, recognising Him as the Head 
of His people in eve!)' nation. 
5: We believe that we can serve the people of 
Sou them Africa best in the name of God by remaining 
undivided. 
6: The Methodists in Transkei should be calm and 6: We commend this matter to the prayers of our 
continue their services as if nothing has happened. people: 
(Daily Dispatch, 13 January 1978:1 ). (Fikeni Papers- see Appendix II) 
··--~-
! 
I. 
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This dialogue through the press did not resolve the issue. Then personal contact \Vas made 
through a meeting between the MCSA delegation and the Transkei Cabinet on 26 January 1978. 
This meeting did not go beyond clarifying their respective positions, which had already been 
explained by their respective statements. 
The Transkeian Government restated its position in a meeting on 31 January 1978. The meeting 
was called by the Prime Minister of Transkei through the Chairman of Clarkebury District. By 
this meeting the Prime Minister wanted to convey to the Transkeian Methodist ministers his 
intention to have the MCSA banned in Transkei and to replace it by the formation of the 
Methodist Church of Transkei. 
2.3 MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE METHODIST MINISTERS 
This meeting was held at the Ncambedlana Lay Centre, Umtata on 31 January 1978. In 
attendance were the Transkeian Methodist ministers appointed to circuits both in Transkei and 
the Republic of South Africa and non-Transkeian Methodist ministers appointed to circuits in 
Transkei. The non-Transkeian Methodist ministers were White ministers appointed to White 
circuits within Transkei Methodist Districts (Clarkebury and Queenstown), like Butterworth, 
U mtata, Kokstad and Matatiele, and non-Transkeian Black ministers appointed to circuits in 
Transkei, such as Xhosas from the Eastern Cape and/or Ciskei, Zulus from Natal and elsewhere 
in the Republic of South Africa, and non-Transkeian Sothos. 
Reverend F. H. T. Fikeni3 presided over the meeting. The Prime Minister was accompanied by 
Cabinet Ministers T. Letlaka, R. Madikizela and H. Pamla and other government officials. 
The Prime Minister delivered his speech in Xhosa. The substance thereof was the same as his 
press statement of 12 January 1978 (see 2.2). 
During question time Rev. H.L. Qambela criticised the Prime Minister for what he termed a 
"defective vision" and suggested that the Prime Minister should have considered banning all the 
White Churches so that a United Church ofTranskei could be formed (Oral sources). 
The Prime Minister responded by saying, 
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Other Christian churches such as the Catholics, Anglicans and Presbyterians would not 
have the same action applied to them as they had not tampered in politics as the 
Methodist Church had .... We cannot pay our money to a conference where we will be 
insulted. I have every reason to believe the Methodist Church of South Africa has 
communication with the World Council of Churches. We cannot have divided loyalties. 
The Church is an autonomous body, but must not interfere with the State (Daily 
Dispatch, February 1, 1978:1 ). 
Reverend R.I. Thompson, fluent in Xhosa, who had been the last White Chairman of the 
Clarkebury District (Mears 1973:73) and was already retired, expressed concern over the corning 
Bill to establish the Methodist Church of Transkei, maintaining that the South African 
Government had never legislated for the existence of a church in South Africa. 4 He was 
convinced that the banning of the MCSA would be too severe a blow to a church which had done 
a great deal of good work in Transkei, especially in the field of education (Oral sources). 
Mr Letlaka, an Anglican and former Pan Africanist Congress member, who had returned from 
exile and joined the Matanzima Government as Minister of Finance, responded to this by saying 
that "Mr Thompson's speech was typical missionary talk. Transkeians did not owe anything to 
. the missionaries" (Daily Dispatch, February 1, 1978:1 ). The missionaries "came here and were 
accepted by Transke"ians when they brought the Word of God. This did not give them any 
mandate to dominate the scene. All we are asking the Methodist Church is that it must: not 
interfere" (lmvo ZabaNtsundu, February 11, 1978:4). Referring to King Henry VIII5 ofEngland, 
who broke away from the Roman Catholic Church to establish the Church ofEngland in 1534 
(see 5.5.5), Mr Letlaka went on to say that it was not true that "churches were not formed by the 
State. The Church of England was formed by the Government and King of Britain .... [The 
Transkeian Government was] going to legislate, and not the South African Government, for a 
church in an independent country. The proposed bill was intended to obviate the conflict of 
loyalties" (Jmvo ZabaNtsundu, February 11, 1978:4). He maintained that it was also wrong to 
say the Government would be interfering with the church because the Methodist Church had 
shown it was "politically motivated" (Daily Dispatch, January 13, 1978:1). 
Then Rev. Thompson suggested that the two parties concerned liaise in an effort to resolve the 
issue peacefully. Mr Letlaka's response was that both parties were united in the move to 
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b h d h "M h d. . . k. bJ . k h an t e MCSA an that t e et o 1st m1msters were rna mg a 1g m1sta e to say t ey 
were dealing with a party as far as the matter is concerned" (!mvo ZabaNtsundu, February 
11, 1978:4). In support of his claim, he quoted the comments of Mr Cromwell Diko, leader 
of the Opposition in the Transkei Parliament, and of Dr Lennox Sebe of Ciskei, who was by 
no means a friend of Transkei. 
During the heated exchange between Rev. Thompson and Mr Letlaka, it became obvious that 
when Rev. Thompson spoke of the ''parties", he had the Government of Transkei and the 
MCSA in mind but Mr Letlaka understood the term in the political sense of meaning political 
parties. Streek and Wicksteed (1980:277) suggest that this was a typical Mantanzima strategy, 
which Mr Letlaka had learnt too well - the misunderstanding may have been deliberate. 
Mr Pamla then challenged Rev. Thompson to explain the existence of the two Methodist 
churches in Umtata within one mile of each other: the Leeds Road Methodist Church for 
Blacks and the Frere Road Methodist Church for Whites (Jmvo ZahaNtsundu, February 11, 
1978:4). Reverend Thompson had no answer. 
Mr Pamla went on to argue that Transkei was non-racial in almost all aspects of its life with 
the exception of the Church and that such an anomaly had to stop. He also said "We know 
that the Methodist Church of South Africa is legally White in South Africa although the 
majority of its members are Africans" (!mvo ZahaNtsundu, February 11, 1978:4). 
Responding to a question from Rev. A.F. Diko on how people could be convinced to join 
a Church which had been formed by a State, the Prime Minister said the Transkeian ministers 
who were stationed in the Republic of South Africa should simply sing, "Noyana ... "6 and 
make the announcement ''The Chief says ... ". People would listen and respond positively 
because they still respected their chiefs. Most Black people in Cape Town were the 
AbaThembu and most in Durban were the AmaMpondo. Most Xhosa-speaking people m 
. Aliwal North (where Rev. Diko was stationed) were the AbaThembu of the Hala clan. 
He went on to say there should be no mistake, he was not suggesting a State church as in 
the case of the Church of England since this "Methodist Church would be allowed to operate 
-:."""':: ··-
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as an autonomous body in Transkei and its constitution would not be interfered with" (Daily 
Dispatch, January 13, 1978: I) because "what Transkeians wanted was an independent 
Transkei Methodist Church to be run by Black Trariskeians and free from the foreign White 
domination of the Methodist Church of South Africa [but] the Whites can stay in our church 
and they will be accepted in one Transkei Methodist Church" (Imvo ZahaNtsundu, February 
II, 1978:4). 
Reverend Tom Mbabane then requested that the Prime Minister leave the matter to the 
ministers, who would pursue it through ecclesiastical channels. The Prime Minister promised 
to consider the request and said Parliament would still pass legislation enabling it to ban the 
Methodist Church of South Africa and form an independent Methodist Church of Transkei. 
However, the Bill would be delayed if the ministers came forward and made their stand on 
the matter clear. The step taken by the Transkei Cabinet was in the interest of the Methodist 
Church followers and their ministers in Transkei (!mvo ZahaNtsundu, February ll, 1978:4). 
Reverend Fikeni then called upon Rev. Dr E.K. Mgojo, a lecturer at the Federal Theological 
Seminary in Pietermaritzburg at the time, to pass a vote of thanks. Dr Mgojo thanked the 
Prime Minister for inviting the ministers to a consultation on such a serious issue, something 
the Vorsters of South Africa would never dream of doing (a reference to Mr B.J. Vorster, 
Prime Minister of South Africa at the time). A long ovation endorsed Dr Mgojo's speech. 
2.4 METHODIST MINISTERS' SESSION 
After the Prime Minister and his entourage left, the ministers re~ained to discuss the matter. 
Their aim was to formulate their response to the Prime Minister's intention of banning the 
Methodist Church of South Africa and having a Methodist Church of Transkei formed. 
Reverend Fikeni presided over the meeting with Rev. Tom Mbabane recording . 
. Three proposals were put forward and duly discussed. The first came from Rev. Mvume 
Dandala who said the envisaged Methodist Church of Transkei would essentially be a Black 
Church and argued that a breakaway by only the Transkeian section of the Methodist Church 
of South Africa would not only harm it but also be very damaging to Black solidarity. He 
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proposed that the matter therefore be referred to the Black Ministe~s' Consultation (BMCf, 
a Black caucus within the Methodist Church of South Africa, formed by Rev. E.N. Baartman 
and Rev. Dr Mgojo in 1975 to act as a pressure group challenging the racist practices of the 
MCSA (Ba1ia 1991 ). Reverend Dr Mgojo, Secretary of the Black Ministers' Consultation, 
rejected this proposal, pointing out that the BMC had no locus standi in the Church as the 
polity of the MCSA did not make provision for the existence and operations of a body like 
the BMC. 
The second came from Rev. W.B.S. Gaba, who pointed out that the ministers of the Church 
were its bona fide leaders and even the Prime Minister had recognised that fact hence his 
inviting only the ·ministers to his meeting. The ministers should therefore express their 
opinion on the issue. 
The third proposal came from Rev. A.G. Mposelwa, who suggested that the matter be 
referred to another meeting attended by both the ministers and the circuit stewards. He 
pointed out moreover (in response to Rev. Gaba's proposal perhaps) that the Church, in fact, 
belongs to the laity and it was therefore their sole right to express a decisive opinion on the 
ISSUe. 
The meeting finally settled for Rev. Mposelwa's suggestion, which led to the meeting of 21 
February 1978. 
2.5 MEETING OF MINISTERS AND LAY LEADERS, 21 FEBRUARY 1978 
This meeting was held at the Ncambedlana Lay Centre in Umtata. 
2.5.1 Constitution 
.In attendance were the Transkeian and non-Transkeian Methodist ministers appointed to the 
three Transkeian Methodist Districts of Clarkebury (circuits east of the Bashee River up to 
the Natal border of the Umzimkulu River but including East Griqualand [Kokstad and 
Matatiele, which are in Natal]), Queenstown (circuits west of the Bashee River up to the Kei 
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River), and Kimberley and Bloemfontein (circuits in the north-west of Transkei [Herschel 
magisterial district]) (see map, Appendix III), circuit stewards and some prominent lay 
people, who were neither circuit stewards nor members of the District Synods and/or 
Conference, but were regarded as prominent Methodists in their own personal capacity, from 
the three Methodist Districts. 
Reverend F.H.T. Fikeni, Chairman of the Clarkebury District, presided over the meeting with 
Rev. T.B. Mbabane, then Secretary of the Clarkebury District Synod, recording. Reverend 
Fikeni read a telegram banning the foreigners from the meeting (see 2 7.2). The telegram, 
signed by Transkei's Minister of Justice, read "Prime Minister has directed that all church 
meetings of the Methodist Church in Transkei be for Transkeians only. Foreigners attending 
will be dealt with" (Dimension, 5 March 1978: 1). Having read the telegram, Rev. Fikeni 
asked all the non-Transkeians to recuse themselves from the meeting in compliance with the 
banning order. Nobody left the hall but some people simply moved back to occupy seats 
along the wall near the entrance (Oral sources). 
2.5.2 Mr K.M.N. Guzana vs Mr M.V.D. Lila 
Mr Guzana, a lawyer and member of the Methodist Conference, challenged Mr Lila, a former 
minister of the MCSA who had resigned in 1974 for personal reasons and was then working 
for the Transkei Government in the Department of Foreign Affairs, to withdraw from the 
meeting because he was neither a minister nor a circuit steward. Some delegates pointed out 
that there were several other people in the meeting who did not qualify in terms of that 
criterion (Fikeni Papers). 8 Reverend D.O. Dabula referred the meeting to the order paper 
which extended the invitation to "ministers, circuit stewards and other prominent Methodists 
to attend the meeting"- He then pointed out that, although Mr Lila was neither a minister nor 
a circuit steward, there was no criterion by which he could be denied the status of a 
prominent Methodist, if he perceived himself as such (Oral sources). 
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2.5.3 Mr Guzana on the "secret meetings" 
Mr Guzana then challenged the ministers to tell the truth and declare their stand on the "secret 
meetings" which had been reported in the February 15 and 16 editions of the Daily Dispatch 
newspaper. The reports had disclosed that there had been "secret meetings" of ministers who were 
for the "nationalisation" of the Methodist Church in Transkei. 
Reverend Dabula responded by reminding the meeting that it had been convened to discuss a very 
serious matter and not to investigate "secret meetings" and should proceed with its valid agenda (Oral 
sources). 
Although Mr Guzana did not pursue the matter any further, he did not abandon his witch hunt for the 
ministers who had attended the "secret meetings" and persisted in taunting the ministers throughout 
the meeting to declare how they felt about the "secret meetings" and whether they had attended. Mr 
Lila remained in the hall for the duration of the meeting. 
2.5.4 Objectives of the meeting 
Reverend Fikeni then reviewed the events leading up to the meeting of 21 February 1978, starting 
with the Prime Minister's press statement on 12 January 1978, the Methodist Church of South Africa's 
official reaction (see 2.2) and a report ofthe MCSA delegations to the Transkei Government on 26 
January and 16 February 1978. Reverend Fikeni emphasised that the Prime Minister was adamant 
about introducing a Bill at the next Parliamentary session in February 1978 and was urgently awaiting 
the Church's reaction to his intentions. 
2.5.5 Report on the 1977 Benoni Conference 
The Chairman then reported on the 1977 MCSA Conference debate on the issue of greetings. The 
report was substantially similar to the MCSA position statement in section 2.2. above. 
--·~---
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2.5.6 The Dimension report 
The questions of why the Church had.not corrected the statement made by a reporter from Dimension 
and what the Church had done about the reporter were raised. It was pointed out that reporters are 
free to report what they regard as news as long as they complied with the rules of journalism (Fikeni 
Papers). 
2.5.7 Rev. W.B.S. Gaba vs Rev. Dr E.K. Mgojo 
After Rev. Fikeni called for comments Rev. Dr Mgojo suggested that the idea of forming the 
Methodist Church ofTranskei should be rejected because, in his theological view, the idea of a church 
formed by the State was theologically unheard of, wrong and a sin. 
Reverend Gaba was outraged at this and the first to respond: · 
Ungasifaki emgxobhozweni mfondini! (Don't push us into a quagmire!) The issue is not 
theological at all! This is an issue of administration. Do we cease to be Methodists if we 
become the Methodist Church ofTranskei? What is the theological justification for having the 
Methodist Connexional Office in Durban served by an all-White staff? To me, the issue is very 
clear: it is the issue of Transkei independence. Come out clearly, all of you who are in the 
Republic of South Africa. Do you recognise the independence of Transkei or not? (Oral 
sources). 
An uproar broke out as many appealed to Rev. Gaba. He protested and addressed the Chairman, "No, 
no, no. Mr Chairman, these people must come out clearly. We who are in Transkei are now in this 
mess because ofTranskei independence ... " (Oral sources). It was also argued that faith, the Kingdom 
of God, Scripture, theology and church history were irrelevant to the issue and should therefore be 
put aside. The problem was that of administration (Fikeni Papers). 
Against this view it was argued that the intended formation of the Methodist Church of Transkei 
could not be supported by Scripture, theology or any models of church history. 
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Church autonomy was not bad per se, provided the Methodists in Transkei asked for it if and 
when they were ready for it. The case of the Methodist Church of Zimbabwe, which was 
granted autonomy by the British Methodist Conference in 1977, was cited to illustrate the 
point. Church autonomy should therefore not be imposed by the State. 
State sponsored autonomy would cripple the Church's witness as it would not be able to say 
"Thus says the Lord .. ". Besides, a church created by the State would be denied fellowship 
with the rest of the Christian community (Fikeni Papers). 
2.5.8 Resolutions 
A suggestion was then made that formal resolutions be tabled. The first motion came from 
Mr Guzana: 
In the light of the request from the Prime Minister of the Transkei for a reaction from 
the Church to his decision to ban the Methodist Church of South Africa and establish 
the Methodist Church of Transkei, this body sitting today (21/2/ 1978) decides that, 
as it is still part of the Methodist Church of South Africa, it cannot make a final 
decision and therefore refers this matter to Conference through Synod (Fikeni Papers). 
He was seconded by Mr Jolobe. In support of this motion Mr Guzana maintained that 
Christians are part of the Church, which is the Body of Christ. We could not be chopped 
away without suffering the effects. Compartmentalisation of the Church along colour lines 
was scripturally unsupportable (Fikeni Papers). 
The second motion came from Mr H.M. Canca, circuit steward of Osborn Circuit, who had 
moved the motion asking for Transkei independence in the Transkei Legislative Assembly 
(see 3.3 .4.3): "I move that this meeting should accept the idea of creating the Methodist 
·Church of Transkei". He was seconded by Rev. N. Jafta (Fikeni Papers). In support of his 
motion Mr Canca maintained that ''it would be useless to oppose the formation of the 
Methodist Church of Transkei as that would not change the decision of the Prime Minister 
and his Cabinet to ban the Methodist Church of South Africa in Transkei. As an independent 
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state, Transkei needs its own Church" (Fikeni Papers). 
A prolonged debate over the first motion followed. Reverend Gaba argued that Rev. 
Mbabane's amendment of Mr Guzana's motion (by adding the words ·' ... as we are still part 
of the Methodist Church ... refer the matter to Conference through Synod") had made the first 
motion substantially the same as the second. The two motions could now be read together 
as follows: 
We accept the formation of the Methodist Church of Transkei in principle (Motion 
2) and since we are still part of the Methodist Church of South Africa, we refer the 
matter to Conference through Synod (Motion l) (Oral sources). 
Accepting Rev. Gaba's reasoning, some members suggested it was not necessary to vote on 
the two motions but they should be read as one in the manner Rev. Gaba had suggested and 
then presented to the Prime Minister. 
Both Mr Guzana and Rev. Mbabane rejected Rev. Gaba's reasoning and insisted on a vote 
on the motions. While Rev. Dandala was still pursuing the argument that the motions were 
substantially the same and that voting for either did not imply rejecting the other, the 
Chairman called for votes for motion 2. Mr Guzana hastily responded to Rev. Dandala by 
saying: "Mfundisi, this is quite simple. If you were in Buntingville [a reference to the ·secret 
meetings'], you have to vote for motion 2" (Oral sources). 
The first motion (proposed by Mr Guzana) was carried by 70 votes to 40 (Fikeni Papers). 
Amidst considerable excitement, some delegates were heard to shout·' Buntingville defeated!" 
and the meeting settled down with a great deal of difficulty as many of the delegates were 
still emotionally excited (Oral sources). 
2~5.9 The Interim Committee 
It was then decided to appoint an Interim Committee that would accompany the Chairman 
of the District whenever he was called by the Prime Minister. The committee consisted of 
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Revs F.H.T. Fikeni (Convenor), T.B. Mbabane (Secretary), E.K. Mgojo, T.Z.A. Bam and W.B.S. 
Gaba, and Messrs K.M.N. Guzana, J.N. Bam and H.M. Canca. 
2.6 THE CLARKEBURY DISTRICT SPECIAL SYNOD, 21 FEBRUARY 1978 
When the meeting of ministers and lay leaders (2.5) had ended, Reverend Fikeni went on to constitute 
a Ministerial Session of the Clarkebury District Special Synod. His reason for this special synod was 
that he had received a petition signed by nine ministers (Revs H. Dzingwe, A.S. Fadane, W.B.S. 
Gaba, P.P. Mjali, A.G. Mposelwa, R.D. Ntatu, J.N. Silwanyana, P.M. Waqu and E.S. Zihlangu 
(Dzingwe 1991) of the District demanding that he convene a District Special Synod to explain the 
suspension ofthree District ministers (Revs W. Mazule, N. Mrubata and W.C. Zweni) by the 1977 
Methodist Annual Conference. 
The main objectives of this Special Synod are not relevant to this study therefore only the schism will 
be considered. Mr C.S. Mda, Leader ofthe Opposition Party in the Transkei Parliament, said in 
Parliament that ministers who refused to submit to the discipline oftheir (Methodist) Church had 
forced the Prime Minister to ban their Church (Daily Di::;patch~ 16 June 1978). Makalima (1989) 
accepts this view, but the author does not (see 3.4.5). 
At the Special Synod two senior ministers, Revs G.G.K. Madikiza and L.T. Nkamba, asked the 
Chairman to comment on the media disclosure of ''secret meetings" in the District and Black 
Ministers' Consultation activities going on which sought to undermine his authority in the District. 
Reverend Fikeni angrily denounced the existence of the BMC in a District that was already under 
Black control. He pointed out that the BMC was a thorn in the flesh not only of the Clarkebury 
District but of the whole Church. But he did concede that, although the BMC had no official standing 
in the Church, its existence was well known. 
Reverends Madikiza and Nkamba then denounced the BMC for meddling carelessly in serious church 
issues. They argued that the tone of the discussions earlier that day on the issue of the MCSA ban was 
evidence of this meddling. 
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2.7 TilE ROLE OF TilE BMC 
At this point it is necessary to go back a few steps in order to explain why and how the 
BMC became controversial. After the meeting of 31 January 1978 some ministers of the 
Clarkebury District felt that the meeting had not treated the issue of the impending ban with 
the urgency it deserved. In addition, others felt having to wait for 21 days (from 3 i January 
to 21 February 1978) to know the direction of events was unbearably long. They then 
requested the Clarkebury District BMC branch executive to convene a meeting where they 
could discuss the issue. 
In preparation for that meeting, which was scheduled for 14 February 1978, the Clarkebury-
Queenstown BMC executive decided to consult with Rev. Dr Mgojo, who was then the 
Secretary of the Connexional (national) BMC. 
2.7.1 The BMC Executive visit to Rev. Dr Mgojo 
A delegation, consisting of Revs D.D. Dabula, C.A.N. Bubesi and F. de Waal Mahlasela of 
the Queenstown District and W.B.S. Gaba and M.T. Lungu of the Clarkebury District, went 
to Pietermaritzburg on 8 February 1978. 
The delegation was given ~ very cold reception by Dr Mgojo. Piecing together information 
from him and a certain Mr Ntloko, a Methodist lawyer (whom they met separately), the 
delegation gained a clear impression that the idea of the formation of an MCT was 
unacceptable to the two men. They were also informed that the MCSA was planning to send 
prominent Methodist theologians to the meeting on 21 February 1978 to guide the thinking 
of the meeting.9 
These revelations raised some questions in the minds of the BMC delegation: 
(I) Was the decision to defer adopting a position on the matter so that the laity could 
have a decisive say in the issue (ie, the proposal made by Rev Mposelwa at the meeting on 
31 January 1978 [see 2.4]) merely a pretext or a Trojan horse to bring in White theologians 
to guide the thinking of the Blacks? 
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(2) At what stage would Blacks have a right to decide on 1ssues that affected them 
directly? 
The delegation returned to Transkei angry and with the feeling that Rev Dr Mgojo had done 
an about-turn. 10 
2.7.2 The telegram banning the "foreigner~" 
In some way Chief George Matanzima (Minister of Justice) obtained this information and 
that was the background to his telegram banning all ''foreigners" from attending the meeting 
on 21 February 1978. On 10 February 1978 he sent a telegram to Rev Fikeni, Chairman of 
the Clarkebury District, banning any foreigner from attending the meeting. As reported in 
Dimension (5 March 1978: I), the telegram read'' Prime Minister has directed that all church 
meetings of the Methodist Church in Transkei be for Transkeians only Foreigners attending 
them will be dealt with." 
This telegram caused waves of alarm among the Methodist hierarchy and many of the lay 
people. It was seen as an indication that the Transkei Government was determined to ban the 
MCSA. Reverend Hendricks, the President of the Conference, was the first to concede this 
possibility although he did cautiously point out that ''it has to be honestly stated at this point 
that things have not gone as well as we had hoped. The situation is most unhappy and 
disturbing" (Dimension, 5 March 1978: 1 ). 
The "foreigners" who were banned from the meeting were the MCSA President himself, any 
White ministers (including those stationed in the Umtata, Butterworth, Kokstad and Matatiele 
circuits) who were working in Transkei circuits and any Black ministers who were not 
Transkeian citizens. Since this telegram and its use of the term "foreigners" proved to be a 
decisive turning point in the process leading up to the schism, it will be dealt with in 6.4. 
2.7.3 The Buntingville BMC meeting 
This Clarkebury District BMC branch meeting was held in Buntingville on 14 February 1978 
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and was attended by 22 ministers 11 from the Clarkebury and Queenstown Districts. Reverend W.B.S. 
Gaba presided with Rev. M.T. Lungu recording. The meeting was intended as a think-tank to 
formulate a common stand among the ministers before meeting the lay leaders on 21 February 1978 
(see 2.4). This was in pursuance of Rev. Gaba's suggestion that the ministers were the people who 
had to take the initiative in responding to the crisis; a suggestion which had been rejected by the 
meeting on J 1 January 1978 (see 2.4). In support ofthis view Rev. Dabula pointed out that at the 
meeting on 21 February the lay people would outnumber the ministers by a ratio of 3: 1. 12 It was thus 
imperative that the ministers have a strong strategy for the meeting since they were the group likely 
to be affected most by the impending ban. 
Reverend Gaba raised the manner in which negotiations to settle the dispute between the Transkeian 
Government and the top leadership of the Methodist Church of South Africa had been conducted. He 
felt that what was needed was to send a man who was an expert in tribal protocol, like 
Nyikiny'ubhoxo (Rev. N. Jafta), to Paramount ChiefMatanzima to say, "Ngxe ... ngxe ... Mhlekazi" 
(Sorry ... sorry ... Sir ... ). This is based on the notion that you do not need to explain anything to a 
Chief; you simply apologise, even for wrongs you have not done. 
Formal proposals on a common stand were then called for. Three views were expressed but there was 
no attempt to reconcile them or eliminate others in favour of adopting a common stand. 
Reverend A.Z. Poyo expressed a view of pragmatic consideration: Since the Prime Minister was 
inflexible and would ban the Methodist Church of South Africa in spite of negotiations, there was no 
point in opposing the formation of the Methodist Church of Transkei. Instead, the Transkeian 
Methodists should work for its formation and extract the best deal possible from the Transkeian 
Government in case they were abandoned by the Methodist Church of South Africa. This option 
could be achieved by negotiating the autonomy of the Transkeian Methodists with the Methodist 
Church of South Africa. 
Others reacted to the suggestion of possible abandonment by the Methodist Church of South 
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Africa. They pointed out that, by intending to address the meeting of 21 February 1978, the 
Methodist Church of South Africa was signalling its unequivocal support for and interest in 
the Transkeian Methodists - a signal which had, unfortunately, been intercepted by the ban 
on "foreigners" (see 2.7.2). 
Some members wanted to know how the Minister of Justice (who had decreed the ban) had 
come to know in the first place that the Methodist Church of South Africa would send a 
delegation to the meeting on 21 February 1978. The question was ruled out as a digression 
since nobody could answer it (see 3.3.4.5). But Mr Lila disclosed that the Transkei Security 
Branch already knew what had been said in Durban and who had been proposed to address 
the meeting on 21 February. 13 Due to the far-reaching implications of this statement-. for the 
process of the schism, it will be covered in 3.3.4.5. 
Reverend W.L. Pupuma expressed the view that it was not the task or responsibility of the 
Transkeian Methodists to resolve the dispute between the Transkeian Government and the 
Methodist Church of South Africa. The Transkeian Government should therefore proceed 
with their intention of banning the Methodist Church of South Africa and forming the 
Methodist Church of Transkei in whatever manner they deemed fit. 
Reverends C.A.N. Bubesi and M.M.D. Mdolo were of the view that Transkeian Methodists 
should commit themselves and work for the formation of the Methodist Church of Transkei 
in compliance with the Prime Minister's wishes. The issue of oppression within the Methodist 
Church of South Africa, as suggested by the Prime Minister, and the Methodist Church of 
South Africa's negotiations with the Transkeian Government were irrelevant. 
Some members expressed reservations about the fact that the meeting on 21 February would 
be presided over by Rev. Fikeni, Chairman of the Clarkebury District, whereas the matter 
involved other Districts as well (see 2.5.1 ). It was then suggested and agreed that a 
supernumerary (retired) minister be proposed to preside over the meeting, not because he 
could be trusted more than the Chairman of the Clarkebury District but in order to protect 
Rev. Fikeni's name because the top executive of the Methodist Church of South Africa could 
suspect him of wanting to form his own Methodist Church of Transkei. Reverend F. de Waal 
t 
\ 
! 
--~·--· -----~ 
44 
Mahlasela was then proposed and accepted (BMC Minutes 14 February 1978). 
2.7.4 The Daily Dispatch reports 
The Daily Di~patch of 15 February 1978 reported that there had been "secret meetings" in 
Clarkebury Institution (subsequently corrected by the February 16 editiuii, which stated that 
the meetings had, in fact, been held in Buntingville Institution on 14 February 1978) by the 
"nationalist" ministers, who supported the nationalisation of the Methodist Church of South 
Africa in Transkei. It also reported that the Chairman of the Clarkebury District, Rev. Fikeni, 
had been "ousted" and Rev. D. D. Dabula of Queenstown was to be the new Chairman of the 
new Transkei Church. 
2.7.5 The Black Minister~' Consultation and the Daily Dispatch report 
After the meeting on 21 February 1978 ·the Black Ministers' Consultation Executive met to 
consider the damage done to its image by the Daily Dispatch report. Its findings were that 
some of those who had attended the meeting in Buntingville had different expectations of the 
meeting. They had not come to formulate a common stand on Chief Matanzima's intention 
of banning their Church and replacing it with the Methodist Church of Transkei. Some 
ministers of the Clarkebury District had thought the meeting was a caucus meeting in 
preparation for the Clarkebury District Special Synod at which the issue of the suspended 
ministers would be raised. The general suspicion was that either of the suspended ministers 
who were disillusioned with the outcome of the meeting might have decided to damage the 
Black Ministers' Consultation by giving distorted information to the press. According to Rev. 
Zweni (1994), it was Rev. Mbabane who did the damage by sending Rev. A.V Manitshana 
to the Buntingville meeting to be his "ear"-' 4 Reverend Zweni had pinned his hopes of 
reinstatement on the Transkeian Methodists breaking away from the Methodist Church of 
South Africa. Reverend N. Mrubata, on the other hand, pinned his hopes on the Clarkebury 
. District Black Ministers' Consultation exerting pressure on Rev. Fikeni at the Clarkebury 
District Special Synod. He was disappointed that the Black Ministers' Consultation meeting 
in Buntingville did not even mention the Special Synod. 
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The Black Ministers' Consultation decided to send a delegation to Rev. Fikeni, Chairman of 
the Clarkebury District, not to apologise but to explain to him what had been discussed in 
Buntingville, inform him of the constitution of a Black Ministers' Consultation branch in the 
Clarkebury District and, if possible, wean him from the Loyalists (who rejected the formation 
of the Methodist Church of Transkei; see 2.5.8) and win him over to the viewpoint of the 
local Black Ministers' Consultation. 
2.7.6 The Black Minister.;' Consultation and Rev. Fikeni 
The meeting was held in Mount Frere early in March 1978 and started on a very tense note. 
After hard and open discussion Rev. Fikeni seemed satisfied. The Black Ministers' 
Consultation delegation consisted of Revs Gaba, Lungu and Mjali from the Clarkebury 
District and Bubesi, Dabula and de Waa1 Mahlasela from the Queenstown District. Rev. 
Fikeni was also invited to attend the Black Ministers' Consultation branch meeting scheduled 
for 21 March 1978 as an observer to prevent any further misunderstanding or disinformation 
(Oral sources). 
2.7.7 Black Minister.;' Consultation meeting: Lay Centre, Umtata on 21 March 1978 
Twenty-six ministers attended this meeting, which had been called to consider: 
( 1) the National Black Ministers' Consultation Conference in Bloemfontein, 29-3 I May 1978 
(2) the local situation. 
A welcome was extended to Rev. Fikeni, Chairman of the Clarkebury District, and 
appreciation expressed for his attending the meeting as an observer. In response to the 
castigation of the branch (and its activities) by the Clarkebury District Special Synod on 21 
February, the right of the Black Ministers' Consultation branch to address the issue of the 
·formation of the Methodist Church of Transkei was firmly restated. 
The question of whether to send a delegation to the National Black Ministers' Consultation 
Conference in Bloemfontein on 29 to 31 May 1978 was discussed. It was finally decided not 
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to send a delegation although members could attend as individuals. On the local situation it was 
noted that the Methodist Connexional Office (MCO) had frozen car loans to ministers in the 
Transkei. 15 In reaction to this development, it was suggested that circuits in Transkei freeze paying 
their assessments to the MCO. 
Reverend Fikeni then informed the meeting that the MCO was already sorting out the question of 
liabilities, assets and investments in Transkei circuits should the Methodist Church of Transkei be 
formed. He urged the circuits to continue paying their monthly assessments to the MCO. He also 
informed the meeting that he would be attending the Chairmen's Meeting in Durban on 7 April 1978. 
He wanted to know the opinion of the people 'on the spot' on the formation of the Methodist 
Church of Transkei, in anticipation of such a question from the Chairmen's Meeting. 
One member responded with the question: If the MCO was already working on the assumption that 
the Methodist Church of Transkei was going to be formed by freezing car loans for ministers 
working in Transkei circuits and withholding payment of the hostel accounts, 16 why should the 
Transkeian ministers work on a different assumption? 
Reverend Mahlasela was more direct and to the point. He moved that the Black Ministers' 
Consultation branch commit itself and work for the formation of the Methodist Church of Transkei. 
Reverend H. Dzingwe seconded the motion and it was unanimously adopted. 
In support ofthis position Rev. B.B. Mazwana pointed out that the top executive of the Methodist 
Church of South Africa had never even consulted the people on the spot, but were satisfied with 
discussing the issue of the ban outside Transkei. Reverend Fikeni contradicted this by saying that 
the MCO had intended addressing the meeting on 21 February 1978 but had been barred from 
attending by the ban on "foreigners". To this a member replied that that was no excuse as the MCO 
could have changed the venue to Kokstad, a border town in the Republic of South Africa which also 
falls within Clarkebury District. 
Reverend Mahlasela then suggested that the Interim Committee appointed on 21 February 1978 
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(see 2.5.9) be replaced by the Steering Committee, which would work for the formation of 
the Methodist Church of Transkei. This was seconded by Rev. W.B.S. Gaba and it was 
decided to table this proposal at the forthcoming meeting convened by the Interim Committee 
(BMC Minutes 21 March 1978). 
2.8 PLENARY SESSION OF THE INTERIM COMMITTEE, 12 APRIL 1978 
This meeting was convened by Rev. Fikeni in his capacity as Convenor of the Interim 
Committee appointed on 21 February 1978 (see 2.5.9). The aim of the meeting was to brief 
ministers and lay people on developments since their last meeting on 21 February. 
After the meeting had been formally opened and constituted, some members requested 
confirmation or denial of the rumours that the Interim Committee had had a sharp and 
embarrassing internal disagreement at the Chairmen's Meeting in Durban on 7 April 1978. 
According to the rumours, the Interim Committee allegedly reported to the Chairmen's 
Meeting that the Black Ministers' Consultation meeting of 21 March (see 2.7.7) had been 
convened by Rev. Fikeni in his capacity as Chairman of the District and attended by over 
fifty ministers of the Clarkebury District. It was further alleged that when Rev. Fikeni 
disputed the report, a member of the Interim Committee (identified by Makalima [ 1989: 12] 
as Rev. Tom Mbabane) accused Rev. Fikeni of "telling lies"! 
It was confirmed that ··unfortunately" the rumours were true. The reaction of the meeting 
was dismay and anger. 
The meeting then accused the Interim Committee of having exceeded its terms of reference 
by: 
(l) arranging a meeting with the Prime Minister as the meeting of 21 February 1978 had 
·appointed the Interim Committee only to accompany Rev. Fikeni whenever he was called by 
the Prime Minister 
(2) going to Durban to attend the Chairmen's Meeting on 7 April 1978 as this had not even 
been mentioned in the meeting on 21 February 1978 (Oral sources). 
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The Interim Committee was then thanked and dissolved (Fikeni Papers). 
Reporting on the meeting of7 April 1978, Rev. Fikeni said that the Chairmen's Meeting had decided 
to adopt the Interim Committee as the official link between the top executive of the Methodist 
Church of South Afiica and the Methodists in Transkei. This was no longer of any consequence as 
it had been discredited and dissolved by the body which had created it. 
From the report it was clear that the Chairmen of Districts were very negative about the formation 
of the Methodist Church of Transkei although Mr Gorven, the Connexional Lay-Treasurer, had 
suggested at the same meeting that the Methodist Church of South Africa should work with a 
pragmatic attitude towards the formation of the Methodist Church of Transkei by constitutional 
means. His suggestion was that the Clarkebury District Synod should forward a motion to the 
October 1978 Annual Conference requesting autonomy for the Methodist Church of Transkei, 
which would comprise all the circuits falling within the "State" ofTranskei. 
This seemed to be the position adopted by the Chairmen's Meeting of 7 April 1978 and was 
accepted by the Transkeian meeting on 12 April 1978 with great excitement and appreciation. 
It was decided that any Circuit Quarterly Meeting could send a motion to the Clarkebury District 
Synod requesting an autonomous Methodist Church of Transkei. In the meantime the Methodists 
in Transkei should prepare themselves for the new church (Oral sources). 
This meeting, having dissolved the Interim Committee, decided to replace it with the Lindikhaya 
Steering Committee (LSC) - an idea which was first mooted by the Black Ministers' Consultation 
meeting on 21 March 1978 (see 2.7.7). The word "lindikhaya" means "homeguard"- to safeguard 
and protect the interests ofTranskeians. Four subcommittees of the Lindikhaya Steering Committee 
were appointed to deal with (1) Finance, (2) Constitution, (3) Theology and ( 4) Administration of 
the Methodist Church of Transkei, if it should be formed. The subcommittees were charged with 
the task of the formation of a separate church (Wilkins Papers). 
, 
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Most of those who had been members of the (dissolved) Interim Committee were agam 
elected to the Lindikhaya Steering Committee (LSC), some as convenors of the 
subcommittees_ This was probably an attempt to say that the Interim Committee had been 
rejected for what it had done but its members, as individuals, still enjoyed the confidence of 
the meeting. Reverend Fikeni was elected Convenor and Rev. Tom Mbabane, Secretary- yet 
another attempt to reconcile them despite their differences. 
2.9 THE MCSA CHAIRMEN'S MEETING, 2 MAY 1978 
As Chairman of the Clarkebury District, Rev. Fikeni attended this meeting in Durban at 
which he reported that the Prime Minister was still adamant that the Methodist Church of 
Transkei be established and would not wait beyond the October 1978 Conference. 
He advised that the Church take the initiative and grant the Methodists in Transkei autonomy 
so that fellowship between the Methodist Church of South Africa and the Methodist Church 
of Transkei be maintained since it would be unChristian for the Methodist Church of 
Transkei to compete with the Methodist Church of South Africa in the Republic of South 
Africa. Reverend Fikeni seemed to have anticipated such competition in view of Chief 
Matanzima's insistence on 31 January 1978 that the Methodist Church of Transkei have 
circuits even in the Republic (see 2.2). In his view, a church initiative would preempt any 
such development. 
Far from treating the matter as urgent, however, the Chairmen's response was to stick to the 
normal ecclesiastical procedure by waiting for the Clarkebury District Synod resolution, 
which would be tabled before the October Conference. 
Reverend Fikeni also appealed for financial assistance for the LSC. The President, Rev. Abel 
Hendricks, ruled out any rights of the LSC to such benefits but the Secretary of the 
. Conference, Rev. Cyril Wilkins, promised to look into the matter. 
{ 
I 
\ 
r 
50 
2.10 THE LINDIKHA Y A STEERING COMMITTEE (LSC) 
The LSC subcommittees worked on their respective assignments and met twice: on 19 April 
and 12 May 1978. On 24 May 1978 they submitted their reports and recommendations to the 
LSC Plenary Session, the proceedings of which will be outlined. 
2.10.1 The Fir'St Plenary Session of the LSC, 24 May 1978 
This meeting was held at the Ncambedlana Lay Centre, Umtata for the purpose of 
considering the reports of the LSC subcommittees. 
Reverend Fikeni, as Convenor, presided over the meeting. Immediately after the meeting had 
been constituted Rev. Mbabane resigned as Secretary of the LSC and Rev. M.T Lungu was 
appointed to replace him. The reports of the subcommittees were then tabled. 
2.10.2 Administration s~bcommittee: Rev. M.M.V. Njongwe 
The subcommittee recommended that the Methodist Church of Transkei be established in the 
Transkei only and no MCT circuits outside Transkei. However, if for any reason, Transkeians 
outside Transkei needed the pastoral ministry of the MCT, they would not be denied that 
right The status of such engagement (outside Transkei) would be defined and approved by 
the Conference of the MCT (MCT, Laws and Discipline 1978:6). This recommendation was 
unanimously approved and adopted. 
2.10.3 Finance subcommittee: Rev. W.B.S. Gaba 
From the meeting with the MCO in Durban on 25 April 1978 it emerged that there were no 
monies belonging to Transkei as such. Monies were only due to the ministers as individuals 
· in the form of pensions and some benefits. 
The Finance subcommittee noted with shock and dismay that the Clarkebury District alone 
owed about R3 5 000,00 out of a total of R80 000,00 due in unpaid assessments for the eight 
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Districts of the Methodist Church of South Africa' The subcommittee had been informed that, 
should the Methodist Church of Transkei be formed, it would get its share of the capital 
account less any debts owing in arrears on assessments and loans. 
The meeting recommended that circuits pay their assessments to the MCO and that any 
amount deducted by the MCO of the Methodist Church of South Africa in lieu of debts be 
reclaimed by the MCO of the Methodist Church of Transkei from the defaulting Transkei 
circuits. 
2.10.4 Theology subcommittee: Rev. M.T. Lungu 
The Preamble (see Appendix IV) to the Constitution of the Methodist Church of Transkei 
stated categorically that no "new" Church was envisaged in the sense of different doctrines, 
practices and procedures. The Methodists in Transkei would have to remain in Transkei and 
continue witnessing for Christ in the Methodist tradition and practices they knew even in this 
new situation of being cut off from the Methodist Church of South Africa. 
The subcommittee also emphasised that it would be more Christian for the Transkeian 
Methodist ministers to remain in Transkei to continue exercising their pastoral ministry to 
the Transkeian Methodists than to seek appointments in the Republic of South Africa to 
prove their loyalty to the Methodist Church of South Africa. 
After much discussion, the Preamble was finally adopted. 
2.10.5 The Constitution of the Methodist Church of Transkei 
Reverend Fikeni then distributed copies of the Draft Constitution of the Methodist Church 
of Transkei. Some reservations were expressed about this step since the LSC had no mandate 
·to draw up a constitution for the Methodist Church of Transkei, which had not been approved 
by the Methodist Church of South Africa. 
However, it was pointed out that the LSC had acted within the mandate of the meeting of 
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12 April 1978 (see 2.8) because looking at the constitutional, financial, administrative and 
theological implications of forming a Methodist Church of Transkei meant drawing up its 
constitution and that was within the main charge of preparing for the new Church. Reverend 
Gaba challenged anyone to show him the section in the Lmt1S and Discipline of the Methodist 
Church of South Africa dealing with forming a new church. He also asked whether a 
committee drafting the Constitution of the Methodist Church of Transkei would be 
constitutional simply because it had been appointed by Hendricks and whether such a 
Constitution (of the MCT) would be valid and constitutional simply because it had been 
drawn up by Hendricks and the Methodist Connexional Office. No answers were necessary 
to these rhetorical questions (Oral sources). A printed copy of the Draft Constitution was then 
read. It was identical to the Lmv s and Discipline of the Methodist Church of South Africa 
except that all references to South Africa had been deleted and replaced with references to 
the Transkei. 
Some members felt that this was too simplistic an approach because there was much that 
needed to be changed in the Lmv s and Discipline of the Methodist Church of South Africa. 
Others opposed this view arguing that the object of the whole exercise was not to constitute 
a "Reformed" Methodist Church but to continue the Methodist Church ofSouth Africa as 
it was known but only under a different name, namely the Methodist Church of Transkei 
(LSC Minutes 24 May 1978) .. 
The Drqft Constitution was finally accepted and it was agreed that it would be presented to 
the Synod of the Clarkebury District on 9 June 1978. The Synod would then forward it to 
the October 1978 Conference of the Methodist Church of South Africa together with the 
motion requesting an autonomous Methodist Church of Transkei. 
2.11 THE UNDESIRABLE ORGANISATIONS ACf, 9 OF 1978 
· On 26 May 1978 the Transkei Government declared the Methodist Church of South Africa 
an undesirable organisation in accordance with the Undesirable Organisations Act, 9 of 1978 
(see Appendix V). 
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On the same day the Prime Minister released a press statement in which he said: 
The declaration of the Methodist Church as an undesirable organisation is not aimed 
at the ordinary Transkeian members of the Church, but at its governing body based 
in South Africa (Daily Di!>patch May 27, 1978). 
In the same press statement he urged Methodist congregations in Transkei to continue with 
normal church services and other church activities (Daily Dispatch May 27, 1978). 
Reverend Fikeni also released a press statement saying that he had been 
''assured in his capacity as Chairman of the controlling body of the Methodist 
Church in Transkei that there would be no government interference in normal Church 
activities" 
and further 
the MCSA has not been declared an 'unlawful' organisation but only an 
'undesirable' organisation. I therefore appeal to all (Methodist) members to remain 
calm and to continue with Church services and activities as before" 
and also announced 
... the meeting of all Transkeian Methodist ministers in and around Transkei, circuit 
stewards and lay representatives scheduled for 9 June will now be held on June 2 at 
the Lay Centre, Umtata. The declaration of the Church as an undesirable organisation 
will be discussed at the meeting" (Daily Dispatch May 27, 1978). 
·If it were "unlawful", its activities would be a contravention of the law and it (or at least its 
members) would be liable for legal prosecution. Being ''undesirable" meant it was not liked 
or looked upon with favour and its existence was a threat to some interests. As for the 
meeting mentioned in the press statement, no meeting other than the Synod of the Clarkebury 
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District had been planned for 9 June 1978 (see 2.1 0.5). 
Reverend Abel Hendricks, the President of the Methodist Conference, issued a statement 
deploring the "banning" of the Methodist Church of South Africa in Transkei: 
The banning of a church which has openly proclaimed the Gospel of Jesus Christ for 
over a century in the Transkei, and which has provided the backbone of education, 
is one which must be rejected in the strongest terms" (Daily Di:o.patch May 27, 1978). 
He went on to say, ''But we shall not despair at the unity of the church being ruptured by 
a political action. The Transkei is not the first government to silence the church and it 
undoubtedly won't be the last.... 26 May should be remembered as a sad day in the history 
of Transkei and South African Methodism." 
To the Methodists in· Transkei he said, "Be assured that whatever may be the political 
actions or manipulations, you are in our prayers as you yourselves struggle to understand the 
ways and actions of men. Man in his political actions may issue decrees banning churches. 
But in that we proclaim God as the ultimate authority, let me say I do not accept a political 
ban on our church" (Daily Dispatch. 27 May 1978). 
Archbishop Bill Burnett of Cape Town said, "Fellow Christians must be disturbed by the 
decision of any government to declare part of the Church of God an undesirable organisation. 
I know of no action of the Methodist Church which could have deserved so severe a response 
from the state" (Daily Dispatch, 27 May 1978). 
Archbishop Denis Hurley of the Catholic Church said he did not understand how one could 
ban a church and thought it unlikely that the ban could be enforced (Daily Dispatch, 27 May 
1978). 
2.12 SECOND PLENARY SESSION OF THE LSC: FORMATION OF THE MCT 
This meeting on 2 June 1978 at the Lay Centre in Umtata was convened by Rev. Fikeni to 
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consider the implications of the Transkeian Government's declaration of the Methodist 
Church of South Africa as an undesirable organisation. 
On the same day the Transkeian Government published the Gazelfe banning the Methodist 
Church of South Africa in Transkei (see Appendix VI). After the formal opening of the 
meeting Rev. Fikeni read the Gazette and then pointed out that, under the conditions imposed 
by the ban, the meeting was illegal unless it regarded itself simply as a meeting of 
individuals of like minds. He then suggested that the Methodist Church of Transkei be 
formed because "it was better than having no Methodist Church in Transkei" (Daily 
Di::,patch, June 3, 1978, Dimension, July 2, 1978: 2). He himself had ceased to be the 
Chairman of the Clarkebury District of the Methodist Church of South Africa but was 
presiding over the meeting as the Convenor of the LSC. 
Reverend W. Pupuma moved that those willing to form the new Church should sign their 
names and move up to the stage in the hall. This was seconded by Rev. O.K. Mbele. Mr 
T.N. Bam moved that anyone not willing to join the new Church should leave the hall. This 
was seconded by Mr L.N. Nkukwana (LSC Minutes 2, June 1978). 
At that point Revs A. Fadane, T. Mbabane, H.Z. Mbuli, A.G. Mposelwa, 0. Ngcatshe, P. 
Shone and J.N. Silwanyana left the hall protesting (Dimension, July 2, 1978: 2). (A complete 
list of the ministers who refused to join the Methodist Church of Transkei and those who 
joined is given in Appendix VII.) It was pointed out to them that there was nothing they 
could do because all the business that would be conducted concerned only the Methodist 
Church of Transkei since the Methodist Church of South Africa had been banned (LSC 
Minutes 2 June 1978). 
The signing of the register of the new Church was a very emotional experience. The Daily 
Dispatch reported that the event was characterised by ··exuberance" and had a ·'theatrical 
touch". Reverend Fikeni, who was "deadly serious about the whole business" summed up the 
anxieties of many when he said, ·'I pray that this is not going to hurt anyone" (Daily 
Dispatch. June 3, 1978). As the ministers signed the register they gave expression to their 
feelings in remarks like '· ... we have nothing to lose ... we shall start afresh ... this looks like 
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a play to me .. ''. One minister described his personal feelings as he signed the register as 
''the pain of cutting the umbilical cord" with tears running down his cheeks (Oral sources). 
The meeting proceeded to appoint Rev. F. de Waal Mahlasela as President of the Methodist 
Church of Transkei and Rev. Wellington B.S. Gaba as Secretary of the Conference and other 
top officials of the new Church. It was then decided that a full Conference of the Methodist 
Church of Transkei would be held on June 4, 1978 to complete the constituting of the 
Methodist Church of Transkei and set the machinery of church administration in full motion. 
I 
2.13 REACfiONS TO mE FORMATION OF mE MCf 
In 2.11 it was pointed out that some church leaders reacted to the declaration of the MCSA 
as an undesirable organisation as if it were a banning decree. When the banning order was 
ultimately proclaimed, the reactions of some people focused only on the formation of the 
MCT and categorised the Transkeian Methodist ministers in terms of loyalty and disloyalty 
to the MCSA. 
2.13.1 Rev. Abel Hendricks 
Commenting only on the formation of the MCT, Rev. Hendricks said that the new Church 
(MCT) was an ''ecclesiastical disaster" and elaborated on that by declaring it ''a disaster for 
those ministers who have elected to join it and thus resign their ministry in the Methodist 
Church of SA as, in the short term at least, the new Church - created by pressure and action 
of the political state - had no hope of recognition by world Methodism" (Dimension, July 
1978: 1 ). He also said it was a disaster for ''the countless ordinary Methodists in Transkei 
who will be confused at the mind-boggling non-theological actions of some of their ministers 
and some of their lay leaders who have cut their ties with Methodism in Southern Africa" 
(Dimension, July 1978: l ). 
He then called on the new Church to reconsider its position ''in the interests of Christian 
unity and of theological and Biblical truth; in the interest of obeying God rather than man 
....... " and commended the seventeen ministers who had refused to join the new Church, 
- -·-
----
57 
saying "it is encouraging that as many as 17 men have remained loyal" (Dimension, July 1978: 1). 
2.13.2 Rev Dr Charles Villa-Vicencio 
In an article, "Transkei Church - a cry for liberation or heresy?" in Dimension, August 6, 1978, 
Villa-Vicencio suggested that the creation of the MCT was more probably a symptom of the rise 
of Bantustanism than of Black nationalism or an expression of Black discontent with dominant 
White leadership of the Church. Reacting to Rev. Hendricks' finding it "encouraging that as many 
as 17 men have remained loyal", Villa-Vicencio asked why "it was not equally noted 'that at least 
twice this number have not remained loyal" (Dimension, August 6, 1978). In fact, they were three 
times that number (see Appendix VII). 
Villa-Vicencio then examines the significance of being "loyal" to one's church and concludes by 
saying that this is sometimes overrated - Luther was not loyal to the church of his ordination and 
it is a little controversial as to just how loyal Wesley was to Anglicanism. He then suggests that the 
most important thing is loyalty to Christ the Lord (Dimension, August 6, 1978). 
This issue will be discussed in chapter 4. 
2.13.3 Rev. Wilfred Hartley 
Reverend Hartley was an ex-President of the MCSA ( 1965) and former Chairman of the 
Queenstown District under which a section ofTranskei fell. He took up the debate on loyalty and 
advised calmness and understanding of "those ministers whom some would call disloyal to the 
Methodist Church" (Dimension, August 6, 1978: 1 0). 
He also pointed out that he himself would have agonised over whether to stay with "my people who 
would need my ministry more than ever. Let us not therefore, by implication, suggest that ministers 
who have stayed on in Transkei are not loyal. Let us continue to treat them as brethren who see the 
Kingdom of God as something very much greater than the 
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Methodist Church of South Africa" (Dimension, August 6, 1978: I 0). 
2.13.4 Rev. Dt· D.W. Bandey 
Dr Bandey, too, advised calmness and pointed out that the critiques of the events in Transkei 
were concerned with what people in Transkei had done and had not thought of what God 
could do in Transkei. He personally was surprised that ''anyone who knew Transkei was 
surprised at the move towards an autonomous Methodist Church there" (Dimension, August 
6, 1978: 10). 
He then advised calmness and patience and watching God working at His own speed in His 
own way in Transkei, and that the new Church (MCT) be given chance ''to recover from the 
shock of its premature birth". It was time to regain poise and see what God intended doing 
through the "disloyal ministers" in Transkei. The MCT could be a success story because it 
''had the Bible as the basis· for Christian teaching and Jesus Christ as its Lord; there will be 
prayers and worship as sincere as anywhere in the world" (Dimension, August 6, 1978: 1 0). 
Since the idea of loyalty expressed in these (and other) responses was so crucial in the 1978 
Methodist schism, the issue will be taken up in the conflictual analysis of the schism in 
chapter 4 of this study. 
2.14 POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS OF TilE EARLY BAN 
When Chief George Matanzima, Minister of Justice, was asked why Transkei had taken that 
sudden action when the Church (Transkeian Methodists) were expected to seek autonomy by 
constitutional means later in the year (see 2.10.5), he replied that it had been necessitated by 
certain (undisclosed) circumstances. When pressed further for the Government's response to 
a telegram from the MCSA requesting him to reconsider his action of banning the MCSA, 
·he said that would de~end on whether the Church had reconsidered its decision not to 
recognise Transkei (Daily Dispatch June 3, 1978). 
Any or all of the following could have been the undisclosed ''certain circumstances": 
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2.14.1 Actions of the Transkeian Methodists 
When asked in England by the Ecumenical Council of the British Council of Churches why 
the Transkeian Government had banned the MCSA, Mr Digby Koyana, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, said that ·'the Government's action against the Methodist Church of South Africa 
was motivated by Transkei's Methodists" (Daily Dispatch July 14, 1978). This could either 
have been a diplomatic trick to save face or else he was referring to specific actions that the 
Transkeian Methodists had taken. Here the following facts should be considered: 
Although the nationalists favoured the formation of the MCT, there was no intention of 
breaking away from the MCSA. They were satisfied that the Conference would accept a 
Synod resolution from the Clarkebury District Synod. 
However, fed by rumours, there was speculation amongst the Transkeian Methodists that the 
Transkeian ministers in the loyalist bloc had resigned from the Lindikhaya Steering 
Committee because they would, in any case, be brought back by the MCSA to lead the 
MCSA sponsored MCT. These fears were strengthened by the rumours that the MCSA was 
planning to transfer some ministers out of Transkei, especially those who were in the 
Lindikhaya Steering Committee. The rumours could not easily be dismissed, especially after 
Rev. Hendricks, President of Conference, issued a strong statement on 29 May 1978 
challenging the Transkeian ministers to decide one way or another where they stood. He also 
stated that the Church would no longer continue to tolerate people who hunted with the 
hounds while running with the foxes (Makalima 1989: 13) 
In the light of these developments the Lindikhaya Steering Committee, which met on the 
evening of the same day, declared themselves an ··underground" MCT. This move was meant 
to pre-empt two possible developments should the MCSA be banned before the MCT could 
be constituted. First, the move was aimed at preventing the MCSA from transferring its 
properties in Transkei to another church to pre-empt expropriation by the Transkeian 
·Government. Secondly, it was aimed at preventing another church, say, for instance, the 
Bantu Methodist Church in Transkei, from suddenly reconstituting itself as a Methodist 
Church of Transkei in order to inherit properties expropriated from the MCSA. 
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This action (offonning an "underground" MCT) was conveyed to Chief George Matanzima on 30 
May 1978. This was after his speech of 27 May 1978 therefore this development could not have 
been part of the "certain circumstances" to which he referred. However, as the MCSA was banned 
on 2 June 1978, one cannot altogether dismiss the possibility that the formation of the 
"underground" MCT on 29 May 1978 could have had a bearing on that development. Moreover, 
this could also explain the coincidence of the meeting of the Transkeian Methodists and the 
gazetting ofthe ban on the same day, 2 June 1978. 
2.14.2 Political defections 
Another possibility is that the undisclosed circumstances precipitating the ban had to do with the 
political tension in Transkei since March 1978. The ruling Transkei National Independence Party 
had lost some members through the defection of its members in Eastern Pondoland. Some members 
of Matanzima's TNIP broke away and formed their own political party, the Transkei National 
Progressive Party (T.N.P.P.) on 21 March 1978. By Aprill978 this party had grown to 16 members 
under the leadership ofMr. C.S. Mda (Streek and Wicksteed 1980: 56). 
It could be that the Matanzimas felt that they should reduce the political tension in Transkei by 
quickly disposing of the church tension by banning the MCSA since they were committed to the 
formation of the MCT rather than waiting for the October Conference. 
2.14.3 The Thembu feud 
Besides the defections in Eastern Pondoland, another possible direct cause ofthe ban could have 
been the political tension due to a feud between Paramount Chief Matanzima of Western 
Thembuland and Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo of Thembuland. This feud dragged on until 
1979. 
Paramount ChiefSabata Dalindyebo strongly opposed the homelands policy. He was charged with 
undennining the dignity of the State President (Paramount Chief Matanzima) and found guilty. He 
was deposed and fled to Lusaka where he later died (Streek & Wicksteed 
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1980:308-334). His remains were brought back to Transkei m 1990 and reinterred in his 
Great Place. Perhaps the Matanzimas felt that the church tension was opening another front, 
which could possibly cause more instability, and therefore decided to ban the MCSA quickly 
to reduce tension. 
2.14.4 The Transkei Maniage Act, 21 of 1978 
The final possibility is that the "undisclosed circumstances" leading to the ban could be 
related to the issue of polygamy. The Sunday Times of June 4, 1978 declared that the secret 
of Kaiser's banned church was a bid to force a polygamy law on the Methodists. The ban on 
the MCSA was to be used "to force Methodist ministers remaining Transkei to accept 
polygamy ... legalising polygamy will serve to rationalise Chief Matanzima's own position. 
He has three wives and is a Methodist lay preacher" (Sunday Times 4 June 1,978). 
According to the article, ''confirmation that the polygamy issue is the reason behind the 
church banning" came from an official close to Chief Matanzima and from the Methodist 
Church President, Rev. Abel Hendricks, who said that the Methodist Church officers in 
Transkei had told him that the recognition of polygamy lay behind the banning (Sunday 
Times, 4 June 1978). 
This Marriage Act was passed in May 1978. It does not explain why the MCSA was banned 
but it could explain why Chief Matanzima did not wait for the formation of the MCT in 
October of the same year by constitutional means. It is the researcher's belief that the key 
reason behind the ban remains the issue of the recognition of the independence of Transkei. 
The Marriage Act had the potential to provoke a strong reaction from the churches because 
it supported polygamy. According to the Manual: Solemnization and Registration of 
Marriages (1978:2), article 17 of the Marriage Act states that 
A male person may contract a customary marriage -
(a) if he is a single person (i.e. not a party to any subsisting civil or customary 
marriage); OR 
(b) if he is a party to any subsisting customary marriage or civil marriage out 
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of community of property. 
In order to contain such opposition, the Transkeian Government might have felt it expedient 
to ban the MCSA in Transkei quickly because it had the largest following and could 
therefore mount a serious challenge to the Act 
The factors as outlined from 2.14.1 to 2.14.4 may have combined to move the Transkeian 
Government actually to ban the MCSA (as threatened in the press statement of 12 January 
1978) rather than wait for the Church to form the MCT by constitutional means. 
2.15 PERSECUTION OF THE "REBEL" MINISTERS 
The June 10, 1978 edition of Imvo ZahaNtsundu used the term "rebel" to describe the 
seventeen ministers (whom the Methodist Church of South Africa called "Loyalists") who 
rejected the formation of the Methodist Church of Transkei. Different reasons were given for 
their rejection of the new Church. Reverend T.B. Mbabane claimed that their ''rebellion" 
against the formation of the Methodist Church of Transkei was governed by faith while 
another, who wished to remain anonymous, held that their concern centred on four main 
issues, namely whether the new Church would be able to pay the salaries and the pensions 
of its ministers, educate their children, a~d accommodate all Transkeian Methodist ministers 
who might be forced to come back to Transkei from the Republic of South Africa (Im vo 
ZabaNtsundu, June l0,_1978r 
In the process of the transition from the Methodist Church of South Africa to the Methodist 
Church of Transkei, there were some unpleasant incidents between the Transkei Police and 
some of the ministers occasioned by the ministers withdrawing large sums of Church money 
from the bank and removing church property such as curtains, items of furniture and vehicles 
with the intention of taking them to the Methodist Church of South Africa in the Republic 
of South Africa. Those who were wardens of the hostels, except Rev. J.N. Silwanyana, 
withdrew the money from the banks (before the Transkei Government froze all the Methodist 
bank accounts) so that they could feed the students in the hostels (Silwanyana 1993 ). 
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Reverend Amos S. Fadane was arrested by the Transkei Police for saying in Kokstad that 
Transkei was a police state (Fadane 1992). Reverend O.B. Ngcatshe was summoned to the 
office of the Prime Minister, who persuaded or pressurised him to remain in Transkei (Streek 
& Wicksteed 1980:280; Dimension July 6, 1978). Reverend P.C. Shone was served with a 
deportation order and escorted by the Transkei Police to the Kei River border post (Streek 
& Wicksteed 1980:280). The case of Rev. Mbabane has been considered in section 1.7.2. 
2.16 CONCLUSION 
From the above narrative description of the Methodist schism in Transkei, it is clear that, 
although the dispute was initia:Jy between the Transkeian Government and the Methodist 
Church of South Africa, the Transkeian Methodists eventually played the decisive role. It is 
also clear that they themselves held different views on a number of issues. 
The Methodist schism in Transkei in its broader political and ecclesial context, its nature in 
relation to other schisms in the broader South African Christian tradition and, finally, the 
conflict of the different loyalties which determined the role played by the different parties 
will be analysed in the following chapters on the basis of the content of this chapter. 
ENDNOTES 
l. The designation "top executive" will be used throughout this study to refer to the 
President of the Conference in council with the Secretary of the Conference and the 
Chairmen of Districts. 
2. For the WCC's views on the "independence" of Transkei see 3.3.4.3. 
3. Reverend F.H.T. Fikeni was the Chairman of the Clarkebury District at the time. His 
presiding over the meeting became contentious because two other Districts (Queenstown 'and 
the Kimberley and Bloemfontein Districts) were also affected by the ban (see 2.7.3 and 
Appendix III). 
4. This was, in fact, incorrect since the Union Parliament had passed The Methodist 
Church of South Africa Act (Private Act 12 of 1932), uniting the three Methodist Churches 
in South Africa, the Wesleyan Methodist Church of South Africa, the Transvaal Missions and 
the Primitive Methodist Missions (Laws and Discipline 1992: 11-12). 
5. This was a reference to King Henry VIII of England who broke away from the 
Roman Catholic Church to establish the Church of England in 1534. 
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6. This was a reference to hymn No. 262 in the Methodist Xhosa hymn book which is very 
popular in the Young Men's Guild (a Methodist men's association for evangelism). 
7. This was a Black caucus within the Methodist Church of South Africa formed by Rev. E.N. 
Baartman and Rev. Dr E.K. Mgojo in 1975 to act as a pressure group challenging the racist 
practices of the MCSA. This forum was originally known as the Black Ministers' Consultation 
(BMC). In the face of the apartheid system the MCSA declared in 1958 that it was a "one and 
undivided church." This policy statement has, since then, been reaffirrrted by all the subsequent 
Conferences of the MCSA. Black Methodists have, ever since, wanted to see this policy statement 
translated into practice in the face of the obvious discriminatory practices within a church which had 
declared itself non-racial (see Mbangula 1986:90). The awakening of Black Methodists to the 
injustices of the apartheid system in general may be attributed to Rev Alex Boraine, who was the 
General Secretary of the Christian Education and Youth Department from 1964 to 1971. Dr Boraine 
focused on the broader South African way of life and was once embarrassed by the Prime Minister 
of South Africa, Mr B.J. Vorster, who rebutted his challenge to the apartheid system by pointing 
out to him the racial inequalities within the Methodist Church (Balia 1991 :8). The programme of 
focusing on the MCSA was actually initiated by one of Dr Boraine's youth field workers, Rev 
Ernest Baartman, who ultimately succeeded him as General Secretary. Rev Baartman invited Black 
Methodist ministers to a consultation in May 1975 in Bloemfontein. This consultation was formally 
constituted as the Black Ministers' Consultation (BMC). Rev. Baartman was elected as chairman 
and Rev. Dr Mgojo as secretary. In 1978 it was renamed the Black Methodist Consultation in order 
to accommodate the laity. In 1980 membership was opened to Black women as well. The BMC 
conferences were at that time usually held in Bloemfontein, during May each year to review and 
reflect on the decisions of the previous Methodist Annual Conference. In September each year 
another conference was held to strategise for issues that would arise at the forthcoming MCSA 
Conference in October. The main programme of the BMC was to "conscientise" Black ministers on 
the leadership roles they should play in a non-racial church. Black Consciousness and Black 
Theology were the chief inspiration of the BMC. The BMC believed that political conscientisation 
was a legitimate church programme and therefore "Black sermons should germinate political 
consciousness so that our people are led to take relevant action in a local situation" (Balia 1991:89). 
On the practical level the BMC sought to identity the power bases of the MCSA and these were the 
Connexional Secretariat and the Chairmen of Districts. The BMC adopted a policy of canvassing 
for Black candidates as heads of Departments, e.g. Missionary, Youth, etc. whenever a vacancy 
occurred. It also noted that "the position of Chairman was vested with much power in the Methodist 
Church and the BMC was convinced that Black members were not being faithfully served by White 
Chairmen who have White interests at heart, and that the Methodist system was perceived as White, 
Western and Capitalist" (Bali a 1991 ). There was also the observation that the Chairmen of Districts 
were always White and the deputy-chairmen always Black. The 1977 BMC Conference took a 
resolution that no Black ministers should accept nomination to these token positions. It also 
recommended that each District should form a District BMC. The Clarkebury District BMC was 
constituted on 24 September, 1977. The following committee was elected: Chairman: Rev. P.P. 
Mjali; Secretary: Rev. W.B.S. Gaba; Other members: Revs. M.T. Lungu, A Fadane and H.M. 
Dandala (provisional, since he was on study leave at the time). 
---
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8. There were many people who attended the meeting who did not belong to any of the 
invited categories, i.e. either ministers, circuit stewards or "prominent Methodists." For 
example, there were some members of the Security Police and some young people working 
for the Black People's Programme based at the Ncambedlana Lay Training Centre where the 
meeting was being held. 
9. The people who were delegated by the "top executive" to attend the meeting were 
Rev. Dr D.W. Bandey and Rev. Dr D.G.L. Cragg. They did not attend, however, because of 
the ban on foreigners (Cragg 1995). 
10. Rev. Dr E.K. Mgojo ( 1995) states that he never supported the formation of the MCT. 
The perception existed among some Transkeian Methodists, however, that he had been 
positive about the idea at the meeting of 31 January, 1978. This perception was probably 
based on his words at the end of the meeting, when he was asked to thank the Prime 
Minister (see 2.3). 
II. Rev. R.D. Ntatu (1991) states that there had been people going around in the 
Clarkebury District urging ministers to attend the Buntingville meeting and that failure to 
attend would be regarded as an indication that they were not "K.D.'s friends." 
12. Reverend Dabula based his calculation on the fact that each circuit had two circuit 
stewards and added to that number the lay people who were members of various Synod 
committees. But he overlooked the fact that ministers appointed in the Republic of South 
Africa would not come with lay people, which would reduce the ratio. 
13. Mr M.V.Lila was a government official and therefore had access to such information. 
14. Rev. Mbabane wanted to find out how Rev. Gaba was going to influence the 
meeting, since he suspected that Rev. Gaba had already cast his lot with the MCT. He could 
have come to this conclusion on the basis of Rev. W.B.S. Gaba's motion in the meeting of 
31 January, 1978 (that the Transkeian ministers should decide the issue), together with the 
fact that he walked out of a Transkei Council of Churches Executive meeting on 6 February, 
1978 when ministers of other churches enquired from the Methodists on the Executive what 
the response of the MCSA was to the impending ban. The report of the Daily Dispatch 
(February l 0, 1978) on Rev. Gaba's walkout read: "Some Methodist clergy said some of the 
Methodist ministers in Transkei were using every means to assure the success of the 
'nationalisation' of the Methodist Church of South Africa." This could have referred to the 
view of Rev. Mbabane. He could therefore have sent Rev. Manitshana to be his "ear" in the 
Buntingville BMC meeting, and also given a twisted report to the Daily Di:-.patch in order 
to frustrate those who had met in Buntingville. 
15. Methodist ministers could negotiate car loans with the MCO on terms which were 
more favourable than those offered by commercial/financial institutions 
16. The Transkeian government was responsible for the maintenance of the six Methodist 
educational institutions, viz. Clarkebury, Bensonvale, Buntingville, Faku, Osborn and 
Shawbury. The wardens of these institutions submitted claims to the MCO for maintenance 
expenses, which in tum reclaimed it from the Transkeian government. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
From the narrative description of the process of the Methodist schism in chapter 2 the 
precipitating factors can be identified as a clash between the resolution of the 1977 
Methodist Annual Conference to discontinue its practice of sending letters of greeting to 
the heads of the Southern African states and the Transkeian Government's need for the 
recognition of its political independence, which it had obtained from the Republic of South 
Africa in 1976 (see 2.2). 
·The Church resolution may look too innocuous (as, indeed, it did to some people) to have 
so offended the Transkei Government that it caused a schism in the Methodist Church of 
South Africa. The ''independence" of a homeland would seem to be equally innocuous as 
a cause of church schis~. This calls for a detailed analysis of the two issues involved. The 
problems did not arise with the Conference resolution but with its context; not with the 
Transkeian independence but with the international context of its rejection. Understanding 
what the Methodist resolution implied and what Chief Matanzima said would not provide 
insight into their respective contexts. That can only be achieved by analysing both issues 
in their respective ecclesial and political contexts, their meaning and significance, and the 
circumstances which led their respective communities to hold the positions they held. 
Accordingly, in this chapter the 1978 Methodist schism in Transkei will be analysed 
contextually in order to 
(I) review the Methodist tradition of sending letters of greeting, the context in which 
the decision to discontinue the practice was taken, and also consider how that decision 
clashed with the Transkeian Government's own agenda 
(2) review the development of Transkei as a "State" up to the stage of attaining its 
"independence" and how the Methodist resolution was perceived in Transkei as sabotaging 
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the Transkeian campaign to secure international recognition of its independence 
(3) consider the peculiarities of the Methodist tradition in Transkei with a view to 
determining why that tradition could not serve to resolve the dispute between the Transkeian 
Government and the Methodist Church of South Africa. 
3.2 THE METHODIST TRADITION OF ADDRESSING THE HEAD OF STATE 
Since this Methodist tradition precipitated the clash between the Transkei Government and the 
Methodist Church of South Africa, it will now be considered. This tradition dates back to 
eighteenth-century Methodism. At that time the Methodists, who had broken away from the 
established Church of England, were suspected of subversive tendencies and accused of 
sympathising with the French republican spirit. In 1800 the Bishop of Rochester accused their 
institutions of having sedition and atheism as their real objects. In the face of such accusations 
the Methodist Conference felt compelled to "publish annually a protestation of deep loyalty to 
the Crown and an instruction to the Methodist people to abstain from political activity" 
(Davies 1963:134-135). 
The birth in 18li of the Methodist tradition of pledging loyalty to the state was not only a 
response to the crisis of the French Revolution but also marked the formalisation of an attitude 
which had been encouraged twenty years earlier. In 1792 the Methodist Conference resolved: 
"None of us shall either in writing or in conversation speak lightly or irreverently of the 
Government" (Halevy 1924: 373). Later, Jabez Bunting, the most powerful Methodist after 
John Wesley, declared: "Methodism hates democracy as much as it hates sin" (Fromm 1960: 
81-3). 
This tradition was exported with Methodism to South Africa. Commenting on the work of the 
missionaries in South Africa, the Kilner Report makes the following observation: 
This Meeting resolves to place on record its assurance that the Wesleyan Methodists 
in the South African Colonies will continue to maintain that loyalty to the British 
Crown which has always characterised the Wesleyan Methodist Church throughout the 
empire. And at the same time, this Meeting rejoices in being able again to declare that 
our people, both Colonial and Native, have on all occasions given abundant evidence 
ofthis loyalty (Kilner 1881: 55). 
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From this Kilner Report it is clear that the Wesleyan missionaries were expected to be 
loyal to the British Crown and to inculcate the same loyalty in their converts. 
In the course of time the tradition underwent changes. First it was an address of loyalty 
to the British Crown while South Africa was still part of the British Empire. At that time 
another address of loyalty was sent to the Governor-General of the Union of South Africa. 
When South Africa became a republic and severed links with the Commonwealth, the , 
address of loyalty to the President was written. In 1965 the address was modified to 
become a letter of greeting. From 1970 to 1976 letters of greeting were also sent to the 
King of Lesotho, the King of Swaziland and the President of Botswana. In 1972 the 
President of Mozambique was also included on the list This development was in 
recognition of the fact that the Methodist Church of South Africa had members and 
churches/circuits in all these states of the Southern African region. 
3.2.1 Format of the Address/Letter of Loyalty/Gn~eting 
The format was quite simple: 
(l) It opened by introducing the sitting Methodist Conference to the recipient (the head 
of state) and then gave approximate membership of the Methodist Church of South Africa 
and the geographical area of its mission work. 
(2) Then followed some kind remarks on the recipient's personal life. In 1960, for 
example, Queen Elizabeth II of Britain was congratulated on the birth of her third son, 
Prince Edward. In 1961 Mr C.R. Swart was congratulated on his elevation to first State 
President of the new Republic of South Africa and Mrs Swart was wished a speedy 
recovery from her illness. 
(3) Reference would then be made to the responsibilities entrusted to the recipient, such 
as the demanding role of the Queen in the Commonwealth, and the task of smoothing race 
relations in South Africa expected of the Governor-General and later the State President. 
These remarks would be followed by an expression of moral support through prayer and 
a pledge of loyalty to the recipient 
~.--:""'.- --
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The prevailing political mood would also determine the content and tone of these 
addresses/letters. As political repression of the Blacks in South Africa increased, the tone 
became more critical of Government policy. So, for instance, the 1976 letter of greeting 
to the State President challenged him as follows (MCSA 1976:250) to encourage and effect 
more meaningful changes in the political situation of the country: 
... we cannot stress too strongly the necessity for your Ministers of State to act 
rigorously to effect changes in all those areas in which South Africans feel that 
they are being suppressed, discriminated against or in any way prevented from 
leading a free and full life .... We believe that every man and woman in South 
Africa is entitled to personal, religious and political freedom and we pray that 
restraint upon these freedoms may soon be removed .... 
These letters to the head of state were generally written in mild and restrained language. 
In the 1961 letter to the State President, Mr C.R. Swart, for instance, the Conference 
offered its sincere congratulations on his assumption to the office as first Head of State 
under its republican constitution. The sentiments expressed in no way reflected the fact that 
not all the Whites had voted in favour of the Republic in the Referendum let alone that 
Blacks did not vote at all. Misgivings about the republican constitution were based only 
on the fact that, unlike other countries such as India, the Republic of South Africa had 
opted out of the Commonwealth. This was revealed in the address to the British Methodist 
Conference that same year where the Conference stated that " ... it has been a matter of 
the deepest regret to us that the ties of Commonwealth association have been severed 
during the year" (MCSA 1961:231 ). 
In addition to the address/letter to the head of state, it was also standard practice to write 
other letters. Thus the Conference wrote one to the British Methodist Conference cited 
above and another to all the members of the Methodist Church of South Africa. There were 
also the report and resolutions of the Christian Citizenship Department (CCD) of the 
Methodist Church of South Africa, which deal with moral, social and political issues. From 
the ceo reports and resolutions and the other addresses, a clear picture can be gained of 
the mind of the Conference on issues that were put mildly in the letter to the head of state. 
An example of this is the question of the Soweto uprising. The Soweto uprising started on 
June 16, 1976 in r~sponse to the South African Government's decision to introduce 
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Afrikaans as the medium of instruction m some subjects in Black high schools. The 
imposition of Afrikaans was rejected by both students and parents. Students from various 
schools started marching through Soweto to Orlando Stadium, collecting other students as 
they went. They were confronted by the police, who fired shots at them and some students 
died. Violence and riots erupted throughout South African Black schools. The Soweto 
uprising changed the whole political situation in South Africa, especially in the field of 
education. Political repression and anti-government violence carried on well into 1977. 
Nowhere in the 1976 letter to the State President was it specifically stated that the tone and 
substance of the letter were motivated by the Soweto uprising. The letter merely appeals 
for change and mentions political repression, discrimination and the denial of personal 
freedoms. That the issue generating both the tone and substance of the letter is the Soweto 
uprising is made clear, however, in the address to the British Methodist Conference, which 
states directly that "events in Soweto have been greeted with shock and horror" (MCSA 
1976:272). This information is complemented by the address to the members of the 
Methodist Church of South Africa, which mentions "widespread riots and strife" and 
further that the Conference is "deeply conscious that for most Black people this is a time 
of tremendous frustration and alienation and of struggle to find human dignity in a climate 
of discrimination and injustice ... our deep sympathy (is extended) to all who have seen 
children, parents, relatives or friends killed in the recent riots" (MCSA 1976:275). 
The CCD report of 1976 (MCSA 1976: 182) goes further to make a firm resolution which 
states: 
In the light of the present Republic-wide unrest in our country the Methodist 
Conference calls for an-immediate end to police harassment of school children and 
community leaders ... Conference declares its solidarity with the hopes and 
aspirations of the Black people and impresses upon the Government the urgency 
of bringing rapid and radical change in the living and educational conditions under 
which urban Black people are living. The Conference further resolves that the 
General Secretaries of the C.C.D. should initiate approaches to the S.A.C.C. 
member churches and the Afrikaans churches of the Reformed tradition with a view 
to discussing ways and means of bringing peaceful change in South Africa while 
there is still time. 
It is clear therefore that the letter of greeting to the head of state was a traditional gesture 
of politeness which did not necessarily express the real feel;ngs of the Conference. 
71 
3.2.2 The 1977 Methodist Annual Conference 
The atmosphere prevailing at the 1977 Methodist Annual Conference which convened in 
Benoni on 20 October can be gleaned from its own address to the British Methodist 
Conference and to its own members as well as from the CCO reports and resolutions. The 
address to the British Conference speaks of the "security clampdown which banned 
eighteen organisations, closed down two papers, The World and The Weekend World and 
silenced Pro Veritate of the Christian Institute, itself among the banned organisations" 
(MCSA 1977:286). The mood of the Conference is further clarified by the address to the 
members of the Church which states that" ... there is a growing resistance building up from 
inside and outside our borders against discrimination and racial injustices and severe 
government bannings of organisations and individuals in the Republic" (MCSA 1977:291 ). 
Among those banned were two Methodist ministers, Theo Kotze and Brian Brown, who 
had been associated with the Christian Institute. 
The 1977 Conference was therefore held when political tension in the country was very 
high due to the death in detention of Steve Biko on 12 September 1977 and the banning 
of Black organisations on 19 October 1977. On the death of Steve Biko the Conference 
accepted the CCO resolution (MCSA 1977: 193) that 
The Conference deplores the death in detention of Mr Steve Biko and some 42 
other detainees and the manner of handling of these matters by the Minister of 
Justice, police and prisons and his department. Conference therefore calls upon the 
Minister to resign his post. 
The Minister of Justice at the time was Mr Jimmy Kruger of the infamous words, "Steve 
Biko's death leaves me cold". 
The letters of greetings to other heads of state (Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, 
Mozambique and Transkei) had already been written and approved when the letter to the 
State President of South Africa became an issue of dispute in the 1977 Conference. The 
committee appointed to draft the letter was sent back several times to redraft it. Some 
delegates felt that the traditional gesture of politeness should be dropped and an angry 
letter be written reflecting the feelings of the Conference. Dr H. Shaw, a layman from 
Pietermaritzburg who was also on the committee, eventually proposed that the letter not 
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be sent as it was a waste of time if it could not express the anger of the Conference. 
Reverend Dr L. Hulley, who was the convenor of the committee, seconded the proposal 
and it was adopted by the Conference (Hulley 1993). 
In the light of this proposal Rev. Cyril Wilkins moved that the whole practice of sending 
letters of greeting to heads of state be discontinued. In support of this motion one of the 
Black delegates asked how many letters of greeting the Conference would have to write 
since more homelands were to become independent in accordance with the SA 
Government's homeland policy (Fikeni 1991 ). The homelands granted independence were 
Transkei (1976), Bophuthatswana ( 1977) with Ciskei and Venda pending in 1981 and 
1982, respectively. They were called the TBYC states. The motion received overwhelming 
support and a previous resolution to send the already approved letters to the heads of the 
other Southern African states (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique and Transkei) 
was then rescinded. 
Since the way in which this dispute was reported in Dimension (the official newspaper of 
the Methodist Church of South Africa) played a central role in the Transkeian schism, it 
should be discussed. 
3 .2.2.1 The Dimension report 
The November 7, 1977 edition of Dimension covered the Annual Conference of the 
Methodist Church of South Africa. In an article entitled "No more greetings" it was 
reported that there had been no agreement in the Conference as to how the letter of 
greeting to be sent to the State President of the Republic of South Africa should be 
worded. According to the report, this letter "went through no less than four drafts because 
of the questions raised by delegates as to some or other detail of the letter" and" ... another 
issue which had been raised was that of the recognition of Transkei. Some Black delegates 
were unhappy that any letter (of greeting) might indicate recognition by the Methodist 
Church of the homeland state". 
It would seem that the intention of the Dimension report was to explain that the reason for 
discontinuing the practice of sending letters of greeting to the heads of state was the 
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dispute over the letter to the State President of South Africa. Incidentally, in doing so, the 
report also reveals that, although the letter to Transkei had been written and approved, it 
had had no easy passage because some Black delegates had seen it as implying a tacit 
recognition of the independence ofTranskei by the Methodist Church of South Africa. That 
this is probably the correct interpretation of the debate is confirmed by the fact that, in 
support of the motion of discontinuing the practice altogether, a Black delegate referred 
to the issue of homelands again by asking how many letters would need to be sent since 
more homelands were to become independent. 
If the Black delegates had expressed reservations about or even objections to sending a 
letter to Transkei, they were, in fact, also raising a matter of principle because the same 
Conference had already reaffirmed its rejection of the Government's homelands policy. In 
this regard the resolution (MCSA 1977: 192-193) stated: 
The Conference is of the opinion that this policy is divisive and disrupting the 
mission and the unity of the church. The Conference calls upon the Prime Minister 
to reconsider the Homelands Policy before the consequences of this policy result 
in devastating effects on the nation as a whole. 
In view of this clear policy position the question should be asked of why the MCSA did 
not condemn the independence of Transkei. Even in its response to Chief Matanzima's 
Press Statement of 12 January 1978 the MCSA was not trapped into declaring its position 
on the issue but insisted that "in the debate on this issue" (N.B. not on Transkei 
independence but on the letters of greetings) "some of those who spoke said that they 
themselves did not recognise Transkei. This, however, was not the issue before the 
Conference and the independence of Transkei was not debated (2.2)." 
The reasons for this non-condemnatory position of the MCSA were probably that it did not 
want to offend and alienate its Transkeian section who, through the Clarkebury District 
Synod had even sent a resolution requesting the Conference to include the Transkei State 
President in its letters of greetings. 
The second probable reason is that the MCSA did not want to compromise its "long and 
very honourable history of loyal service to Transkei". The Church wanted the Transkei 
independence to be recognised for what it was: a creation of the South African 
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Government for which Transkei could not be punished." 
The fundamental question of whether it is theologically correct for the Church to align 
itself with the State by pleading its loyalty even if this had been modified to a form of 
greetings was not addressed. Even in the 1977 Conference the resolution to discontinue 
came as a result of pragmatic consideration as the Church Statement of 16 January 1978 
suggests that 
The growmg complexity of the political situation m the nations served by this 
Church had made it more and more difficult for the Conference to send letters of 
greetings in their traditional form ... (2.2) 
Chief Matanzima, in the political seat of Transkei as successor to the British, Colonial and 
Republican authorities, did not want to see the Methodist tradition of sending loyalty 
address/letters of greetings discontinued but to continue and applied to Transkei as well. 
3.2.2.2 Text and context 
The decision to discontinue the practice of sending letters of greeting was the result of 
considerations arising out of the problem of formulating an acceptable text for the letter 
to the State President of the Republic of South Africa. The background to this problem 
with the text was its context. The contextual problem of a repressive government was also 
challenging the Methodist Church of South Africa to free itself from bondage to a British 
tradition (which had arisen in a specific political context) so that it could be more 
prophetic in and to the South African context. 
The resolution did not only signal a break with a tradition inherited from British 
Methodism but also signalled a relocation of the Methodist focus away from any pro-
establishment bias to those who were oppressed. This has to be said because, as Villa-
Vicencio had observed, the Methodist practice and teaching had always favoured the 
pourgeoisie, it encouraged conformity to the wishes of the upper middle classes and 
inhibited revolution (Villa-Vicencio 1989: 92-1 02). 
This attitude had been challenged in 1976. In the BMC Conference in Bloemfontein, Rev 
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E.N. Baartman remarked about the strange silence of the MCSA on the crisis created by 
the political situation (Balia 1991: 89). Later in the year the BMC presented each delegate 
in the Pietermaritzburg Conference with an "untabled document calling on the Conference 
to 'so adjust its agenda to accommodate discussion on the crisis situation in the country"' 
(Balia 1991: 93). The relocation of the Methodist focus to the oppressed in 1978 was 
therefore long overdue. 
Had the resolution to discontinue the practice been born out of theological reflection rather 
than pragmatic considerations of the problem with the text, it would have been a good 
example of contextual missiology. Nevertheless, the resolution was still a strong declaration 
by the Methodist Church of South Africa that it could not be co-opted by the State nor be 
seen as its co-traveller, especially in the apartheid situation of South Africa. Hulley ( 1995), 
who was on the committee responsible for drafting the letter, claims to have raised the 
issue of the relevance of the whole tradition. The Dimension report refers only to the 
textual problem. 
Having considered the ecclesial context of the dispute surrounding the letter of greeting, 
the next step will be to consider the political context by analysing the significance of 
political independence for Transkei. 
3.3 TRANSKEI AS A ''STATE" 
The creation of Transkei as a separate geo-political entity was a political design by the 
Cape colonial government to promote ethnocultural loyalty by manipulating the cultural 
homogeneity of the Xhosa-speaking tribes who were settled between the Kei River in the 
west and the Natal border in the east. 
This scheme was designed to discourage any political aspirations beyond the Transkei 
border (Hammond-Tooke 1968:45 5-459). The Nationalist Government of the Republic 
conferred a political status on this ethnocultural loyalty by granting political independence 
to Transkei in 1976 - an independence which was recognised only by its own mentor, the 
Republic of South Africa. 
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The 1978 Methodist schism in Transkei revolved around the issues of letters of greeting 
and Transkeian independence. To provide adequate background information on the issue 
of the recognition of Transkei independence and its clash with the Methodist Church of 
South Africa's tradition of loyal addresses, a brief look at the history of Transkei as a state 
IS necessary. 
3.3.1 The Bunga Council, 1895-1955 
The Xhosa-speaking tribes of Transkei had settled in the area now known as Transkei 
(trans= across the Kei River) as independent chiefdoms until the period between 1872 and 
1894 during which they were all incorporated into the British Cape Colony. 
As subjects of the British Crown, people were entitled to vote if they had the necessary 
qualifications prescribed for the non-racial franchise. While this caused no problem 
initially, the future consequences of the non-racial franchise could be anticipated in view 
of the growing number of Africans who could qualify for the franchise. 
To obviate this problem, the Cape colonial government devised a scheme to make Transkei 
a geo-political entity to be governed separately from the Cape Colony by the council 
system. To administer a chiefdom, the Cape colonial government first introduced a tribal 
council under a magistrate to conduct the affairs of each tribal territory. The tribal council 
was later replaced by the District Council. In 1903 these District Councils formed the 
Transkei District Council, which included the whole Transkei with the exclusion of 
Pondoland. 
In 1911 this council system was introduced in Pondoland but a separate council was 
established and finalised in 1927 as the Pondoland General Council. On 1 January 1931 
the two Councils - the Transkei District Council and the Pondoland General Council - were 
amalgamated to form the United Transkeian Territories General Council (UTTGC), which 
when in assembly was called the Bunga (the word means "council"). 
3.3.2 The administration of the Transkeian Tenitoties 
Proclamation 293 of 1896 placed the Transkei under the jurisdiction of a White magistrate 
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in Umtata. By 1931 the Bunga consisted of twenty-six White magistrates from the twenty-
six magisterial districts ofTranskei, three Paramount Chiefs from Thembuland and Eastern 
and Western Pondoland, and three representatives from each magisterial district; that is, 
a total of l 08 members including the White Chief Magistrate. 
The Bunga was meant to concern itself with practical issues affecting tribal life, like the 
dipping of cattle to combat disease and the building and maintenance of rural roads. 
Although the Bunga was restricted to local Transkeian matters, concern with provincial and 
national issues was very high in Transkei. But such enthusiasm was thwarted by the White 
control of the Bunga. Hammond-Tooke ( 1968) contends that this was a major weakness 
of the Bunga. It promised first to be an experiment in local government and training in 
governance but ultimately proved to have been designed to keep the Transkeians apolitical. 
This led to the apathy of the educated people towards the Bunga politics. Some found a 
more viable political platform in the African National Congress. Although the Bunga was 
initially meant to develop non-traditional (i.e. not chiefs) leadership, in the end chiefs and 
headmen formed the majority of the Bunga. When it met in a special session in November 
1955 to consider the integration of the council system with the proposed Bantu Authorities 
system, the Bunga had 17 chiefs, 49 headmen, 6 peasant farmers, 4 teachers, 2 ex-clerks, 
l attorney, 1 farmer and 26 magistrates with the White Chief Magistrate (Hammond-Tooke 
1968:467). It is not strange that they voted the Bunga out of existence in favour of the 
Bantu Authorities Act. 
The Bunga had failed to solve the two crucial issues of the African franchise in South 
African politics and curbing the political role of the chiefs. The commoners, who had the 
right to be involved in politics, were screened and the chiefs, whose traditional role was 
apolitical, were turned into politicians. 
3.3.3 The road to independence: 1955-197 6 
The issue of independence for Transkei was first mooted in 1920 as a reaction to Hertzog's 
deputation to the Versailles Peace Conference to ask for a South African republic. In 
Transkei it was feared that a South Africa separated from Great Britain would be worse 
in its race relations. The Bunga moved that in the event of "the Republic propaganda at 
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present being prosecuted by a certain section of the people of this country materializing, 
the Imperial Government will (or should) take over the Natives of this country under its 
protection as was done in the case of Basutoland" (TTGC 1920:92-93 ). This wish, as well 
as that of seeking provincial status during the 1940 conference, was never realised. 
The attainment of a form of independence for Transkei came as a result of the 
implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act, 68 of 1951, but this indepenuence was 
different from that sought in the 1920s, the status of a British Protectorate and the 
provincial status sought by the Transkei in the 1940s. 
3.3.3.1 The Bamu Authorities A ct. 68 of 1951 
The Bantu Authorities Act was passed in order to "provide for the establishment of certain 
Bantu Authorities and to define their functions" and "to abolish the Native Representative 
Council". Paragraph 2 of the Act provides for the establishment of tribal, regional and 
territorial authorities (Unjon Statutes 1951: 1152-1180). This Act ushered in the era of 
centralised Bantu administration in South African politics and the de facto creation of the 
Bantustans. It was rigorously opposed by the Blacks all over South Africa. They saw it as 
an attempt by the Nationalist Government to co-opt the traditional leaders like the chiefs 
on to its administration. 
When the Bantu Authorities Act was introduced in Transkei, it resulted in the Pondo revolt 
of 1960. On June 6, 1960 the police clashed with the Pondo tribesmen at Ngquza Hill, 
between Bizana and Lusikisiki. Between 11 and 30 Pondo tribesmen were killed by the police 
as well as some Pondo chiefs by the Pondo tribesmen. Later 30 Pondos were sentenced to 
death for their complicity in the Pondoland revolt (Mbeki 1984:116-134). 
3.3.3.2 Chief K.D. Mantanzima and Transkei politics 
During these turbulent years Chief Matanzima emerged as a loyal supporter of the South 
African government policy of the Bantustans. Davenport (1988:415) suggests that Matanzima 
had two main motives for this. First, he wanted to secure his personal promotion. In 1963 he 
became Chief Minister of Transkei and in 1966 was elevated to the rank of Paramount Chief. 
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Secondly, he wanted to accomplish his vision of an independent Transkei, which was why he 
called his political party the Transkei National Independence Party (TNIP). 
Matanzima's strongest opponent was Paramount Chief Victor Poto of Western Pondoland (of 
the Democratic Party). Chief Poto viewed Transkei as an integral part of a unitary South 
Africa and wanted to see it remain in that position. He strongly rejected the Bantustan policy, 
which sought to Balkanise South Africa into various independent Bantustans. 
Chief Matanzima, on the other hand, did not mmce his words in endorsing in toto the 
Government policy of separate development. In explaining his position vis-a-vis that of Chief 
Poto, Matanzima ( 1976:5 1-52) wrote "I accepted separate development and Mr Poto rejected 
it. I accepted the future Transkei as an independent state; he rejected it." 
The clash between Matanzima's separatist and Poto's unitarist views became very clear during 
Transkei's general elections in 1963. The election results showed that the electorate preferred 
the unitary view of South Africa which Poto held. The tribal chiefs, however, elected to prove 
their loyalty to their employer, the South African Government, and thus voted for Chief 
Matanzima's TNIP. Evidence of this loyalty was the fact that even in Eastern Pondoland 
(where the Bantustan policy was rejected by the people [see 3.3.3.1]) the chiefs, who were 
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Chief Poto's kin, voted for the TNIP. 
After the 1963 general elections ideologically defined political parties emerged. Chief 
Matanzima's separatist ideal gained momentum principally because the chiefs supported it. By 
1968, after the general elections of that year, Chief Matanzima was so confident of achieving 
his goal of an independent Transkei that he declared the following years would be a period 
of "sweat and toil in the implementation to its full of the policy of separate development" 
(Daily Dispatch, October 23, 1968). The first indication of this commitment was a motion 
(Hansard TLA 1968:6) during the 1968 Parliamentary Session by Mr H.M. Canca, which read: 
That as in terms of the Proclamation of Bantu Self Government Act of 1959 and the 
Transkei Constitution Act, it is envisaged that the Bantu areas should be developed 
into full independence, in the opinion of this Assembly the Government should 
consider the advisability of approaching the Republican Government to do everything 
in its power to prepare the Transkei for full independence within the shortest possible 
time. 
-----
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This motion was finally adopted by 52 votes to 22 (Hansard TLA 1968:251 ). In the same year 
(1968) the then Prime Minister, Mr B.J. Yorster, was quoted as saying that any Black people 
were free to discuss possible independence with him. 
A Recess Committee to consider the implications of independence for Transkei and to draft 
a Constitution was appointed by the Transkei Legislative Assembly after the general elections 
of 1973. It finalised its report at the end of 1974. Negotiations with the South African 
Government then began. In the interim the South African Government adopted the Status of 
the Transkei Act 100 of 1976, which provided inter alia for the transfer of sovereignty over 
Transkei from the Republic of South Africa to the Government of Transkei as a fully 
sovereign and independent state. Transkei finally became independent on 26 October 1976. 
3.3.4 Independence of Transkei 
The South African Bantustan policy was partly realised when Transkei was granted its 
political "independence" on 26 October 1976. About 1. 7 million people living in Transkei lost 
their right to South African citizenship. This number would swell to about 3 million since, in 
theory, all Xhosa-speaking Blacks were Transkeian except those deemed to belong to the 
Ciskei Bantustan (van der Bent 1986: 58). The Central Committee of the World Council of 
Churches took a resolution by which it 
condemns the deceptive manoeuvre of the South African government to perpetuate and 
consolidate apartheid by the creation of the so-called "independent" Transkei, by 
which these three million South Africans will be made foreigners in their own country 
... and expresses its solidarity with and compassion for the Xhosa-speaking people as 
they struggle for the legitimate rights of all Africans in South Africa (van der Bent 
1986: 59-60) 
In economic terms Transkei was dependent on South Africa for its budgetary needs. That 
Transkei would collapse without such financial assistance was proved during the break in 
diplomatic relationship between Transkei and the Republic of South Africa. Financial 
assistance to the Transkei was not withheld by the RSA (Streek & Wick steed 1980: 13 7). That 
also proved the extent to which the RSA would go to prop up the "independence" of Transkei. 
The RSA was prepared to carry on this financial burden in exchange for the elimination of 
Transkei from the political stakes in South Africa (see cartoon). Transkei remained, by design 
" 
,,, 
-
(H I 
··"·"':::;.~:.i~ 
81 
and expedience, a perpetual reservoir of cheap labour for South Afiica (Streek & Wicksteed 1980: 
148-169). The Transkeians were deemed to have voluntarily opted for this position through their 
vote in the 1976 general elections. This is the subjeCt ofthe following section. 
3.3.4.1 Transkei 1976: eleciiutiS or referendum? 
Within Transkei the political "independence" of Transkei was achieved by a political trick of 
interpreting the victory of the TNIP in the 1976 general elections as a "referendum" for 
independence. People were not asked to vote either for Transkei independence or to remain in the 
RSA (Streek & Wicksteed 1980: 32). Since the TNIP had campaigned on the ticket of Transkeian 
independence, its victory was interpreted as a vote for independence. 
The voting in 1976 had questionable legitimacy. Only 43.4 percent ofthe voters went to the polls. 
Even this figure was inflated by the electoral office to 65.95 percent by adding 100 percent voter 
turnout in the sixteen unopposed seats (Streek & Wicksteed 1980: 31 ). 
Streek and Wicksteed also point out that there were 1 083 175 registered voters in 1976, of 
whom only 354 489 went to the polls in the elections. (This actually gives a percentage of 32.7 
rather than 43 .4.) A total of 164 279 voted, which is 15.17 percent. This means that only 12.67 
percent (the TNIP support) actually supported the idea of independence. 
ChiefMatanzima still interpreted the 1976 election as an overwhelming support for independence. 
This claim motivated Professor Lawrence Schlemmer to investigate this apparent support for 
Transkei independence in the face of widespread rejection of separate homelands by the South 
African Blacks as part of the Quail Commission. He confined his investigation to urban Blacks, 
however, including those who had associations with the homelands and those for whom such 
association no longer existed (Quail Report, 1980: 177-300). 
Schlemmer found that those who approved of the homelands policy did so for socio-economic 
rather than political reasons, such as the right to land and stock or the lesser economic demands 
of rural life compared to urban economic demands. When asked to express their 
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political views, they still preferred a unified South Africa with universal franchise. These findings 
confirmed those ofthe Arnold Bergstrasse Institute, who found that the attitude of urban Africans 
towards the homelands policy was generally one of rejection (Quail Report, 1980: 5). 
In their different studies on the Soweto uprising, Schlemmer, Kane-Berman (1978: 98-10 1) and 
the Cillie Commission ( 1977: 586-588) found that the granting of independence to Transkei by 
the South Afiican Government was partly responsible. They identified the Transkeian dimension 
in the riots by the fact that in some areas the Xhosa-speaking youth took the lead and also by the 
slogans on placards (Streek & Wicksteed 1980: 8-9). 
Although Schlemmer's research was conducted outside Transkei, he holds the view that if 
conditions in Transkei were amenable to research, similar findings would confirm this general 
rejection of the homelands policy. The broad political range of Black attitudes towards the 
homelands policy would support this view. 
3.3.4.2 Black politics and the Bantustan policy 
The international community rejected Matanzima's (Transkei's) independence. The Western world 
awaited a signal of the approval of this independence from the African states, which was not 
forthcoming. Internal rejection within South Africa was uncompromising. The Bantu Authorities 
Act, which was the cornerstone of the Bantustans, had been rejected by the Pedi (1957), the 
Pondo ( 1960) and the Thembu ( 1962-1963) (Mbeki 1964 ). The traditional African political parties 
rejected it on the grounds that it was part of the grand apartheid programme of the South African 
Government. The position of the African National Congress was spelled out by two of its 
prominent leaders, Professor Z.K. Matthews and Chief Albert Luthuli. They reaffirmed the ANC's 
stand of a unitary non-racial and democratic South Africa. Professor Matthews pointed out that 
the homelands policy was an attempt by White South Africa to convince the international 
community by a system of co-opting Black leaders, namely the chiefs, that all was well in South 
Africa (Motlhabi 1985: 49-50). Chief Luthuli, speaking from his position as both politician and 
chief, was far more articulate. According to him, Bantustans were neither democratic nor African 
and when the Bantustan policy was rejected by the bona fide politicians, J:he Government 
approached chiefs individu~lly rather than hold a public 
-·-..-:"":" ·-
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meeting. Those chiefs who agreed with the policy did so against the wishes of their people. The 
most tragic aim ofthe Bantustan Act was that it sought to "wipe Africans off the South African 
political map" and a hierarchy of the governmental pawns would appear to rule while the world 
would be told that this was the traditional African way (Luthuli 1962: 200-201). 
The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) was even more critical of the homelands policy than the ANC. 
It declared the homelands leaders the enemies of the people. ChiefMatanzima and ChiefB.M. 
Buthelezi ofKwaZulu were singled out at the main traitors in the people's struggle against the 
White oppressors. Chief Matanzima was criticised for pursuing the policy of 'geographical 
tribalism' after he agreed to the regional separation of Transkei from South Africa. They treated 
Chief Buthelezi even more harshly for pursuing the policy of 'political tribalism'. In their view, 
Buthelezi was doing more harm to the cause ofBiack liberation by canvassing support even in 
urban areas of South Africa and thus was deceiving people into believing that he was fighting the 
system while, in fact, what he was doing was drawing people into it (Motlhabi 1985: 83). 
The acceptance of the Bantustan policy by some homelands leaders has always been qualified. The 
majority ofthem regarded it as a fourth option to the traditional forms of Black resistance, which 
Motlhabi (1985: I) identifies as political opposition, armed struggle and political journalism. Some 
traditional chiefs wanted to use the Bantustan structure as a form of leverage against Pretoria, to 
challenge the apartheid system from within and thus "fight for the liberation of the Black man fro in 
a position of power" (Republic of Transkei, 1976: 9). Others recognised the contradictions 
inherent in the homelands policy. ChiefMatanzima's statement in I973 showed the ambivalence 
of the policy when he claimed that the homelands could become independent but at the same time 
persisted in staking claims on the South African economy and citizenship. According to Motlhabi 
( I985: 217), in his I973 election manifesto, Matanzima said that: 
I: South Africa belongs to Black and White equally and all its wealth should be shared by all 
inhabitants without discrimination. 
84 
2: The Homelands should be developed to full independence and the division of land in 
terms of population numbers would be basic for the fulfilment of such independence. 
3: · There should be freedom to seek work anywhere in the RSA and freedom from pass 
laws. 
One could ask in what way, if these requirements were met, Transkei would still be 
independent and whether it would have ceased to be part of the RSA. 
Matanzima proceeded to opt for independence before any of his preconditions had been settled 
satisfactorily. For instance, the parts of South Africa he had claimed for Transkei (Griqualand 
East, Maclear, Ugie and Indwe) had not been consolidated nor were Transkeians granted dual 
citizenship (of Transkei and of the RSA) as he had intended. 
In Ciskei the findings of the Quail Commission suggested that the people were not 
enthusiastic about opting for independence yet a court application against Ciskei opting for 
independence was rejec.ted on the grounds that "in strict law the conferring of independence 
was a unilateral action by the South African Parliament whether the Ciskeians wished to 
accept it or not" (Davenport 1988: 456). This court ruling suggested that the Government 
could confer independence on any homeland, if it so wished. 
The homeland leaders came to realise the reality of the homelands and that, although they 
could not be wished away, they were not the final solution to the South African race problem. 
Professor Ntsanwisi, Chief Minister of Gazankulu, suggested that the homelands should be 
regarded as an "interim measure". Chief Lucas Mangope, Chief Minister of Bophuthatswana, 
argued that the "reality" of the Bantustans should not necessarily lead to the abandonment of 
the "permanent ideal" of "one man one vote" in a united South Africa {Mangope 1978: 65). 
Chief Buthelezi suggested that the interests of the majority group should be regarded as 
paramount in a region (B uthelezi 197 4: 11-13 ). 
3.3.4.3 Transkeian independence and the international community 
The Bantustan policy was designed to reach its logical conclusion when each homeland 
attained its full independence. Transkei was an ideal homeland to test and experiment with 
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this policy. The problem of obtaining international recogn{tion, which would legitimise the 
homelands policy, sabotaged the whole scheme. No nation was prepared to recognise Transkei. 
On 25 October 1976 the United Nations Organisation (UNO) proposed a resolution which 
called for the nations of the world not to recognise Transkei, a resolution that was passed 
unanimously with only the United States of America abstaining (Transkei Anniversary 
1986: I 0) 
On 26 October 1976 Nigeria introduced a resolu}ion on "The so-called Independent Transkei 
and other Bantustans" in the UNO. This resolution was adopted as Resolution 31/6A by the 
General Assembly by 134 to 0 votes, with only one abstention. The resolution stated that the 
Assembly: 
( 1) strongly condemned the establishment of bantustans as designed to consolidate the 
inhuman policies of apartheid, to destroy the territorial integrity of the country, to 
perpetuate white minority domination and to dispossess the African people of South 
Africa of their inalienable rights; 
(2) rejected the declaration of "independence" of Transkei and declared it invalid; 
(3) called upon all governments to deny any form of recognition to Transkei and to 
refrain from having any dealings with it or with other bantustans; and 
(4) requested all States to take effective measures to prohibit all individuals, 
corporations and other institutions under their jurisdiction from having any dealings 
with it or with other bantustans (UNO Year Book 1976: 125). 
Similarly, the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches (WCC) called "on 
member Churches to urge their governments to oppose the Bantustan policy, to withhold 
recognition of the Transkei as an independent state and to have no direct or indirect 
diplomatic, commercial or other relations with the Transkei, or any other activity which would 
imply recognition" (van der Bent 1986:59-60). 
This was a blow to both Transkei and the RSA. For Transkei, its international recognition 
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would have legitimised the course it had followed in the face of the widespread rejection of 
the homelands policy by SA Blacks. For the RSA, international recognition of Transkei 
independence would have proved to the SA Black community that its policy of separate and 
independent national states could work. Having failed to secure international recognition of 
its political independence, the Transkeian Government embarked on international lobbying for 
support. This is discussed in the next section. 
3.3.4.4 Transkei independence and international lobbying 
Transkei's desperate need for the recognition of its political independence ushered in a period 
of expensive campaigning. Initially, the campaign was a public relations exercise carried out 
from Pretoria by Dr Esche! Rhoodie's Department of Information. This Department produced 
expensive publications, such as Republic of Transkei ( 1976), Independence my w~· by 
Matanzima (1976) and others, to promote the acceptance and recognition of Transkei. It was 
estimated that the undertaking cost about Rl million (Streek & Wicksteed 1980: 200). The 
desired results were not achieved. 
The Transkeian Government then employed lobbyists to promote Transkei, especially in 
America. Mr Jay Parker, a Black American, who was paid R900 a month plus R60 000 a 
year, was employed to promote Transkei (Streek & Wicksteed 1980: 20 l ). Later, a former 
PAC exile, Mr Ngqondi Masimini was employed as Transkei's "ambassador" to North 
America. 
The lobbyists apparently worked harder in convincing the Transkei political government that 
they were about to make significant 'breakthroughs' than in convincing the international 
community of the Transkei case. They failed to deliver the goods, a failure which cost the 
Transkei a lot of money. 
3.3.4.5 Transkeian independence and political repression 
Within Transkei the need for the recognition of its independence was pursued through political 
repression of dissidents. Draconian laws of state security, some of which were inherited from 
the RSA, were used to persecute those who opposed the independence of Transkei. The 
--
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notorious South African Proclamation R400, which applied to Transkei as well since 1963, 
was not repealed by the independent Transkei. Instead, it was retained. The people who were 
worst hit by Proclamation R400 were the members of the Democratic Party, who held the 
unitarist view of South Africa. At one stage the Party's entire executive was detained (Streek 
& Wicksteed 1980: 12). The number of people detained in Transkei during the period from 
1963 to 1966 was much higher than for the period 1967 to 1975 Streek and Wicksteed ( 1980) 
interpret this as reflecting not so much the growing acceptance of the homelands policy as 
rather the growing realisation of the high risk of opposing Chief Matanzima. 
This political repression created a culture of fear and insecurity to a degree not experienced 
when Transkei was still part of the RSA. General Martin Ngceba, the head of the Transkei 
Police, was the most feared man in Transkei (Streek & Wicksteed 1980: 303 Brigadier Ngceba 
says ... ). The Transkei Intelligence Service, under Mr Fuzile Ngcai, was capable of infiltrating 
any organisation, including the Church. The awareness of its network was intimidating in any 
meeting (see 2.7.3). According to Rev. Mbabane, the presence of members of the Transkei 
Security Police at the meeting on 21 February 1978 was intimidating to some participants and 
prevented them from speaking (Dime~sion, May 7, 1978). 
The Methodist Church in Transkei could not escape being under constant police surveillance 
because some of the top officials in the Police Service, like General Martin Ngceba, Captain 
Damoyi, Lt Z. Lavisa and others, were Methodists and could attend some of the church 
meetings. Although they attended the meetings as good Methodists, they were nonetheless 
police officials in what had become a police state (Fadane 1992) and therefore their presence 
was intimidating. It is also significant that after the formation of the MCT some of them 
became members of some District Synods and also of the Conference (UMCSA 1988: 2). 
It was during this period of political repression and when the international campaign for the 
recognition of its independence was at its height that the Methodist Annual Conference in 
October 1977 passed a resolution on letters of greetings (see 3.6) that was to have fateful 
consequences for the Methodist Church of South Africa in Transkei. 
But, after a casual look at the issues involved, it would seem that there should have been no 
problem for the Methodist Church of South Africa to convince the Transkeian Government 
88 
that no insult to the government was ever intended by the decision to discontinue the practice 
of sending letters of greeting. The Transkeian Government itself, however, seems to have 
elected not to rid itself of the idea of having been insulted. 
The contextual analyses of the Conference resolution and the issue of the recognition of 
Transkeian independence do not give sufficient information about the prior relationship 
between the Methodist Church oi South Africa and Transkei. Since that relationship could 
have had a bearing on the issue in dispute, I shall now analyse it. 
3.4 METHODISM IN TRANSKEI 
In its statement of 16 January 1978, the Methodist Church of South Africa top executive 
claimed "a long and very honourable history of loyal service in Transkei ... " (see Appendix 
II). This long relationship between the Methodist Church of South Africa and Transkei should 
be analysed to see why it could not be used to save the situation and to establish whether the 
greeting issue did not, in fact, provide Chief Matanzima with an opportunity to manipulate 
the "misunderstanding" to pursue his own agenda for the Methodist tradition in Transkei. 
Analysing the problem from these perspectives is. based on the premise that there were 
sufficient grounds for resolving the dispute. 
The first Wesleyan mission station in Transkei was established in Butterworth in 1828. The 
Methodist schism in Transkei occurred on the I 50th anniversary of the establishment of 
Methodism in Transkei. During this long association a peculiar Transkeian Methodist tradition 
developed, consisting mainly in close co-operation between the Methodist (Wesleyan) 
missionaries and the tribal chiefs. Two factors facilitated and laid the foundations for this co-
operation: 
{I) William Shaw's determination to realise his dream of a chain of mission stations beyond 
the Colonial boundaries from Grahamstown through "Kaffraria" to Natal and Delagoa Bay 
(Shaw 1872:60). 
(2) The unstable political situation in the tribal kingdoms of Transkei caused by the Mfecane 
Wars (Edmunds 1936:111). 
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Both the missional)' activity and the political situation necessitated a close co-operation 
between the missionaries and the tribal chiefs. These two factors will now be considered. 
3.4.1 The missionaaies and ttibal poli_tics 
The Mfecane Wars which ravaged Natal and the Eastern Cape were caused by Shaka the Zulu 
imperialist between 1818 and the time of the Great Trek, but continued even after his death 
in 1828 to the 1850s. The Mfecane Wars did not only cause physical displacement of the 
tribes in the Transkei but also shattered the foundations of their social world - religion. The 
missionaries came at the most opportune moment as Peires ( 1981: 75) suggests that "a new 
religion could appeal only to those whose old world was irrevocably shattered and who 
wanted to build on a new one". 
The tribal leaders could no longer afford the luxul)' of quibbling with the missionaries on 
"Why does God not first convert the devil?" (Shaw 1872:75). 
According to Hammond-Tooke (1972: 172), the urgency of embracing the Gospel was spelt 
out by one of Chief Faku's counsellors, who responded to Shaw's address in 1829, by saying: 
The news you have told us today is good. It is sweet. It is like sweet cane Make haste 
and let a missional)' come. You talk about peace. It is good. We are tired of war, tired 
of brawling like wild beasts, or being hunted like game. 
Because of the unstable tribal politics, the missionaries were welcome to establish the mission 
stations and to live among the tribal kingdoms. As the missionaries became part of the tribal 
communities they served, they also shared the fate of the tribe. Some mission stations, for 
. . 
instance, were burned down during the tribal wars (e.g. Morley Mission Station; Clarkebul)' 
was threatened [Mears 1973: 18; 24 ]). The tribal chiefs took responsibility for the safety of the 
missionaries and the missionaries in return contributed by their diplomacy and clearer 
perception of intergroup relations. So, for example, Rev. Peter Hargreaves intervened in the 
disputes between Chiefs Ngangelizwe and Sarhili and between Chiefs Mqikela and Jojo 
(Mears 1973:22; 59). 
So the tribal politics, then, created a culture of a working relationship between the tribal chiefs 
and the Wesleyan missionaries in the Transkei. 
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3.4.2 The missionaries and colonial politics 
In their relationship with the Colonial Government the tribal chiefs adopted the missionaries 
as "our mouth to [the] white chiefs" (Shaw 1872:11 0). In the colonial programme of 
annexing the tribal territories into the Cape Colony the tribal chiefs used the missionary as 
"an agerit through whom he could negotiate with the Colonial Government" (Conradie 
1967:49). Peter Hargreaves advised AbaThembu to accept incorporation into the Cape Colony 
in 1875 (Conradie 1967:49). He also prevailed over Chief Mqikela of AmaMpondo to approve 
the annexation of Pondoland into the Cape Colony in 1894 (Mears 1973:61 ). 
Although the missionary policy specifically prohibited the missionaries from being involved 
in the Colonial-tribal politics, they felt it was within their missionary operations to be involved 
on behalf of the tribal chiefs as their spokespersons and advisers. This, again, helped to create 
d 
a culture of a working relationship between the tribal chiefs and the Wesleyan miSSionanes 
in the Transkei. 
3.4.3 The missionmies and education 
When the Jranskeian Government on 26 May 1978 declared the Methodist Church1 of South 
Africa an undesirable organisation in Transkei, Rev. Abel Hendricks, thep President of the 
Methodist Conference, responded: "The banning of a church which had openly proclaimed 
the Gospel of Jesus Christ for over a century in the Transkei, and which had provided the 
backbone of education, is one which must be rejected in he strongest terms" (Daily Dispatch, 
May 27, 1978). 
This statement would suggest that education was one of the mam features of the total 
missionary package delivered by the missionaries in Transkei. A comprehensive account of 
the establishment of Methodism in the Transkei is provided in Mears ( 1973) Miss ion to 
Clarkebury, in which he tells the story of establishing the major Methodist mission stations 
like Clarkebury, Buntingville and Palmerton. It is therefore appropriate to consider education 
as part of the Methodist claim of "loyal service". 
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3.4.3.1 Fonnal education 
The missionaries, the tribal chiefs and the Colonial Government did not only interact in the 
field of politics but also in the field of education. 
The missionaries initiated the programme of building schools, the tribal chiefs co-operated by 
donating land and provided pupils and money in the form of cattle, and the Colonial 
Government provided teachers and subsidised the mission schools from 1856 (Saayman 
1991:29). 
That the tribal chiefs were interested in education as distinct from the Gospel is borne out by 
the fact that none of the chiefs who had invited the missionaries to establish mission stations 
in their respective areas (Chiefs Ngubengcuka [Thembu], Faku [Pondo], Ncapai [Bhaca] and 
Mhlontlo [Pondomise]) ever embraced the Christian faith. In their invitations they usually 
stated that they wanted their people to be "educated". The very Xhosa understanding and 
designation of the missionary/minister as umfundisi has an education connotation. 
The missionaries themselves put a high premium on education. So it is that people who are 
not Christians often say, "I did not go to school". According to D.D.T. Jabavu (Eveleigh 
1923:27), 
[The] earliest missionaries realised that in order to keep aflame the light thus kindled, 
it was necessary for the converts ... to have literature which they could read for their 
own spiritual solace and for the purposes of propagating the Word among others. The 
school was the natural corollary or appendage of any Gospel Centre. 
This truth is confirmed by the fact that the school in Wesleyville was established only 
fourteen months after the commencement of the mission work (Shaw 1872: 122). Each 
Methodist church site was also a potential Sunday school and ultimately a day school. The 
church and the school became almost synonymous as Jabavu (Eveleigh 1923:27) observed that 
the "school combines in its significance both the Day School and the whole Mission Station 
where the school and the mission are located". 
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Because of the large number of Methodist schools in Transkei, many educated people must 
have been exposed to the Methodist influence at some stage in their lives. The missionary 
policy was that those who wanted to train as teachers in Methodist schools had to become 
Methodists. Eveleigh ( 1923:34) explains this policy by saying the Methodist Church was 
"convinced that only Christian teachers could give the education our schools were intended 
to impart ... at first only such as were members or on trial for membership in the church, were 
admitted to the training institutions ... few pass through our institutions without spiritual 
blessing ... ". 
This policy was extended to the Church employment practice Those who wanted to teach in 
the Methodist schools had to become Methodists. The church building, which was used as a 
Sunday School on Sundays, be~ame a Day School on weekdays. The Day School in the 
mission station developed into a Secondary School and ultimately into a High School or a 
Teacher Training and/or Industrial School. The large educational institutions of Clarkebury 
(1875), Buntingville (1881), Emfundisweni (1887) and Shawbury (1893), which became the 
pride of Methodism in Transkei, grew up during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 
The Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953 transferred the control of the schools from the churches 
to the state. This Act was passed to "provide for the transfer of the administration and control 
of native education from the several provincial administrations to the Government of the 
Union, and for matters incidental thereto". Paragraph 9.1 of the Act states that" ... no person 
shall establish, conduct or maintain any Bantu or native school ... " (Union Statutes 1953: 264). 
The Act robbed the churches of a major area of influence, the one through which the 
missionaries had endeavoured to create a Christian culture in Transkei 
The 1960 Annual Conference of the Methodist Church of South Africa passed a resolution 
that "the Church would continue to control its own Hostels" (MCSA 1960: 126). Indeed, it 
continued to run eighteen hostels in Transkei. By 1991 this number had shrunk to nine 
(MCSA 1991 :225). 
The Methodist Church of South Africa still exercises some influence in its hostels since the 
Transkei Government still gives first preference to the Methodist Church of South Africa in 
the appointment of chaplains to the high schools and colleges which formerly belonged to the 
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Methodist Church. 
3 .4.3 .2 Infonnal education 
As early as 1824 William Shaw realised that informal education had a major role to play in 
>the transformation of the Xhosa society. He believed that this could be achieved (I) by 
encouraging the missionaries to actually live among the Xhosa and visit their homes so that 
their personal influence could befelt and also (2) through the Xhosas' exposure to the Western 
way of life. This he did by taking young Chief Kama of the AmaGqunukhwebe and others 
to Grahamstown (Shaw 1872:129-130) 
This idea was crystallized in the upbringing of the sons of the chiefs by the missionaries. 
From the missionary point of view, the son of a chief who was brought up in the manse 
would be sufficiently exposed to the Gospel and "civilisation". 
The missionaries shared this philosophy of Christian socialisation with the state. Hodgson 
( 1982) uses the establishment of the "Kafir College" as a case study which highlights the co-
operation between the church and the state as epitomising the identification of the missionary 
outreach and the secular motives of imperialism during the Victorian era. 
It was generally believed by the Government and the missionaries that bringing up the sons 
of chiefs in a "European" family was a good and wise investment for both the church and 
the state. Sir George Grey tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Paramount Chief of the 
AmaXhosa, Sarhi1i, to allow his son to come and live with him. 
So far I have merely described the miSSionary activity m the Eastern Cape and Transkei 
without a conceptual theory for interpreting that activity. An interpretation of that activity 
would help in defining the ultimate objective of the missionary activity. 
Peires (1989) interprets the missionary activity as a process of transferring the Xhosa society 
to a new world-view. In the process their own world-view was undermined and delegitimated. 
This sociological interpretation is certainly correct since it is based on a general phenomenon 
which occurs when different cultural groups come into contact. Schreiter ( 1993) has given us 
the useful concept of "group boundaries" for understanding the process of cultural interaction 
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of different groups. According to him, each group has its own "boundaries" and world-view, 
which define its identity. These group boundaries are transgressed when members from one 
group cross the boundaries of another group. In most cases, it is the powerful group which 
invades the weaker group's boundaries. 
In the Eastern Cape this invasion of the Xhosa group boundaries by the missionaries was very 
thorough, starting from conferring the staius of "first" names to the English personal names 
given to the Xhosa at school and in the church right through to dress code. In this process the 
Methodist missionaries waged a campaign of "cultural conversion", which affected not only 
the members of the Church but an even wider community. 
Moreover, the nature of miSSionary activity m the colonial situation had far-reaching 
significance in terms of the attitudes they created. To be more precise in this regard, one could 
ask what type of Xhosa attitudes towards the colonial situation the Methodist missionaries 
created. The answer to this question lies in the attitude of British Methodism towards the 
socio-political issues. The attitudes of British Methodism are linked to those of John Wesley. 
Most scholars agree that, although John Wesley was concerned about the upliftment of the 
"wretched of the earth", he was essentially a conservative churchman who believed in the 
preservation of the status quo. E.P. Thompson (1963: 398) writes that Methodist theology "by 
virtue of its promiscuous opportunism, was better suited than any other to serve as the religion 
of a proletariat whose members had not the least reason, in social experience, to feel 
themselves to be 'elected'. In his theology, Wesley appears to have dispensed with the best 
and selected unhesitatingly the worst elements of Puritanism: if in class terms Methodism was 
hermaphroditic, in doctrinal terms it was a mule." Thompson characterised the Methodist 
teaching as "hermaphroditic"; that is, showing interest in both the oppressor and the 
oppressed, the upper and the lower classes. The Gospel was preached in such a way that each 
class was made to be happy in its status. The emphasis on the egalitarianism (equality of men 
as sinners) concealed the fact of accountability of the upper class for the plight of the lower 
classes and concretised egalitarianism "by drafting the poor and the oppressed in the 
ideological structures of the oppressors" (Mosala 1989: 89). Villa-Vicencio ( 1989: 95) 
endorses this view by saying that Methodism's social influence was essentially one that 
"favoured the bourgeoisie, inhibiting the revolution which radical workers sought". 
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Although Methodism was conservative in design and teaching, it was still capable of 
revolutionising its followers. On this Hulley ( 1987: 27) says that Wesley "had created a structure 
in which ordinary people could hold office as leaders, stewards and local preachers, thus providing 
'training in running a complex organisation and in leadership as well as public speaking, but he was 
afraid of democracy. In the end, however, the democratic potential which he helped to bring 
about triumphed." 
The Methodist tradition, then, as exhibited in both the Eastern Cape and the broader South 
Afiican Methodism is essentially of a conservative mould. Methodists are influenced to conform 
to the social order prescribed by the ruling classes. But, as Hulley (1987) points out, Methodist 
teaching has the potential to break out of that conservative mould. The 1977 Annual Conference 
demonstrates this quite clearly. The time had arrived to "reject the narrow Wesleyan perspective, 
replacing it with a broad theological horizon which is latently and powerfully present in our 
heritage" (Villa-Vicencio 1989: 1 02). In 3 .4. 5 I shall consider the peculiarities of Transkeian 
Methodism. 
3.4.4 Transkei Government and the racial practices of the MCSA 
At the meeting on 31 January 1978 some Transkeian Cabinet Ministers strongly condemned the 
racial practices within the Methodist Church of South Africa. The issues that were highlighted at 
that meeting were the racially segregated circuits and congregations, church property ownership 
and the racially determined stipend scales of the ministers. These three issues should be considered 
separately. 
3.4.4.1 Racial Circuits and congregations 
One of the issues which was brought into the spotlight at the meeting of 31 January 1978 was that 
of the racially segregated circuits and congregations in Transkei. All White congregations in 
Transkeian towns fell under White circuits, irrespective of the distance. Thus a "Coloured" 
Methodist congregation near Port St. John's was administered by Kokstad Circuit, a White 
congregation in Idutywa was administered by East London Circuit. 
In the 1977 Minutes ofConference (MCSA 1977:233) the names ofRevs P.C. Shone and 
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O.B. Ngcatshe appear both in the Umtata (European) Circuit (then called the Mid-Transkei 
Circuit) and the Umtata African Circuit. The congregations, however, were racially divided. The 
congregation at Frere Road was becoming mixed but it was still one of the very few of such 
congregations in the whole of the MCSA to do so. Generally, circuits and congregations were 
divided along racial grouping (as is the practice in some circuits even today- 1995) and ministers 
were appointed mainly to their racial groups, to circuits which were racially defined as 
"European" or "African" and so on. 
While the independent Transkei had removed all the vestiges of an apartheid society from 
Transkei, these were still existing in the RSA and the MCSA. The two Methodist Churches very 
close to each other in Umtata, namely the Frere Road Methodist Church for the White 
congregation and the Leeds Road Methodist Church for the Black congregation, were seen as 
evidence. This was the anomaly which Mr Pamla suggested should be speedily addressed (2.3). 
3.4.4.2 Church property ownership 
Land and property ownership have been contentious political issues since they were regulated by 
the Land Act of 1913 and 1936 and more recently by the Group Areas Act of 1972. 
Mr Pamla raised this issue at the meeting of 3 1 January 1978 when he said, "We know that the 
Methodist Church of South Africa is legally White in South Africa, although the majority of its 
members are Africans" (see 2.3). All church properties in Transkei were, by law, owned by a 
controlling body outside the "sovereign state of Transkei". 
This problem arose from the apartheid system of South Africa. In spite of protests by the Church, 
it had to be classified white or lose all titles to its properties. In Black areas, where the properties 
were occupied by a permit system, the Church could not own any land. 
Conference after Conference rejected the laws through which the apartheid system was socially 
institutionalised: Population Registration Act (MCSA 1970: 160); Prohibition of Mixed Marriages 
Act (MCSA 1977: 183); Bantu Education Act (MCSA 1960: 126) and Group Areas Act (MCSA 
1970: 165), and yet in so many ways the MCSA was itself"trapped in apartheid" 
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(Villa-Vicencio 1988). 
3.4.4.3 Discrimination in stipend allowances 
Discrimination in salaries, stipends and wages on the basis of race has been the premium 
indicator of the economic stratification of the South African society for a very long time. In 
the MCSA this difference in stipend allowances had been a contentious issue at synod after 
synod and conference after conference. 
That the racist stipend scales was the practice not only of the MCSA but also of other 
churches as well was revealed in a study by Rev T.S.N. Gqubule. His article, "Ministers' 
stipends in multiracial churches" (Gqubule 1968) tabled the racially differentiated stipend 
scales of the Church of the Province (Anglican), the MCSA, the Presbyterian Church of South 
Africa and the United Congregational Church. The study revealed the following situation: 
A. The Chmt:h of the Province of South Africa (Diocese of Grahamstown) 
Incumbent 
Assistant Curate 
Deacon 
European· and Coloun~d 
Rl260 p.a. 
RlOOO p.a. 
R 800 p.a. 
African 
R850 p.a. 
R760 p.a. 
R660 p.a. 
B. The Methodist Chmt:h of South Africa 
Probationer· 
Minister 
l-3 years 
Remaining years 
European 
Rl040 p.a. 
Rl200 p.a. 
Colomed and 
Indian 
R 800 p.a. 
RlOOO p.a. 
African 
R568 p.a. 
R568 p.a. 
The CPSA, MCSA and PCSA referrred to their White ministers as "European." 
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Ord. Minister 
1-5 years R1700 p.a. R1050 p.a. R750 p.a. 
6-10 years R1750 p.a. R1100 p.a. R750 p.a. 
11-15 years Rl800 p.a. R1150p.a. R750 p.a. 
16-20 years R1850 p.a. Rl200 p.a. R750 p.a. 
21-25 years R1900 p.a. R1250 p.a. R750 p.a. 
26-30 years R1950 p.a. R1300 p.a. R750 p.a. 
31-35 years R2000 p.a. R1350 p.a. R750 p.a. 
c. The Presbyterian Church of Southern Africa 
Years of service 0-3 3-6 6-12 12-18 18-24 over 24 
European Ministers 1608 1680 1800 1896 1968 2040 
Eur. ord Evangelists 1440 1512 1608 1728 1728 1728 
African Ministers 792 840 888 984 984 1008 
Afr. ord Evangelists 568 696 744 792 792 792 
D. United Congregational Church: minimum scales 
African: R672; Coloured: R960; White: R1,440 (Gqubule 1968:58) 
These racist stipend scales were widely criticised but the MCSA continued the practice of racist 
stipend scales until 1976. In defence of these racist stipend scales the White ministers and lay 
people always argued that a minister's stipend allowance was paid by his own circuit. Secondly, 
to raise the African minister's stipend allowance would be tantamount to elevating him far above 
his own community. Many platitudes were used to remind the African ministers ofthe meaning 
of the Christian vocation, sacrifice and communal identification. 
Against such platitudes the African argument was that it was unChristian to base stipend 
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differentiation on the economic stratification obtaining in the broad South African way of life as 
if that were itself normal and Christian, and that the Church should take the lead to abolish the 
racist differentiation of stipend allowances. 
The MCSA finally abolished racist disparity in ministers' stipend allowances in 1976. This was 
regarded as a great breakthrough, which even merited reporting to the British Conference: 
During the Conference, we have made good progress towards the elimination from our 
structures of vestiges of discrimination. Th~ adoption of a common minimum scale of 
stipends has been a stepforward in our aim of achieving common stipends and common 
standards for a common ministry (MCSA 1976:271). 
The non-racist stipend policy became effective in 1977 as the 1976 Conference had voted for the 
following minimum stipend scales for all the racial group.s: 
Probationer Ministers 
1-3 years 
Remaining years 
Ordained Ministers 
1-5 years 
6-10 years 
11-15 years 
16-20 years 
21-25 years 
26-30 years 
31- years 
R1152 
R1308 
R1536 
R1590 
R1644 
R1698 
R1752 
R1806 
R1860 
(MCSA 1976:108) 
The adoption of the policy of non-racist stipend scales would not have been known by some 
people in 1978. Mr Cromwell Diko, the leader of the Opposition Party in the Transkeian 
Parliament and also a minister of the Methodist Independent Church, still charged that Black 
ministers were given "meagre handouts while the White ministers were getting fat cheques ... " 
(Daily Dispatch, February 1, 1978). 
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This view would persist for some time even amongst those who should have known and 
appreciated the improvement. This was partly due to the fact that the 1976 Conference had 
prescribed only a minimum stipend scale and those circuits, presumably the White circuits, 
who were able to pay more were free to do so. The minimum stipend scale for an ordained 
White minister with 30 years' service was Rl 950 p.a. in 1968 but for 1977 the Conference 
-
recommended R l 8061 This made the policy look more like window-dressing. 
The racist discrimination in ministers' stipend scales was still an issue of contention and it did 
have a bearing on the Methodist schism of 1978- in spite of the 1976 Conference resolution 
to discontinue the practice. 
The Transkeian Government raised the three issues of racial circuits and congregations, church 
property ownership and racist stipends in order to argue for the formation of a Methodist 
Church of Transkei, which would be structurally more "loyal" to the Transkeian state. The 
greetings issue had provided an opportune occasion to pursue the goal of having its "own 
Church". 
Although the Cabinet Ministers raised these issues, what is more significant is that they did 
not so much argue the case for banning the Methodist Church of South Africa as present the 
case for supporting the idea of forming the Methodist Church of Transkei. Their aim, it would 
seem, was to point out to the Methodist ministers the folly of being loyal to a church which 
practised racism while they were citizens of a Transkeian state which was free from racism. 
Similarly, Chief Matanzima did not argue only the case for banning the Methodist Church of 
South Africa but also the case for forming the Methodist Church of Transkei (see 2.3). His 
argument was based on the desirability of forming a church which would be co-ordinated with 
the state of Transkei. Such a church would have its headquarters iQ Umtata, as was the case 
with Transkei state and government, and could have its ministers deployed in the Republic 
of South Africa to serve its Transkeian members. 
3.4.5 The identity of Transkeian Methodism 
Although we should include both the Queenstown and the Clarkebury Districts when 
( 
----
------
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considering the peculiarities of Transkeian Methodism, we should focus especially on 
Clarkebury District because it is exclusively Transkeian (see Appendix III). 
Within the broad South African Methodist tradition the Clarkebury. District has for a long time 
been regarded as a "missionary District" and for this reason has received much attention and 
financial assistance from the MCO. Among its main features as a District was an extensive 
involvement in the field of education that was not equalled by any other District in the 
MCSA. This programme seems to have been the main reason for retaining the White 
missionaries serving Christian communities which were exclusively Black. This involvement 
in the field of education has contributed significantly in creating an essentially Methodist 
Christian oral tradition in Transkei - Christians of other churches will use the terminology, 
ethos and idiom of the Methodists: Mongameli, Mfundisi wam. dade, baza/wana, ramente and 
so on. Then, too, the Methodist tradition has spearheaded the development of indigenous 
Church leadership. 
Even within the MCSA, the Clarkebury District always had more Black superintendents than 
other Districts. The transition of the Clarkebury District from a missionary to an African/Black 
District took about twenty years: from 1950 to 1972. This period is dated from the 
appointment of Rev. E.J. Ndzamela to Palmerton in 1945. Previously very few, if any, Black 
Superintendents and ministers were ever appointed to mission stations that had been 
established by the missionaries. Most of these mission stations had educational institutions, 
for example Clarkebury, Buntingville, Shawbury, Osborn and Mfundisweni. The first Black 
Warden was Rev. Seth M. Mokitimi, who was appointed Warden of Osborn Institution 
(MCSA 197~: 1 0). 
In 1971 Rev. R.I. Thompson, the last White miSSIOnary, retired. The 1968 Conference 
appointed Rev. Jotham C. Mvusi as the first Black Chairman of the Clarkebury District 
(MCSA 1991: 82). At the end of 1975 he retired and was succeeded by Rev. F.H.T. Fikeni. 
In the following year ( 1976) Transkei gained its independence. 
During this period of church transformation to a Black-led District, there was also a parallel 
political transformation to a Black civilian state: the White magistrates and other high officials 
in the public service were replaced by Black officials. This was also the period of the 
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emergence of Transkei local government. 
When Chief Matanzima was prepanng for Transkeian independence, some Methodist 
ministers, Revs A.L. Socikwa, M.V.D. Lila and M.M.V. Njongwe, were appointed to serve 
in the Department of Foreign Affairs. By giving such posts to Methodist ministers, Chief 
Matanzima was probably carrying on the Eastern Capeffranskei tradition of a close 
relationship between the missionaries and tribal chiefs. Chief Matanzima and other Transkeian 
politicians were proud ·of being Methodist lay people and also of long association with most 
senior Methodist ministers, whom they called the "Faculties". They had been students together 
at Healdtown Institution or Lovedale Institution and mainly at Fort Hare University College. 
Although Chief Matanzima involved some Methodist ministers m his preparation for an 
independent Transkei, the sojourn of the Federal Theological Seminary Southern Africa in 
Umtata must have rudely awaken him to the realisation that he was then not dealing with the 
generation of the "Faculties" but highly politicised theological students. This expenence 
created a sceptical attitude towards the younger MCSA ministers. There was a growmg 
perception in political circles that they were being trained to be sympathetic to communism 
and to be political activists, a perception that was long held by some politicians in South 
Africa. 
The different attitudes of some politicians towards the Methodist ministers must have put 
Matan.zima in a dilemma. He and other politicians were largely comfortable with the White 
missionaries and the inherently conservative old-style Black ministers, but had a problem in 
handling the "angry young men of Black Consciousness". 
In spite of his own anger at the younger ministers, Matanzima was still soft on the Methodist 
ministers. This probably explains some events in Transkei following the death in detention of 
Steve Biko on 12 September 1977. While ministers of other churches, Revs Prince Ntintili and 
Mcebisi Xundu, were detained for organising transport for people to attend the funeral in King 
William's Town (Daily Dispatch, 27 January 1978), the Methodists, Revs Tom Mbabane and 
Max Lungu, who were also involved in the arrangements, were never detained. 
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In the light of the above consideration of a peculiar Methodist tradition in Transkei, while the 
Methodist Church in South Africa's top executive claimed the credit for the MCSA, the 
Transkei Government would hold a different view. It could claim that that tradition was 
possible only through the co-operation of the tribal chiefs. 
In the post-missionary period that tradition was no longer very visible. The missionaries had 
left Transkei and education - an important sphere of partnership between the missionaries and 
the tribal chiefs - had been taken over by central government In fact, centralisation in 
administration, both in the political and the ecclesial sphere,. had the effect of undermining 
local co-operation between the "state" and the church. 
After reclaiming authority for local administration through the homelands policy, Chief 
Matanzima would have the same vision for the Methodist Church in Transkei. Through the 
domestication of both politics and the church, the tradition of co-operation between the 
missionaries and the tribal chiefs could be revived. This should explain why he preferred to 
keep the "misunderstanding" alive and also why he was interested not only in banning the 
Methodist Church of South Africa but also in the formation of the Methodist Church of 
Transkei. 
·As it was appropriate to give an account of the political situation in Transkei at the time of 
passing the 1977 Conference resolution (3.3.4.3-3.3.4.5) it is also appropriate to do the same 
for the Clarkebury District 
When Rev Mvusi was retiring as Chairman of the District in 1975 two groups emerged in the 
District, each· with its own candidate for the Chairmanship of the District Rev. Fikeni won 
the contest The tension between the two groups had not finally melted away when the 1977 
Methodist Annual Conference suspended three ministers from Clarkebury District This led 
to unhappiness and the signing of a petition. 
In the District Special Synod Rev. Gaba, who had been a District delegate to the 1977 
Conference, and yet had signed the petition (see 2.6) had no option but to stand together with 
Rev Fikeni when giving an explanation to the District But Rev. Gaba went further than that 
He proposed that the District should pass a vote of confidence on the Chairmanship of Rev. 
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Fikeni, and even argued that it was urgent since the District was under threat from both the 
MCSA (as it had already suspended three of its ministers) and the Transkeian government (as 
it had threatened to ban the MCSA). The vote of confidence was passed unanimously. The 
issue for which the Special Synod had been convened was thus, to the dismay of the 
suspended ministers, relegated to the background. 
From then on the District groups changed alliances; the pro-Masela group of 1975 split, with 
Rev. Gaba then emerging as a leader of the pro-Fikeni group and Rev. Mbabane as the leader 
of a group who were no longer pro-Fikeni. The climax of this feud was reached when he 
accused Rev. Fikeni of "telling lies" in the Chairmen's Meeting (Makalima 1989: 12). Of 
course by then the issues which had caused tension in the Clarkebury District, namely, the 
successor to Rev. Mvusi and the suspension of the three ministers were displaced by the 
question of responding to the ban. The suspension of the three ministers had a bearing on the 
re-alignment of power blocs within Clarkebury District and in creating a culture of fear and 
intimidation in the church; these in turn had a bearing on the way some people responded on 
the impending ban (Oral sources). 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
This contextual analysis of the three issues of the church resolution, the independence of 
Transkei, and the Methodist tradition in the Transkei was a serious attempt to understand 
issues in their respective contexts which define their meaning and significance in their own 
communities. 
The MCSA's resolution on discontinuing letters of greetings to heads of state was therefore 
taken in a complex political context by a church who wanted to be prophetic. In the process 
that led to a clash with a political vision of a homeland. 
While the Transkei Government may seem to have overreacted, it had nothing to gain by 
"punishing" the Methodist Church of South Africa. Instead, it would lose more from the 
international community from which it sought to secure political recognition. And yet, in spite 
of this, it did not back down: its eyes were already set on gain in another respect. 
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As a product of the South African political ideology, Chief Matanzima could probably not 
visualise his new Transkei state without religious support and therefore needed a Transkeian 
Church that would be the Transkeian ''Government at prayer". His dispute with the Methodist 
Church of South Africa therefore did not arise out of an anti-church attitude at all, but rather 
from a conviction, supported perhaps by his observation of the relationship between the South 
African Government and the Dut~h Reformed Church, that a state needs religious support. He 
therefore needed an ecclesial alliance which would complement his political programme of 
creating a Transkeian political identity by injecting a religious spirit into that movement. 
In the end the Transkeian schism occurred not only because the Transkei Government and the 
Methodist Church of South Africa failed to resolve the dispute but also because the issue had 
shifted to the Transkeian Methodists. They themselves were divided by a conflict of different 
loyalties. This will be dealt with in chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER4 
A CONFLICTUAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
~n chapter 2 a narrative method was used to tell a story of the 1978 Methodist schism in 
Transkei. Chapter 3 contextually analysed the issues of the recognition of Transkeian 
independence and Methodist tradition of church greeting. These issues were identified as 
providing the political and ecclesial contexts of the crisis which developed for the 
Methodist Church of South Africa: 
In 1.5.3 it was pointed out that conflict is an inherent component of a story. As anyone 
who reads the story of the MCT will see, the element of conflict runs right through it. 
Although three stages of the conflict in the MCT have been identified, namely between the 
Transkeian Government and the international community, the Transkeian Government and 
the MCSA, and the conflict amongst the Transkeian Methodists, this chapter will focus 
only on the latter. It is a conflictual analysis of the reaction of the Transkeian Methodists 
to the pending banning of the MCSA in Transkei. 
Although chapter 3 may be seen as a study of conflict, it is more an analysis of a clash of 
political and ecclesial agendas. That clash generated a deeper conflict and major players, 
determined by different loyalties, began to emerge. This chapter is about that dimension 
of the process of the schism. In analysing a situation like that of the MCT, it is important 
to take into account the grassroots reaction to a crisis. The common approach is to focus 
only on the main actors, in our case the Transkeian Government and the MCSA, thus 
ignoring the people who are most affected. In this chapter the MCT schism will be 
. analysed from the perspective not of the main actors but of the majority of the affected 
people. 
In the face of the unresolved dispute between the Transkeian Government and the 
Methodist Church of South Africa, the Transkeian Methodists had to take a position. This 
was inevitable because they were the group who would be affected most if the Methodist 
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Church of South Africa were to be banned in Transkei and the Methodist Church of 
Transkei formed. 
The mam Issue dividing the Transkeian Methodists was that of participation or non-
participation in the debate on the banning of the Methodist Church of South Africa in 
Transkei and the formation of the Methodist Church of Transkei. One group, the 
"loyalists", seemed content to leave the matter .in the hands of the top executive of the 
Methodist Church of South Africa while the other group, the ''nationalists", were 
determined, as stakeholders, to make their own input on the matter. 
The question of participation or non-participation plunged the Methodists in Transkei into 
a deeper crisis and their different positions assumed another dimension, namely that of 
loyalty to the Methodist Church of South Africa (the loyalists) and loyalty to the Methodist 
Church of Transkei (the nationalists). This can be represented as follows: 
MCSA Silent 
Majority 
MCT 
(to be 
formed) 
Between the two extreme positions of loyalty either to the ·Methodist Church of South 
Africa or to (the idea of) the Methodist Church of Transkei, there were various other forms 
of loyalty. 
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The different groups and loyalties began to surface at the meeting on 31 January 1978. An 
analysis of the conflict will identify the group loyalties into which the Transkeian 
Methodists were divided. This conflictual analysis will help to explain why the initiative 
shifted from the Transkeian Government and the Methodist Church of South Africa to the 
Transkeian Methodists and also how the interaction of the different groups led to the 
schism instead of procuring a negotiated autonomy from the Methodist Church of South 
Africa for the Methodists in Transkei. 
4.2 GROUP LOYALTIES 
The six loyalties which can be regarded as crucial to the process of the schism will be 
described. 
4.2.1 Loyalty to the Methodist Church of South Africa 
It can reasonably be assumed that all the Transkeian Methodist ministers, whether 
appointed to circuits in the Transkei or the Republic of South Africa, in good ministerial 
standing, retired or suspended, were loyal to the Methodist Church of South Africa. Such 
loyalty entailed observing· and carrying out the directions and policy of the Methodist 
Church of South Africa. The Transkeian Government challenged this monolithic loyalty 
by stating that the intention of forming the Methodist Church of Transkei was to ''obviate 
the conflict of loyalties" (see 2.3), that is between their loyalty to the Methodist Church 
in South Africa in the Republic of South Africa as Methodists and their loyalty to Transkei 
state as Transkeian citizens. 
This challenge divided Transkeian Methodists. Reverend Tom Mbabane represented the 
group, designated the loyalists in this study, who felt that the top executive of the 
Methodist Church of South Africa had the sole right to handle the matter. At the meeting 
on 31 January 1978 he asked the Prime Minister to allow the Methodist ministers to pursue 
the matter of forming the Methodist Church ofTranskei through the ecclesiastical channels. 
Rev. W.B.S. Gaba on the other hand represented the group, designated the nationalists in 
this study. He felt the Transkeian Methodist ministers were competent to handle the matter. 
109 
4.2.2 Loyalty to the tribal structure 
Loyalty to the century-old Methodist tradition of the alliance between the missionaries and the 
tribal chiefs was also evident in that meeting. That tradition encouraged close cooperation 
between the missionaries and the tribal chiefs (see 3.4.1). This tradition could see no 
contradiction between endorsing ChiefMatanzima's vision of a Transkeian Church and loyalty 
to the Methodist Church of South Africa. 
Some supernumerary ministers, who themselves had been brought up during the days of the 
missionary-chief cooperation, were deeply influenced by this loyalty. Rev.erend N. Jafta (his 
praise name: Nyikiny'ubhoxo) represented this group at the meeting on 31 January 1978. He 
made the traditional praise chant (ukubonga) as the Prime Minister entered the hall: 
Ah! Daliwonga 
Lwangen'ufaf olude 
Unyana kaMhlobo" 
umazondwa ziintshaba 
Zingaz'umenza nto 
Daliwonga .. . I!! 
(Hail, Daliwonga! 
There enters the tall one 
The son of Chief Mhlobo 
He who is hated by his enemies 
And yet they cannot hurt him 
D I. Ill) a 1wonga ...... 
This was a dramatic Xhosa way of telling the assembly of ministers that it was not just a 
politician they were going to deal with but also a tribal chief At the BMC meeting in 
Buntingville a similar view of negotiations and tribal protocol was expressed (see 2. 7.3). 
4.2.3 Loyalty to Black Solidarity/Consciousness 
In the context of the Black struggle of the time, the Clarkebury District could be regarded as 
a "liberated zone" as it was the only Methodist District with a Black Chairman. 
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Although Chief Matanzima did not approve of Black Consciousness (see 3.4.5), there were 
Black Consciousness (BC) supporters who were in favour of the formation of the MCT 
(see the BMC debate in 2.7.3 & 2.7.7) since they saw it as an opportunity to foster Black 
leadership and autonomy. However, most BC supporters were strongly opposed to the 
homelands policy. and any form of tribalism. In the name of an all-embracing Black 
solidarity, some BC supporters opposed the formation of the MCT. This view was 
expressed by the Rev. Mvume Dandala when he pointed out that the envisaged MCT 
would essentially be a Black Church and therefore a breakaway by only the Transkeian 
section of the MCSA would not only harm the MCSA but would also prove very damaging 
to Black solidarity. He suggested that the matter of forming the MCT should therefore be 
referred to the BMC (see 2.4). 
4.2.4 Loyalty to the local congn~gation 
This loyalty was expressed by those ministers seeking the assurance that the formation of 
the MCT would not interfere with normal Methodist church life (the Methodists would 
continue with the same Methodist hymns they knew, the same church organisations like 
the Manyanos, church uniforms, and so on). They settled for the MCT in order to continue 
with day-to-day ministry despite unhappiness with the schism and its consequences. 
This loyalty did not emerge clearly at the meeting on 31 January 1978 but at the later 
stages of the schism. It is expressed by the action of Rev. A.M. Sincadu. He was persuaded 
by his circuit, in the interests of his congregation, to change his decision of leaving 
Transkei after the formation of the MCT and to join the MCT (see Appendix V).(Sincadu 
1992). 
4.2.5 Loyalty to Methodism 
The idea that there could be a Methodist Church in Transkei disaffiliated from the MCSA, 
With its own Methodist Connexional Office in Umtata, suggested a distinction between 
loyalty to the MCSA and loyalty to Methodism. Loyalty to Methodism implied loyalty to 
Methodist doctrines, practices and usages but not to the top executive or the organisational 
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structure of the MCSA. Reverend W.B.S. Gaba pursued this line of thinking throughout 
the process of schism. 
4.2.6 Loyalty to the MCf 
As the MCT did not exist at the time, any support for the formation of a Transkeian 
Church can be regarded as an expression of potential loyalty to the MCT. Reverend 
Qambela (see 2.3) represented this loyalty. 
The following diagram illustrates the loyalties which were pulling Transkeian Methodists 
in different directions: 
Loyalty to 
!\lethodism 
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An explanation of the diagram: 
(I) Methodism is central because all the Transkeian Methodists claimed 
loyalty to it. 
(2) The BMC circle overlaps with both the MCSA and the MCT 
because in it there were both those who were loyal to the 
MCSA and those loyal to the (still to be formed) MCT. Both 
groups shared a common loyalty to Methodism hence their 
circles overlap with Methodism but not with each other. 
(3) Loyalty to the local congregation was one way of being loyal to 
Methodism, but not necessarily to either the MCSA or the MCT 
(hence the circle does not overlap with either of them). 
( 4) The local congregation was based in Transkei so interacting with 
the homeland politics was unavoidable hence the circles of the 
local congregation and the homelands policy overlap. 
(5) The policy ofthe MCSA was opposed to the Homelands Policy 
(see 3.2.2.1) hence the circles ofthe MCSA and the Homelands 
Policy do not overlap and are at opposite poles in the diagram. 
(6) . The history of Methodism, especially in Transkei shows 
a close cooperation between the Methodist missionaries and 
the tribal chiefs (see 3 .4.1) (a practice continued by Black ministers) 
hence the circles of Methodism and the tribal structure overlap. 
(7) The circles ofthe tribal structure and the Homelands Policy overlap 
because the former was an essential element of the latter (see 
3.3.3.1). 
(8) The tribal structure circle overlaps with that of the MCT because 
-- --... 
that would be unavoidable for a church operating primarily in a homeland 
context. 
---
Many of these loyalties were present (to some extent) in all the participants but their relative 
importance differed. This led to the formation of some distinct "constellations" of loyalties 
among Transkeian Methodists. The different constellations will now be analysed. 
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4.3 INTERPLAY OF LOYALTIES IN THE VARIOUS GROUPS 
Although a number of groups surfaced at the meeting on 31 January 1978, in the process 
of the schism some of them converged to form two main combinations: 
(a) Those who felt that the issue of the formation of the MCT should be 
addressed by the national bodies of the Church, namely the MCSA 
Conference (Rev. Tom Mbabane) and the BMC (Rev. Mvume Dandala) 
(b) Those who felt that the issue should be addressed by the local bodies of the 
Church, namely Transkeian Methodist ministers (Rev. W.B.S. Gaba), and 
Transkeian circuit stewards (Rev. A.G. Mposelwa) 
Similarly, the different loyalties can be reduced to the two main ones of loyalty to the 
MCSA and loyalty to the MCT. 
(1) Loyalty to the MCSA. The following statements and positions expressed 
loyalty to the MCSA: 
The matter should be referred to the MCSA Conference (Mbabane). 
The BMC is irrelevant because it has no locus standi (official 
standing) in the Church (Mgojo ). 1 
The breakaway will also hurt the MCSA (Dandala). 
(2) Loyalty to the MCT. The following statements and positions express 
(incipient) loyalty to the MCT: 
Praising the Prime Minister as a tribal chief (some supernumeraries). 
The Transkeian Methodist ministers should decide the issue (Gaba). 
The Transkeian circuit stewards should decide the issue (Mposelwa). 
Some suspended ministers. They pinned their hopes of reinstatement 
to ministry on the formation of the MCT (Zweni 1992). 
I 
In order to contrast these 'opposing positions they will be analysed in greater detail. 
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4.3.1 The constellation of loyalties making up the loyalist position 
The constellation of loyalties making up the loyalist position may be represented as 
follows: 
H 
Loyalty to 
local Bl\IC 
A 
Loyalty to 
Methodism 
The loyalists regarded their loyalty to the MCSA (B) as more important than loyalty to 
the local congregation (C). They regarded loyalty to the MCSA (B) as equivalent to 
loyalty to Methodism (A). They regarded the MCT (D) and the Clarkebury-Queenstown 
BMC (H) as fatally compromised to tribalism (E) and to the homeland system (F) and 
therefore rejected it. Those among the loyalists who were BMC members, identified 
with the view of the national BMC (G) rather than the local BMC (H). 
( 1) The loyalists regarded loyalty to Methodism as implying loyalty to the MCSA 
hence Rev. Tom Mbabane regarded severing that link as ''blasphemous" (Dimension, 7 
May 1978: 1 0). 
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(2) In the diagram loyalty to the local congregation does not overlap with either the 
MCSA or the MCT but with loyalty to Methodism. The loyalists would expect the 
circle of the local congregation to overlap with that of the MCSA as well because, 
since they were "still part of the Methodist Church of South Africa" (see 2.5.8), they 
would also have been expected to show loyalty to the MCSA. 
(3) The BMC (national, Mgojo, Dandala, Mbabane) circle overlaps with the circles 
of both loyalty to Methodism and the MCSA. The loyalists expected the issue of the 
formation of the MCT to be discussed only by the national bodies of the Church (see 
4.3(a)). 
( 4) The loyalists regarded the BMC of the Transkei Districts (Clarke bury and 
Queenstown) as fatally compromised to loyalty to the chief and tribal structure and, 
ultimately, to the homelands policy and its homeland Church (MCT) and therefore 
rejected their line of action. 
4.3.2 The constellation of loyalties making up the nationalist position 
A 
Loyalty to 
Methodism 
--::--: 
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( 1) The nationalists, led by the Clarkebury-Queenstown BMC (H), regarded loyalty to 
Methodism (A) as more important than loyalty to the MCSA (B) and were prepared to 
sacrifice the latter. The local BMC members felt abandoned by the national BMC (G). 
(2) The nationalists regarded it as inevitable that loyalty to the local congregation (C) 
would overlap with that to the MCT (D), still to be formed,· since they could not all be 
uprooted from Transkei. For them "a Methodist Church ofTranskei" would be better than 
no Methodist Church in Transkei" (see 2.12). 
(3) The nationalists accepted the MCT (D) because they did not regard Transkei as a 
political homeland created by the apartheid system (F) but rather as their natural home with 
all the cultural sentiments including loyalty to tribal chiefs/structure (E) and therefore many 
of them could not see any political equation in their choice to join or establish the MCT. 
The clash between the two loyalty blocs over the formation of the MCT must be analysed 
below. To do so, the events leading to and the thinking behind the resolutions on the 
formation of the MCT will be discussed. 
4.4 THE RESOLUTIONS ON THE FORMATION OF THE MCT 
At the meeting on 21 February 1978 (see 2.3) two motions spelling out the positions ofthe 
loyalists and the nationalists were tabled, debated and voted on. Since these two motions 
capture the essence of the two approaches, they afford an excellent opportunity to analyse 
the interplay of the conflict of loyalties. 
4.4.1 The first motion 
The loyalists consistently denied Transkeian Methodists the right to act on the issue of the 
ban and the formation of the MCT. They took the view that only the Conference of the 
MCSA or its top executive had the right to decide on the issue. Initially their position was 
to totally reject the idea of a Methodist Church of Transkei. Reverend Dr Mgojo said the 
idea of a Church formed by the State was theologically unheard of, 
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wrong and a sin. The idea of forming the MCT should therefore be rejected (see 2.5.8). 
Mr Guzana's original resolution expressed the same uncompromising rejection of the 
MCT: ··we reject the idea of a church formed by a state" (2.5.8).· Reverend Mbabane's 
amendment, which was finally adopted, c~anged the resolution to read: 
In the light of the request from the Prime Minister of the Transkei for a reaction 
to his decision to ban the Methodist Church of South Africa and establish the 
Methodist Church of Transkei, this body sitting today (21/02/1978) decides that, 
as it is still part of the Methodist Church of South Africa, it cannot make a final 
decision and therefore refers this matter to the Conference through Synod 
(see 2.5.8). 
This resolution did not reflect the thinking of the loyalists or the theological arguments 
they had advanced against the idea of forming the MCT. According to the Fikeni 
Papers, they had rejected the MCT because 
( 1) That would be tantamount to endorsing the homelands policy and, 
ultimately, tribalism. Mr Guzana had argued that once the Church of 
Transkei was formed, presumably on the basis of the homelands 
policy, " ... nothing would stop Methodists in the Transkei 
continuing their divisions along tribal lines ... what would stop 
a formation of a Pondo Church?" (see 2.5.8) 
(2) The initiative to form the MCT had been taken by the Transkeian 
Government. They had argued that no one would be against church 
autonomy provided that the Transkeian Methodists had worked for it 
rather than had it imposed by the Government (see 2.5.8). 
(3) The prophetic mission of the MCT would be compromised if it were 
formed by the state. It would never be able to say, ··Thus says 
the Lord ... " (see 2.5.8). 
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Why those formulating the resolution put aside these theological arguments will be 
discussed after considering the second motion ( 4.4.2). 
4.4.2 The second motion 
The second motion, tabled by Mr Canca and reflecting the thinking of the nationalists, 
read that "this meeting should accept the Methodist Church of Transkei" (see 2.5.8). 
In support of this motion Mr Canca maintained that ''it would be useless to oppose the 
formation of the Methodist Church of Transkei as that would not change the decision of 
the Prime Minister and his Cabinet to ban the Methodist Church of South Africa" (see 
2.5.8). 
In the context of this pragmatic approach Rev. Gaba argued that engaging in theological 
arguments was futile as "faith, the Kingdom of God, Scripture, theology and church 
history are irrelevant to the issue and therefore should be put aside" (Fikeni Papers). 
This argument apparently intended to say that there would be no change in the 
understanding of these doctrinal issues even in the MCT or that political realities were 
more powerful and needed to be faced pragmatically. 
/ 
For adopting this pragmatic approach, which avoided or even dismissed a theological 
I 
analysis of the issue by simply reminding others " ... who does not know KD?" (i.e. 
Chief Matanzima), Rev. Mbabane accused the nationalists of treating the ban as if it 
were afait accompli and concluded that "it is no longer the Prime Minister who wants 
the ban to be implemented" (Dimension, 7 May 1978: I 0). 
Mr Canca did not stop at precluding theological arguments by his pragmatic approach 
but went on to say that as ''an independent state, Transkei needs its own church" 
(Fikeni Papers). This statement made the pragmatic and the ideological considerations 
converge in favour of forming the MCT and thus made loyalty to the MCT and loyalty 
to the homelands policy overlap. 
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It could be argued that the majority of the nationalists did not support Mr Canca's 
views as they did not regard Transkei as a homeland in the first place but rather as 
their natural cultural home base. Mr Canca, who was a member of Chief Matanzima's 
ruling TNIP (Dimension 7 May 1978: I 0) and had tabled the motion in the Transkeian 
Parliament requesting the Republican Government to grant Transkei its political 
independence (see 3.3.3.2), could not entertain such a distinction. Those who evaded 
this equation of Transkei and a homeland state argued in favour of a distinction 
between loyalty to Methodism and loyalty to the MCSA. For them, loyalty to 
Methodism meant a truly Methodist Church but without any administration and 
financial links with the MCSA. Reverend Tom Mbabane dubbed this distinction 
"blasphemous" (Dimension, 7 May 1978: I 0). 
Why the loyalists ignored the theological arguments against the formation of the MCT 
will be considered next. 
4.4.3 A comment on the motions 
To start with, the two motions are not really contradictory or mutually exclusive, 
although the majority decision at the meeting ruled against this view. The two motions 
served two different purposes: the second motion served to define how many were for 
and how many were against the formation of the MCT. On the strength of the 70-40 
vote against the idea, the debate on the issue should have been closed and the Prime 
Minister informed accordingly. The first motion probably served two purposes, the first 
being to reject the very idea of voting on the issue because ''we are still part of the 
MCSA" and the second to reject the idea itself. Many people would accept the latter as 
the main intention but Rev. Mbabane's report suggests that this was a surprising and 
''unexpected victory" (Dimension, 7 May 1978: I 0) 
The first motion, which did not define how many were for and how many against, was 
a strategic device on the part of the loyalists. It was used to conceal the fact from the 
Prime Minister that the idea of forming the MCT had been rejected by 70 to 40 votes. 
This is why the Prime Minister was satisfied when he noted that the first motion 
-----
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expressed what he had said at the meeting on 31 January 1978 (viz. that the matter 
should be taken from Synod to the Conference). 
The loyalists' fears of Chief Matanzima's reaction were he to be told that the idea of 
forming the MCT had been rejected by 70 to 40 were as realistic as those of the 
nationalists C 'who does not know KD')"). This view was confirmed by Rev. Fikeni 
( 1994). 
Secondly, the first motion was used to pass the buck to the MCSA: let the MCSA 
decide 'because we are still part of it'. At the same time, however, the theological 
arguments and 70-40 vote on the second motion were taken to express their own 
opinion - even if the MCSA should decide otherwise. 
Thirdly, the effect of the first motion was to keep the issue alive within Methodist 
circles. By witholding information on the second motion, the Prime Minister was spared 
having to think about how to handle the issue. For the process of the schism, what he 
was not told rather than what he was told (i.e. who is for and who is against) became 
more significant. 
Developments resulting from the vote of 21 February 1978 will be analysed next to 
show their impact. 
4.5 CONSOLIDATION OF GROUP LOYALTIES 
4.5.1 The nationalist bloc 
The nationalists' energies were not dissipated by their defeat and humiliation in the 
meeting of 21 February 1978. Instead, they expanded their constituency by attracting 
various groups with different interests and agendas to join them under cover of 
pragmatism. There were three components in the nationalist bloc. 
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4.5.1.1 The BMC. Clarkebwy-Queenstown Branch 
This group formed the core of the nationalists. They were severely censured in the 
j 
meeting on 21 February 1978. Their rallying points were their common lack of 
confidence in the MCSA top executive's ability to negotiate effectively with the 
Transkeian Government and their suspicion of the loyalists' motives for wanting to 
leave the issue entirely in the hands of the MCSAs top executive. These two rallying 
points were used to drum up support for the Clarkebury-Queenstown branch of the 
BMC against the loyalists and Transkeian Methodist ministers appointed to circuits in 
the Republic of South Africa. At their meeting on 21 March 1978 they committed 
themselves to working for the formation of the MCT and to imposing their own agenda 
on the Lindikhaya Steering Committee (see 2.11 ). Once this was achieved, the 
Clarkebury-Queenstown BMC branch ceased to exist and function as a distinct group 
(see Appendix I). 
4.5.1.2 The supernumerary ministers 
From the start of the process of the schism some supernumerary ministers played a role 
far out of proportion to their status as retired ministers. The most prominent of these 
were the Revs. F. de Waal Mahlsela, E.D. Gwiliza and N. Jafta. This was probably a 
reflection of the influence of African culture on Black Christianity. In African culture 
) 
respect for age is rated much higher than respect for expertise, knowledge and 
professional rank. 
These supernumeraries probably viewed the whole crisis of the banning of the MCSA 
and the formation of the MCT from a totally different perspective. Having themselves 
been nurtured in a church dominated by a culture of close cooperation between the 
missionaries and the tribal chiefs, they could see nothing exceptionally wrong in Chief 
Matanzima's vision of a Transkeian Church. In their view, this would be a revival and 
perpetuation of the Eastern Cape/Transkei Methodist tradition. 
The younger generation of ministers, who had been exposed to (and probably 
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participated in some way in) the then prevailing Black struggle like the Black 
Consciousness Movement, South African Student's Organisation (SASO) (cfBMC), could 
have approached the issue from perspectives that could have conflicted with the 
missionary-tribal chief mould of the senior men. Such was not the case, however. 
Two factors may have reduced the potential conflict. The first may still have been respect 
for age. Even in the "multiracial" churches like the MCSA, the White Chairmen ofDistricts 
usually display amazing accommodation of this African culture of respecting age. The 
second may have been fear on the part of the younger generation - fear of Chief Matanzima 
and of the reaction of the MCSA to the whole issue. This would explain why the younger 
ministers pushed the supernumerary ministers to the frontline in the process of the schism. 
The supernumeraries had nothing to fear from the MCSA because they were already 
retired. They had no problem relating to the Prime Minister, whom they approached more 
as a tribal chief than a politician. This fear would also explain why the the younger ministers 
supported the name of Rev. F. de Waal Mahlasela2 as the first President of the MCT. They 
wanted to manipulate his personal friendship with Chief Matanzima. 
4.5.1.3 The disgruntled ministers 
In a speech in the Transkeian Parliament in June 1978 Mr Caledon Mda charged that the 
MCSA had been banned in Transkei because "certain ministers who could not bow down to 
the regulations of their church and keep their vows (had) influenced the Prime Minister to 
ban the Methodist Church of Southern Africa" (Daily Dispatch, June 16, 1978:1 ). The 
original statement, which Mr Mda was ordered to withdraw, read: "Certain Methodist 
ministers, who had failed to abide by the regulations of their church, had refused to be 
disciplined, had dragged the Transkei Prime Minister by the ear and persuaded him to ban 
the Methodist Church of Southern Africa'' 
This allegation could be referring to three categories of disgruntled ministers: ( 1) those who 
had resigned, (2) those who had been given early retirement (prematurely retired) and (3) 
those who had been suspended. 
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(1) Ministers, like Mike Ula/ who had a-esigned. Mr Lila's presence at two meetings 
has already been mentioned (see 2.5.2 and 2.8). As a Government official, Mr Lila 
supported the formation of the MCT. 
(2) Supemumeraay ministea'S, like F.de W. Mahlasela and E.D. Gwiliza, who had been 
prematm-ely a-etia-ed. According to Rev. Mahlasela (1994), the Port Elizabeth church 
riots between 1974 and 1976 were sparked off by the reaction of the youth to a 
Quarterly Meeting decision to divide them into the normal classes of 12 members. 4 
Instead of supporting his efforts to implement the Q.M. decision, the MCSA top 
executive let him down by removing him from the Port Elizabeth circuit. In spite of 
this initial betrayal, he had initially wanted to help the Church in negotiating with Chief 
Matanzima to drop the idea of banning the church. Later he changed his mind and 
supported the formation of the MCT. 
Reverend Gwiliza was stationed at Faku .Institution. When the students burned the 
hostel, he was removed by the MCSA without any inquiry. 
(3) Minister'S who had been suspended. The concern for the ministers in the Clarkebury 
District who had been suspended was such a live issue that it led to a petition and the 
convening of a District Special Synod (see 2.6). Even though the suspended ministers 
themselves did not participate in the meetings, it should be noted that in the Black 
community one does not need a formal status to influence people. 
The influence of these disgruntled ministers should therefore not be underestimated. 
They had a vested interest in the formation of the MCT, which, some of them might 
have hoped, would be kinder to them than the MCSA. 
In the end many groups and a large section of the silent majority were attracted by the 
pragmatism of the nationalists and the promise of a truly Methodist Church in Transkei 
with the same liturgy, doctrines, church organisations and church uniforms because, as 
Rev. Fikeni, Chairman of the Clarkebury District, said, ''A Methodist Church of 
Transkei is better than no Methodist Church in Transkei" (Daily Dispatch, June 3, 
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1978: 1 ). 
4.5.2 The loyalist bloc 
The development of the loyalist bloc after the meeting on 21 February 1978 also needs 
to be considered. 
The loyalists continued to hold their view that only the Conference of the MCSA or its 
top executive had the right to decide on the issue. It was probably through their 
influence that the Interim Committee5 attended and reported on developments in 
Transkei to the Chairmen's Meeting on 7 April 1978, for which they were severely 
censured (see 2.8). 
To the loyalists, loyalty to the MCSA and loyalty to Methodism were inseparable hence 
they could not approve a Draft Constitution of the MCT, not because of any flaws but 
because its drafting had not been mandated by the MCSA top executive (see 2.1 0.5). 
Consequently they rejected any initiatives taken by Transkeian Methodists since that 
would endorse the fragmentation of the church. 
In the early stages of the schism the loyalists controlled centre stage. The turning point 
came on 12 April 1978, when the Interim Committee was dissolved and replaced by the 
Lindikhaya Steering Committee. Although some of their members were re-elected to the 
Steering Committee, they soon resigned when they realised that the nationalists had 
outmanoeuvred them by imposing their own agenda on the Lindikhaya Steering 
Committee. All those who were appointed to circuits in the Republic of South Africa 
stopped attending, thereby leaving a few loyalists in Transkei to fight alone against the 
majority of nationalists. In the end seventeen ministers refused to join the MCT when 
it was finally formed (see Appendix VII). 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
In 1.5.3 it was stated that conflict is an important and even essential component of a 
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story (since a story has a rational structure of plot, conflict and resolution [Williams 1986: 
24 ]). This chapter is designed specifically to show the role of that component in the story of 
the Methodist Church ofTranskei. The conflictual analysis provided in this chapter should 
make sense out of a story that is otherwise baffling and confusing, by explaining the 
motivations and the mood of the participants (see 1. 5. 1 ). 
From the conflictual analysis given so far one can discern a movement in the story: in the 
. early stages of the schism the loyalists controlled centre stage and at a later stage 
(especially after 12 April 1978) the nationalists displaced them. This reflects the normal 
movement in a conflict situation where power and influence shift from group to group. 
For a better understanding of the conflict, the nationalist and the loyalist blocs as 
protagonists and antagonists respectively have been used in the process of the schism. The 
nationalists have been associated with the interests of the local bodies of the church and 
the loyalists with those of the national bodies of the church. 
Beneath these structural designations are the political, ethnic and cultural issues which are 
pertinent to dividing society. It should be clear from the foregoing conflictual analysis that, 
as the history of Christendom testifies, very little can be attributed solely to theological 
differences when it comes to church division. Non-theological issues like political, ethnic 
and cultural considerations are very often decisive. They themselves may not be the cause 
of the schism but strong determinants of the direction of events. This applies to the story of 
the Methodist Church of Transkei as well. Although the loyalties that divided the 
Transkeian Methodists were not the cause ofthe schism, they were very much a part of the 
process of the schism. 
The question for both the loyalists and the nationalists was what loyalty to Christ meant in 
terms of loyalty to the Church (either the MCSA or the MCT) and loyalty to the state 
(either the undivided but racist South Africa or the "independent" Transkei). Some 
ministers (the loyalists) regarded loyalty to Christ to mean loyalty to the MCSA against the 
MCT and the Transkeian state. Others (the nationalists) regarded it as 
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meaning loyalty to the MCT and the Transkeian state against the MCSA and South 
Africa. Still others (the silent majority) regarded it as meaning loyalty to their local 
congregations and - since the MCSA was going to be banned anyway, - settled for the 
MCT as the only way to remain loyal to their flock. 
The issue of loyalty seems to be basic as a way of looking at the world for any society 
or community. Since there is no given standard or recipe for Christian loyalty that can 
be applied to all situations, people will go on making choices that they believe best 
embody Christian loyalty. 
The aim of the study, amongst other objectives, was not only to identify and analyse 
the role played by different loyalties in the MCT but also, through this chapter, to raise 
awareness of their role in any schism or conflict situation. In this study we cannot 
therefore identify a particular loyalty as being solely responsible for the schism. All of 
them contributed in varying degrees. This consideration of the conflict of different 
loyalties helps in understanding more clearly the interests which influenced different 
groups. 
This conflictual analysis also shows that research on the AICs (see chapter 5) should 
not be confined only to theological/ecclesial/religious theoretical frameworks of 
interpretation but should also take into account socio-cultural issues which make up the 
''world of meaning" for the people affected. Some of the loyalties which have been 
analysed are peculiar only to the Transkeian ··world-view". In other similar studies 
different loyalties will play a central role. The point to make here is that the ecclesial, 
theological and even political issues may provide the wider context, but the decisive 
determinants for the participants may be their socio-cultural loyalties. 
Having considered the role played by the conflict of different loyalties in the process of 
the 1978 Methodist schism in Transkei, an analysis of the nature of the schism leading 
to the formation of the Methodist Church of Transkei needs to be done. 
r. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Mgojo's position was ambiguous. Does the irrelevance of the BMC suggest that the 
matter should be settled by the MCSA or the Transkeian Methodists? In his later 
statements it was clear that he wanted the matter to be addressed by the MCSA. 
2. Reverend Mahlasela was a very prominent Methodist minister. He was the first 
Black Secretary of a District Synod (Clarkebury District) and the first Black 
Warden ofClarkebury Institution. He was transferred to Grahamstown District 
wheri he contested the chairmanship of Clarkebury District. In Port Elizabeth 
Circuit he came into conflict with the Class 8 youth and subsequently took early 
retirement. 
3. Mr Lila resigned from the ministry ofthe MCSA for personal (family) reasons. He 
was reinstated to the ministry ofthe MCSA in 1993 (MCSA 1993: 44). 
4. Church members are divided into classes of 12 members including a class leader for 
the purposes of spiritual nurture and administration. In the African Circuits this 
practice is still followed. The class leader is a member of the Society Leaders' 
Meeting and also of the Circuit Quarterly Meeting. 
5. The Interim Committee was so elected that both groups were represented as 
follows: Loyalists: Rev. Tom Mbabane and Mr Guzana. Nationalists: Rev. Gaba 
and Mr Canca. These can be regarded as the most outstanding representatives of 
the groups at that stage (see 2.5.9) 
----.. _ 
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CHAPTERS 
A TYPOLOGICAI_J ANALYSIS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 gave a contextual analysis of the factors that precipitated the schism and chapter 4 
a conflictual analysis of the different loyalties that interacted in the process. 
In this chapter I shall situate the MCT in the context of the African Independent Church (AIC) 
movement. To facilitate achieving that goal, the nature of the MCT will be categorised, using 
insights gained from the typology drawn up for the AIC movement as analysed in 1.4.4. 
Applying that typology, which causative factors and typological classification most 
appropriate for the MCT, must be considered. 
5.2 CAUSATIVE FACTORS 
Causal theories to explain the AIC movement abound. Some missiologists explain the rise of 
the AICs in purely religious terms while others do so in socio-political terms. 
5.2.1 The religious explanation 
Over the past forty years the approach to and judgement of the AIC movement has undergone 
some conversion from an attitude of outright condemnation to a more positive evaluation. This 
was due to approaching the issue from two different angles. Some were concerned over what 
the AIC movement was doing to the Gospel and judged it to be a syncretist distortion. 
Missiologists who did so approached the AIC movement fully armed with the "correct" 
theological presuppositions and Western assumptions about what the "true Gospel" is. They 
were alarmed at the rate of"perversion" going on in the AIC movement. 
Sundkler ( 1961: 297), the founder of the studies on the AIC movement, initially saw the 
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motivating factor for this movement as ''a nativistic-syncretistic interpretation of the 
Christian religion" which created "the bridge over which Africans are brought back to 
heathenism - and ultimately to 'the African animism' from which they started". 
Oosthuizen, who, in particular, underwent a conversion of attitude, started by denying them 
any right to call themselves Christian. He regarded them as ''post-Christian" movements 
because they maintained traditional religion instead of regarding the Word of God as 
normative (Oosthuizen 1968: 73-75). He later modified his views by recognising the 
Christian orientation of some of these churches (Oosthuizen 1979: 3). The severest 
judgement, however, was passed by Beyerhaus (1969: 79), who saw them as being under 
the control of demonic powers. 
Other missiologists approached the issue with a view to determining how the AIC 
movement was impacting on the African culture and traditional religions. They returned 
a verdict of contextualization. 
Daneel, the champion of this more tolerant spirit, initiated the positive attitude as early as 
1971 when he challenged the missiologists who overemphasised the syncretist motif in the 
rise of the AIC movement. Daneel ( 1971: 455) pointed out that the "older generation of 
mission Church officials - European and African - tend to view the Separatists as their 
opponents, 'sheep-stealers' who rob members of their flock, and as' twisters of the truth' .... 
They regard them 'as an inferior expression of Christianity' or as decidedly non-Christian'' 
Daneel regards the phenomenon of the AICs as primarily concerned with the need to adapt 
Christianity to African traditional rituals and symbols. According to him, they are therefore 
exhibiting a genuine ''process of contextualization" and ''create the kind of context in 
which dialogue and confrontation between the Christian message and traditional religion 
takes place consistently" (Daneel.l984: 67). 
Daneel (1984: 68) points out that the AICs "are realistic and ever engaged in presenting 
the Christian message at the deeper levels of traditionalist thought and experience" and 
goes on to describe what actually takes place in the process of contextualizing the Gospel: 
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This process of contextualization is not just a simplistic adaptation to traditional 
ritual and thought: neither is it a kind of accommodation which merely selects, 
inserts or absorbs the so-called'' good" elements from traditional culture or religion. 
On the contrary, it is an adaptation that displays parallels with traditional religion 
but in its essence implies a continuing confrontation with an original, creative 
transformation of traditional religious values. 
Far from distorting the Gospel, Daneel sees the AICs as grappling with the fundamental 
problem of relating the Gospel to a specific situation of African culture. 
Another missiologist who advocates evaluating the AICs in their own right is Turner 
( 1967: 32), who suggests that the development of the AICs expresses a need to reconstruct 
a sacred world to provide security, fellowship and spiritual guidance in the face of a 
disintegrating order. Turner (1984: 112) furthermore rejects the approach that seeks to 
evaluate the AIC movement only in relation to the ''historical" or ''mainline" churches 
because of its tendency to elevate negative factors like ''protest" at the expense of the 
more positive factors of'' spiritual search, religious insight and experience, and encounter 
with revelation". 
For this reason he feels that the traditional/mainline churches always subject themselves 
to unnecessary guilt feelings which is probably fostered by Barrett's thesis of "a failure 
in love" (Barrett 1968: 156). This approach has also created a stereotype culture amongst 
the Blacks of blaming the missionaries for everything wrong. To illustrate this stereotype 
mentality, Turner cites the "white trick" thesis ofMajeke1 (1953: 73-74) when dealing 
with the Xhosa Cattle Killing of 1857. Nongqause, a medicine woman, had a vision in 
1856 that the Xhosa ancestors would come from the sea and drive the White colonists into 
the sea. For this to happen, the Xhosa were required to kill all their cattle and destroy all 
their grain.[2] Many people perished in the famine which followed (Wilson & Thompson 
1971: 258). Turner (1984: 111) points out that Majeke's "trick" thesis reduces the Xhosa 
to the level of simple-minded dupes being manipulated into a stupid and crazy act instead 
of treating them as a people making a profoundly religious response. 
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In 5. 5. 1 the contextualization of the Gospel model proposed by Dan eel and Turner as a 
dominant motif in the AIC movement will be considered again. 
5.2.2 The socio-political explanations 
The ethnic and cultural factors are also included in this category of explanation. 
5. 2. 2.1 The ethnic factor 
In a study on the development of the AICs in Swaziland the ethnic factor was found to offer 
some explanation for the secession syndrome in the Mrican Churches. It was attributed to the 
tribal tradition of a kin group breaking away and attaining independence after the death of a 
family patriarch (Kuper 1946). It was also observed that for Mrican soc.ieties the small kinship 
group was regarded as the ideal social model (Knoob 1961 ). 
In 5.5.3 an attempt will be made to see whether this "tribal zeistgeist" played any significant 
role in the MCT. 
5.2.2.2 The socio-political situation 
Sundkler (1961), Balandier (1970), Anderson (1958), Oosthuizen (1968a, 1968b, 1979, 1982) 
and other missiologists stress that the socio-political conditions are central causes of the AIC 
movement. They cite the dehumanising experiences of social injustice, racial tension and racial 
segregation as giving rise to an urge to opt out of a multiracial church and create an ethnic or 
racial church where personal dignity could be regained. 
Oosthuizen ( 1968a: 7) suggests that, although there are religious motives, the movements are 
an-expression of a reaction against the inbred Western assumption of superiority. This rejection 
is then transferred to and projected on to the spiritual and ecclesiastical plane. 
This concern with politiq.l accommodation made Oosthuizen (1968b:209:.221) put the 
"poli_tical causes on top of the twelve groups of causes for independence", a view which 
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he did not modify even in 1982 as he went further to insist that the struggle for political 
independence helped to create the atmosphere for religious independence (Oosthuizen 
1982: 29). 
In 5.6 an attempt will be made to determine whether there was a rise in political 
consciousness in Transkei as well as to what extent such political consciousness gave rise 
to a need for its own Church. 
5.3 TYPOLOGIES OF THE AFRICAN INDEPENDENT CHURCHES 
A consideration of the type or nature of the Church to emerge after the schism has led to 
the typological classification of the AICs. In his study of the AICs, Sundkler (1961: 53-59) 
also classified them into different types: the Ethiopian, those who had seceded from White 
mission churches or their offshoots, and the Zionist Churches, who included other 
designations, such as "Zion", "Apostolic", "Pentecostal" and "Faith". 
Turner and Daneel later improved on Sundkler's typology. Turner classified the AICs into 
two groups: non-Christian and Christian. The Christian group is again divided into two 
groups: Ethiopian and Zionist. Daneel ( 1971: 258-349) prefers to designate the Zionist 
group as ''spirit-type" churches while Turner ( 1979: 9 5) designates them as ''prophet-
healing" churches. 
The Zionist Churches are characterised by a more serious attempt to adapt some Christian 
teachings to the African world-view. The Ethiopian type emerged between 1890 and 1920 
and are characterised by their reaction against the Whites and the missionaries. The 
Methodist schisms considered below (5.4) were largely influenced by this Ethiopian motif. 
5.4 SCHISMS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN METHODIST TRADITION 
In his list of African Independent Churches in South Africa Sundkler (1961: 354-374) has 
more than twenty of them bearing the name ''Methodist". An investigation into why the 
Methodist tradition is vulnerable to schisms is outside the scope of this study.[3] Only a 
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few Methodist schisms will be considered here, their selection being based on the similarity 
between them and the MCT. The comparison should help in defining the nature or type of the 
MCT. 
5.4.1 The Nehemiah Tile schism, 1884 
Nehemiah Tile's schism of 1 ~84 is generally regarded as the first lasting church schism initiated 
by a Black Christian in South Afiica. No study on the AICs can avoid his name because he can 
be regarded as the father of the African Independent Church movement in Southern Africa 
(Oosthuizen 1973: 233). The recent interest in Nehemiah Tile and other 19th-century Black 
Christians stems from a concern to formulate more satisfactory explanatory theories on the 
phenomenon of the Afiican Independent Church movement. Current ideas on present African 
Christianity in its various shapes and designations, such as Africa~ Christian theology, Black 
theology, African Independent Church movement, and new religious movements, are attributed 
to the seminal influence of some writers. For instance, Pretorius ( 1990) regards Nehemiah Tile 
as the pioneer of African Christian theology and Oosthuizen ( 1973: 23 3) regards him as the 
father ofthe AIC movement. Hodgson (1984: 20) regards Ntsikana as the precursor of the 
movement who only failed to effect a formal secession. 
If Nehemiah Tile's name occuptes a special status in the AIC movement in general, a 
consideration of him as a Methodist in the study of the MCT should have a far deeper 
significance. Tile was a Methodist evangelist stationed at Mqekezweni substation of the 
Clarkebury Circuit. Mqekezweni was also the Great Place of the Thembu kings. Reverend 
Peter Hargreaves, who was stationed at Clarkebury, the third link in Rev. William Shaw's 
"chain of mission stations" and established in 1830, was also the Superintendent minister over 
Nehemiah Tile. He was so impressed by Nehemiah Tile's gifts that he sent him to Healdtown 
Methodist Theological College for training as a Probationer minister. 
The turning point in Nehemiah Tile's life came in 1883 when the very first Conference of the 
Wesleyan Methodist Church of South Afiica, which had been granted autonomy by the British 
Methodist Conference in 1882, refused to ordain him "despite", according to 
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Saunders (1970: 555), "the relatively lengthy period he had served on trial". Nehemiah 
Tile then left the Wesleyan Methodist Church of South Africa and later founded the 
Thembu National Church. The only interpretations of the schism to be considered here will 
be those of C. C. Saunders ( 1970) and Hennie Pretorius ( 1990). 
5.4.1.1 Saunders' interpretation of the Tile schism 
Saunders approaches the Tile schism from a political perspective and argues that it was 
part of a larger movement of political protest against the loss of tribal independence in the 
Eastern Cape. The schism was therefore a political protest expressed in religious terms. 
He suggests that it was Tile's involvement in Thembu politics that was unacceptable to the 
Wesleyan Church. That is what probably cost Tile his ordination. Tile had his own "--
dissatisfaction with church administration, which centred on (1) the exclusive control of 
church funds by the' 'English" ministers alone- this was in conflict with the principle laid 
down by the missionary committee in England. The principle stated "that all contributions 
from the Native Churches shall, in the first place, be applied to the maintenance of a 
Native Ministry, needful schools, and a training Institution for Native agents of both sexes" 
(Kilner 1881 :7); and (2) the granting of autonomy by the British Methodist Conference to 
the SA Methodist Conference, which had been negotiated by the White missionaries since 
the early 1860s (Hewson 1950: 81-85). Tile might have felt that the granting of autonomy 
to the SA Methodist Conference would eliminate the influence of the British Methodist 
Conference on the SA Methodist Church, a move which would entrench exclusive White 
control. This move was bad news for the African Methodists hence Tile's dissatisfaction. 
Nehemiah Tile then exploited the tribal discontent against the moves by the Cape Colonial 
Government to incorporate Thembuland into Transkei, which would effectively terminate 
the independence of the Thembu chiefdom. Thembuland was indeed incorporated into 
Transkei in 1884. 
Then Tile urged Chief Ngangelizwe to reject the division of Thembuland into four 
magisterial districts because that would reduce the Chiefs control of his subjects since 
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some issues could be' settled in the magistrate's courts without recourse to him. He also stirred 
up the AbaThembu to boycott the hut taxes, which, in his view, had been levied to support the 
proposed four magistracies (Saunders 1970: 558). These activities brought Tile into conflict 
with the Cape Colonial Government, who subsequently arrested him. 
It is probable that the Cape Department of Native Affairs might have challenged the Church 
to review Tile's political activities (Saunders 1970: 555-556). When the Church confronted Tile 
with allegations of political activities, he did not refu,te them but decided to leave the Church 
during the second half of 1883. Two reasons may have led to this decision: the Church's refusal 
to ordain him for political reasons and the Church's collusion with the Colonial Government 
to curtail his freedom of political activity. 
The death ofParamount ChiefNgangelizwe adversely affected Tile's standing in the Thembu 
chiefdom. The new Paramount Chief, Dalindyebo, who had been brought up under missionary 
tutelage (Pretorius 1990: 1 0), did not endorse all Tile's political activities. There was also 
pressure on him from both the Wesleyan missionaries and the Colonial Government to 
dissociate himselffrom Tile (Saunders 1970: 555-570). However, Tile was able to secure the 
recognition of the Thembu National Church as the Church of the Chiefdom, with Paramount 
Chief Dalindyebo as its head, presumably following the example of the Church of England 
(Sundkler 1961: 38). 
5.4.1. 2 Pretorius's inte1pretation (?f the Tile schism 
Pretorius, on the other hand, approaches the Tile schism from an ecclesiastical perspective and 
argues that it was an ecclesiastical protest against the White control and orientation of the 
Wesleyan Methodist Church of South Africa. When this protest could not be effective in the 
African ecclesiastical context, the volatile political mood of the time was then manipulated. The 
ecclesiastical protest was therefore expressed in political terms. 
That Tile's secession was motivated by religious considerations and the desire to adapt the 
message ofthe church to the needs of his own Thembu was shown by the changes he made in 
the liturgy. The prayer for the British royal family was applied to the Thembu 
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royal family: 
Sindisa Tixo uNgangelizwe(God save Ngangelizwe) 
Sindisa Tixo nonmtwana wakhe (God save his son too) 
Sindisa Tixo isizwe sabaThembu (God save the Thembu nation) 
(Pretorius 1990: 13) 
-----......___ 
To exert more pressure on Chief Dalindyebo to dissociate himself from Tile, the Wesleyan 
missionaries and the Colonial Government enlisted the help of prominent members of the 
Wesleyan Church like ChiefMatanzima, ChiefDalindyebo's uncle and brother of the late Chief 
Ngangelizwe, the father ofChiefDalindyebo, and from a broader African community like J.T. 
Jabavu (Pretorius 1990: 1 0). 
The Tile schism shows, amongst other things, the close co-operation between the Wesleyan 
missionaries and the Colonial authorities when dealing with the tribal chiefs. It is clear that Tile 
regarded his involvement in Thembu politics as a legitimate part of his ministry. Since he was 
above the average Thembu in education, intelligence and exposure to Western civilisation, who 
could have been a better adviser to the Thembu chiefs during that crucial period in the life of 
the tribe? 
While the missionaries were in constant consultation with the Colonial authorities they denied 
the African ministers the right to advise their tribal chiefs. 
Reverend T. Chubb, the first Chairman of the Clarkebury District from 1882 to 1885 (Mears 
1973: 73) summoned Tile to appear before a disciplinary committee. Amongst the allegations 
against him were the following: 
( 1) He was responsible for agitating against the magistrates in Thembuland. This allegation 
may have been motivated by the Cape Native Affairs Department, who wanted to divide 
Thembuland into four magisterial districts. Tile supported or even urged (incited) Thembu 
acceptance of only one magistrate (Saunders 1970: 556-557). 
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(2) He had not kept Chubb (who was also his superintendent) informed of his political 
activities. This allegation confirms Saunders' suspicion that the first allegation may have 
been motivated by the Cape Native Affairs Department. It also suggests that Chubb was 
embarrassed by Tile's political activities. 
(3) He had donated an ox for the circumcision ceremony of Dalindyebo, the great son of 
Paramount Chief Ngangelizwe (Saunders 1970: 556). This was the only allegation which 
involved church discipline. The Methodist policy discouraged the observance of African 
customs and rituals. 
Tile did not contest these allegations but instead left the Church (Saunders 1970: 556). 
Having considered the two interpretations of the Tile schism, then, it may be asked 
whether it was really a political protest expressed in religious terms (Saunders 1970) or an 
ecclesiastical protest expressed in political terms (Pretorius 1990). 
It seems as if both interpretations are valid and complement each other, especially if my 
proposal of a third option is acceptable. It seems the Tile schism was a cultural protest. 
This, of course, includes both the political and religious dimensions. When considering the 
political situation of Thembuland at the time of the Tile schism, it is clear that there was 
no outright rejection of the new political dispensation nor did they have the capacity to do 
so. The least the Thembus could negotiate was a political and religious transformation 
which did not undermine loyalty to the Thembu national or tribal identity. In the area of 
political transformation, the creation of four magisterial districts was seen as undermining 
loyalty to the Thembu Paramount Chief because a sub-chief would have to deal with the 
magistrate of his territory. To the Thembu this arrangement was more than a political or 
administrative matter but undermined an important cultural symbol, that of tribal hierarchy 
(cf Saunders 1970: 557) 
On the religious front Tile rejected the dominance of the white missionaries and the white-
oriented liturgy. His substituting references to the Thembu royal family for the references 
to the British royal family (Pretorius 1990) expressed not only a quest for African 
Theology and/or contextualization of the Gospel (Daneel) but more than that a 
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determination to have loyalty to African culture entrenched by religious legitimation. Tile's 
concern therefore was to preserve and protect the Thembu (African) cultural symbols. This 
was expressed in both religious and political terms. 
The Tile schism will be mentioned in 5.5.3 again because of similarities between it and 
that of the MCT. 
5.4.2 Mangena Maake Mokone 
Mckone is generally regarded as the founder of Ethiopianism. However, Sundkler ( 1961: 
3 8), Bali a (1991: 75) and other scholars consider Nehemiah Tile as the founder and 
Mokone only as its organiser. Mokone was ordained as a Methodist minister in 1880. He 
was concerned about the education of the African people and through his influence a 
school was established at Kilnerton (so called in honour of Rev. John Kilner). He became 
its first principal in 1891 (Balia 1991: 69). 
Although Ethiopianism itself may be linked to the African rejection of European 
imperialism in Africa, which reached its peak in the late nineteenth century, it was . 
expressed in a religious context of challenging and rejecting racial practices within the 
Church. Mckone, a typical example of this reaction in the 1890s, attacked racial separation 
at the Synod and Conference sessions in the Methodist Church. 
On 24 October 1892 Mokone resigned from the Methodist Church. In the Founders' 
Declaration of Independence sent to Rev. George Weavind, his superintendent (Balia 1991: 
69), he cited some African grievances centred on the racial segregation of the District 
Synod while at the same time the White ministers were permitted to hold leadership 
positions in the African circuits and the African Synod (Balia 1991: 72). On 20 November 
1892 Mokone and about fifty other ministers formed the Ethiopian Church (Bali a 1991: 
73). 
Unlike Nehemiah Tile, who used his Thembu tribal base to launch his church, Mokone 
appealed to all the African tribes to join his church. He interpreted Psalm 68:31 and Acts 
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8 as a clarion cail to broad Africanism in the face of the imperialistic Western nations and 
churches. Mokone understood these biblical texts as legitimising "the self-government of 
the African Church under African leaders" (Sundkler 1961: 39). He regarded the Ethiopian 
Church as no different from the mission churches apart from being led by Africans and 
believed that it was firmly grounded in the tradition of Wesleyan Methodism, even 
regarding it as "John Wesley's legitimate child" (Balia 1991: 74). 
The relevance of Mckone's Ethiopianism for the MCT will be reviewed again in 5.5.2 -
5.5.4. 
5.4.3 James Mata Dwane 
Dwane was ordained as a Methodist minister in 1881 (Balia 1991: 75). In 1887 and 1892 
he went to England to raise funds to build a college or university for Blacks in South 
Africa. When Dwane returned with sufficient funds, his supervisor, Rev. Lamplough 
insisted that the money be put into the general funds of the Church. Dwane was annoyed, 
especially by the innuendos casting some doubt on his trustworthiness. He finally obliged, 
handed over the money and then resigned from the Methodist Church. 
In 1896 he joined the Ethiopian movement initiated by Mokone. Mokone had already 
initiated moves to affiliate the Ethiopian Church to the African Methodist Episcopal 
Church (AME), which had been founded by Rev. Richard Allen in Philadelphia, USA in 
1816 in protest against racism in the Methodist Church (Niebuhr 1972: 260). Dwane was 
the only delegate who attended the affiliation service in the USA. This secured his 
appointment to the office of Vicar-Bishop of the new fourteenth district of the AME 
Church in South Africa. 
Having ousted Mokone as the leader in South Africa, Dwane was still not satisfied as he 
felt that he was still inferior to his American counterparts. Another source of dissatisfaction 
for him was that the AME Church would not entrust large sums of money to him. He 
began to question the authority of the AME Church to hand out episcopal orders (Balia 
1991: 77). Dwane then formed the Order of Ethiopia, which, for episcopal reasons, was 
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affiliated to the Anglican Church (called Church of the Province of South Africa since 
1900). 
The Dwane case illustrates the problem of Black leadership and stewardship in the multi-
racial or non-racial churches. Since it has some relevance for the MCT, it will be reviewed 
again in 5.5.2 and 5.5.4. 
5.4.4 The Bantu Methodist Chun:hes of 1932 and 1933 
The Methodist Church of Southern Africa as presently constituted was formed in 1932 by 
the amalgamation of three South African Methodist Churches, namely the Wesleyan 
Methodist Church of South Africa, the Transvaal and Swaziland District of Wesleyan 
Methodist Church of Great Britain and the Primitive Methodist Mission Church. 
During the same period a section of the Black Methodists in Transvaal broke away to form 
the Bantu Methodist Church. Sundkler ( 1961: 341) suggests that that schism was linked 
to the formation of a united Methodist Church of South Africa, while Hewson (1950: 94) 
· ascribes it to ·'revolt from discipline rather than from White Methodist domination". The 
protest against the raising of the Church fee (the reason given for the schism by its leaders) 
might have been an occasion to express African protest against the transfer of the mission 
work from England to the Methodist Church of South Africa. 
This discontent started simmering early in 1932. Those who were in favour of the 
formation of an independent Methodist Church first approached Rev. R- (whose name is 
not disclosed by Sundkler [ 1961: 172]), who delayed casting his lot with the new Church. 
Then they approached Rev. J.H. Hlongwane, who was willing to lead the new Church. 
A protest procession against the ra1smg of Church members' quarterly fee from two 
shillings to two shillings and sixpence was then organised. Leading the procession was a 
donkey bearing placards reading ''Jesus Christ was sold for thirty pieces of silver. We are 
sold for thirty pence"[4] (Sundkler 1961: 341). The nickname "Donkey Church" for the 
Bantu Methodist Church which was,formed in the process has stuck ever since. 
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The indecisive Rev. R- finally agreed to lead the Bantu Methodist Church but Rev. 
Hlongwane refused to relinquish his position as the president. Reverend R- and a section 
of the Bantu Methodist Church then formed the Bantu Methodist Church of South Africa 
in October 1933 (Sundkler 1961: 172-173) 
The four Methodist schisms briefly considered here throw some light on the nature of 
Methodist practice and African reactions to it. Some of these issues are already evident in 
the previous chapters in various forms and to different degrees. The causes underlying 
these schisms will be reviewed again in 5.5.4 to see the extent to which the MCT 
resembled or differed from the earlier Methodist schisms. 
5.5 AN ANALYSIS OF CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 
In the light of all the foregoing descriptions and analyses, an analysis of the factors 
contributing to the MCT schism will now be considered. 
By now it should be clear that a church schism is a complex issue, involving many parties 
with different interests. To attempt to attribute the whole process of the schism to one 
particular causative factor would not do justice to it. Insights gained from the consideration 
of theoretical frameworks for interpreting church schisms in 5.4 will now be used to 
determine the extent to which the MCT was an expression of religious, ethnic, Ethiopian, 
political or personal interests. These possible interpretations will be considered individually. 
5.5.1 The MCf: an expression of theological interests? 
The views of Turner and Daneel (see 5.2.1 above) show that there are differences between 
religious and theological explanations for the development of the. AICs. Turner sees their 
development as expressing a human attempt to impute meaning to a marginal or anomie 
situation. This need arises when their world of meaning has been threatened or even 
shattered. From the same perspectives Berger (1973: 34) defines the role of religion as 
"the human enterprise by which a sacred cosmos is established" and goes on to say " ... 
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religion is cosmization in a sacred mode". 
In spite of the ''disintegration of the old order" (Turner 1967: 32), if the alienatio~ of 
Transkei from the RSA can be regarded as such, the MCT does not belong to the category 
of the new religious movements which are characterised by a strong tribal background. It 
did not arise as an attempt to respond to an anomie or marginalised experience. The MCT 
therefore does not fit into Turner's model of religious fulfi.lment where there Is an attempt 
to relate the nomos to the cosmos. 
Daneel, on the other hand, sees the development of the AICs as expressing the desire to 
relate the Christian Gospel to the African world-view. This is a theological concern of 
contextualization. During the process of the MCT schism theological arguments were 
advanced against the formation of the MCT (see 2.5.8). A strong position was taken 
against introducing any theological innovations. The intention of formi:1g the MCT was 
not, it was stated, to ''reform" the Methodist Church. That position shows clearly that 
Daneel's contextualization motif did not apply to the MCT. This is because the MCT was 
not an attempt to address problems arising from the traditional African world-view. The 
MCT therefore was not an expression of religious/theological interests. 
5.5.2 The MCf: an expression of Ethiopian inter~sts? 
At the meeting on 31 January 1978 some members of the Transkeian Cabinet expressed 
their strong rejection of the White control of the MCSA (see 2.3). Their remarks were 
reminiscent of what Mokone had said about the Wesleyan Methodist Church in the 1890s 
(see 5.4.2). This White control of the Wesleyan Methodist Church was also one of the 
reasons behind the Tile schism (see 5.4.1). 
Chief Matanzima wanted an MCT that was identical to the MCSA in all respects except 
control. This was endorsed by the Transkeian Methodists who rejected'' reforming" it. This 
position was intended to ground the MCT firmly in the traditions of Methodism so that, 
like Mokane's Ethiopian Church, it too could be regarded as "John Wesley's legitimate 
child" (Bali a 1991: 74 ). In this regard the MCT fits the classic definition of an Ethiopian-
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type ''independent" church; that is, one whose primary reason for existence is freedom 
from White control. But whereas Mokone appealed to all the African Christians to join the 
Ethiopian movement, Chief Matanzima deliberately played down an appeal to all the Black 
people. This reflected his political attitude . 
. Although Chief Matanzima was a contemporary of Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo at 
the University of Fort Hare, he never embraced African nationalism (Streek & Wicksteed 
1980: 113-114). As a student his aim was to pass his degree and return home to fulfil his 
role as a tribal chief Streek and Wicksteed even advise caution in accepting Lawrence's 
assessment of Chief Matanzima as a Xhosa nationalist. Lawrence ( 1976: 8) concludes his 
assessment of Chief Matanzima by saying, "Stripping away the politicking, the man that 
emerges is a Xhosa nationalist dedicated to restoring Xhosa hegemony in the lands 
historically occupied by the Xhosa-speaking people .... African unity ... was of marginal 
importance· compared to Xhosa nationalism. Where it served the Xhosa cause it was 
propagated, but where it became an obstacle it was discarded'' Streek and Wicksteed 
( 1980: 125) point out that "if it was ever suggested that a greater Xhosaland be created 
with Ciskei's Chief Minister, Chief Lennox Sebe, at the head, the Matanzimas would kill 
the notion. The anchor of their interest in greater Xhosa unity is their personal ambition" 
It can therefore be said that Chief Matanzima was actually ''politicking" when he spoke 
as an African nationalist or a dreamer of a Greater Xhosaland which could include Ciskei, 
the ''White" corridor between Ciskei and Transkei, and also East Griqualand (Streek & 
Wicksteed 1980: 172). His ideological and political framework was that of a tribal mould. 
Despite some similarities, therefore, the MCT envisaged by Chief Matanzima was not of 
the Ethiopian type. Besides, whereas a Pan-Africanism or Black Consciousness is the 
philosophical base for Ethiopianism, ethnic consciousness is the cornerstone of the 
Bantustan policy. Ethiopianism and the Bantustan policy are therefore incompatible. The 
only Ethiopian element in Chief Matanzima's MCT was the removal of White control. 
In conclusion it should be noted that Ethiopianism, which characterised the earlier 
Methodist schisms, was displaced in the case of the MCT by ethnic considerations, which 
had become an important element in the South African political ideology by the 1970s. 
----....... 
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Whereas Tile was chastised by both the Church and the State for playing the ethnic card 
in the 1880s, Chief Matanzima was behaving ''correctly" by doing the same in the 1970s. 
5.5.3 The MCf: an exp1-ession of ethnic inte1-ests? 
From the foregoing consideration of the Ethiopian model it is clear that the origin of the 
MCT was deeply influenced by the ethnic factor. A classic example of a schism in which 
ethnic interest played a role is that of Tile. Not only was the ethnic factor the motivation, 
it was also the framework for the schism. The suggestion that in Tile's vision ethnic 
considerations took second place to a conception of common Blackness (Saunders 1970: 
567) has to be taken with caution. This assessment was made by some Africans in 1902 
at the peak of the Ethiopian movement. They wanted to raise Tile's status from that of a 
tribal leader to one of a national hero. 
It was precisely the narrow tribal base of Tile's Thembu National Church that led to its 
disintegration. One of his able successors, Rev. Jonas Goduka was not acceptable to Tile's 
followers because he was not a Thembu and as a result some of Tile's followers joined the 
Ethiopian Church of Mckone and Dwane (Sundkler 1948: 46). 
Chief Matanzima, another Thembu, wanted to form another tribal church but his tribal base 
had been ideologically broadened by redefining all the tribes in Transkei as Transkeians. 
The similarities between the Thembu National Church and the MCT are striking because 
of some ethnic elements in both, including (1) the exclusion of White control, the only 
element they share with Ethiopianism; (2) the insistence that only bona fide members of 
the Thembu tribe could succeed Tile; in the MCT Chief Matanzima insisted that only the 
Transkeians would run the MCT although the ''Whites would be welcome in our Church" 
(lmvo Zaba Ntsundu February 11, 1978: 4); and (3) the refusal to broaden the tribal base: 
Tile's successors shunned a close link with Mckone's Ethiopian Church (Saunders 1 9 7 0: 
566). In the 1970s Chief Matanzima did not entertain Rev. Ernest Baartman's suggestion 
of expanding the MCT to a Black Methodist Church of South Africa (Streek & Wicksteed 
1980: 281 ). 
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These considerations lead one to the conclusion that since the MCT as conceived by Chief 
Matanzima was a homeland church, ethnic interests played a role because a homeland is 
little more than a tribal kingdom. 
In the face of rising broad African nationalism both Tile's Thembu National Church and 
the MCT could not survive for very long because of their narrow ethnic base. Jonas 
Goduka reconstituted the Thembu National Church as the African Native Church (Sundkler 
1948: 46) and the MCT changed its name to the United Methodist Church of Southern 
Africa in 1979 (Streek & Wick steed 1980: 281 ). 
5.5.4 The MCf: an expression of socio-political interests? 
Mahlasela ( 1986) identifies the racial practices of the MCSA as a crucial factor in the 
schism yet at no stage did Transkeian Methodists cite racial practices within the MCSA 
as a reason for wanting to break away from the MCSA. Nor did they endorse Transkeian 
Cabinet Ministers' accusations that the MCSA was a racist Church (see 2.3). Transkeian 
Methodists were certainly aware of and opposed to the racial practices of the MCSA and 
they did not need the politicians to remind them of such practices. The questions then arise 
of why Transkeians did not use racial practices as a reason for the schism and why they 
did not capitalise on that when it was suggested by the politicians and some of the 
Transkeian Methodists? Besides, all the previous schisms in SA Methodism had been 
precipitated by racialism; for example, Tile (see 5.4.1), Mokane (see 5.4.2), Dwane (see 
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5.4.2) and the Bantu Methodist Churches (see 5.4.4). 
It would seem that Transkeian Methodists were interested not in winning support or even 
a sympathetic understanding from the world by undergirding their position with respectable 
reasons, like rejecting racism in the Methodist Church, but in winning the support of the 
Methodist masses within Transkei. 
Avoiding mention of racial practices as a justification for the schism was a tactical move 
by the BMC/nationalist bloc, who wanted to win the support of the ··silent majority" in 
Transkei, who were known to be politically conservative5 The majority of the Transkeian 
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Methodists were rural people who had less exposure to the dehumanising personal 
experience of the apartheid system and to the politicising influence of Black political 
movements which were primarily urban phenomena. They were people who had accepted 
the supremacy and competency of the White missionaries. Even amongst the ministers 
there was a big gap of perception of the racial issue between the younger generation of 
ministers, who were members of the BMC, and the older generation who either did not 
understand what the BMC was all about or else were not even aware of its existence (see 
2.6). 
To have suggested any changes to Methodism as the majority of Methodist understood it 
would simply have reduced potential support for the drive to form the MCT. To maintain 
and win broad grassroots support, it was tactical to assure them of the continued use of the 
Laws and Discipline (except for replacing references to South Africa by Transkei), the 
Xhosa Methodist Hymn Book, the Methodist liturgy, the church organisations they knew 
with their uniforms and so on. It was wise to convince them that the new Church was 
going to be formed because their Prime Minister wanted it and that those in the forefront 
of the schism were going to do everything possible to perpetuate the traditions of 
· Methodism as they had been received from the missionaries. This is the reason behind the 
strange silence on the racial practices of the MCSA in the debate preceding the schism. 
This strange silence on the racial practices did not make the MCSA comfortable. Hewson 
( 1978: 102-103 ), like Mahlasela, still felt that the racial practices of the MCSA were the 
main reason behind the schism and blamed the Methodist system of church administration 
for not granting ''a greater measure of autonomy to each Methodist district". The 
implication .of this statement is that, since Clarkebury District had a Black Chairman, it 
should have been possible to settle the dispute locally with the Prime Minister. Instead, the 
top executive of the MCSA got involved and as a result the negotiating team became less 
representative; that is, fewer Blacks were involved. 
Although socio-political arguments in the interest of forming the MCT were therefore 
suppressed, one can read it as a latent protest. The deliberate attempt to eliminate theology 
from the debate in the process building up to the schism was aimed at rallying grassroots 
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support for the perpetuation of loyalty to Methodist doctrine and practice even if that meant 
sacrificing the organic unity of South African Methodism. 
5.5.5 The MCT: an expression of personal interests? 
In considering theoretical frameworks of interpreting church schisms no reference was made 
to personal interests as a distinct cause in the theories or typological models. Here, however, 
they will be treated as a framework of interpreting the schism because the press persistently 
referred to the Transkei schism as exhibiting no more than personal interests. 
Commenting on the MCT, Rev. D.W. Bandey said "What we saw looked more like the action 
of a few resentful and perhaps power-hungry politicians than like the action of a responsible 
body of Methodist ministers" (Dimension, August 6, 1978: 1 0). In almost the same vein 
Hewson (1978: 102) commented: "This strong feeling (ofthe Transkeian Methodist identity) 
has been harnessed by opportunists to further their own ambitions." This was not the first time 
that Hewson reduced a national concern to a personal interest. He attributed the 1932-33 
schisms, which led to the formation of the Bantu Methodist Churches (see 5.4.4), to a rejection 
of church discipline and accordingly interpreted the African protest against the sixpence rise 
in church fees as a mere pretext. Yet that was during the years of economic depression! It 
seems that, when it comes to an analysis ofthe Methodist schisms, personal interests should 
indeed be considered as playing a role and therefore serve as a framework for interpretation. 
Makalima also used personal interests as an interpretive scheme in castigating some Transkeian 
Methodist ministers and by comparing Chief Matanzima to King Henry VIII of England. With 
regard to the latter, Makalima's views are similar to those in an article in the Sunday Times of 
June 4, 1978, which declared that the secret of Kaiser's banned church was a bid "to force 
Methodist ministers remaining in Transkei to accept polygamy".6 The article went on to argue 
that legalising polygamy would "rationalise ChiefMatanzima's own (personal) position. He has 
three wives and is a Methodist preacher." 
148 
Chief Matanzima and King Henry VIII can be compared on two levels. First, on the personal 
level, as Makalima and the Sunday Times article do, and secondly, on the political level, as an 
article in The Argus of 4 February 1978 and Letlaka (see 2.3) do. On the political level, The 
Argus article merely saw a parallel between Chief Matanzima's intention to nationalise the 
Methodist Church in Transkei and Henry VIII of England. The heading ofthe article was 
"Matanzima: a new Henry VIII". Letlaka used the reference to King Henry VIII ofEngland 
to argue that Transkei was a sovereign state with powers to legislate even on church matters. 
According to his argument, iflegislating on church matters had, in fact, been done in England, 
what was to prevent Transkei, as a sovereign state, from doing the same? Letlaka's argument 
was a response to Rev. Thompson, who had expressed reservations that a state should legislate 
on the establishment of a church (see 2.3). He did not consider the precipitating factors in the 
formation of the Church of England, such as the matrimonial problem of King Henry VIII (on 
the personal level) and the question of dual loyalty of English citizens, who were loyal to the 
King and the Pope as members ofthe Roman Catholic Church (on the political level). 
Personal interests did play a role in the schism though not beyond sustaining its momentum. 
The decisive factors in the schism were not personal. On the formation of the Church of 
England, Elton (1965: 229) says that without the divorce "there would therefore have been no 
Reformation, which is not at all the same as to say that there was nothing to the Reformation 
but the divorce". King Henry VIII got away with this interference with church matters simply 
because of the groundswell of unhappiness with the Pope in England (a similar situation 
regarding the MCSA was obtaining in Transkei). In the case of the MCT, the personal interests 
could be detected in ChiefMatanzima's wish to "repossess"' his estranged wife7 and in some 
disgruntled ministers (see 4.5.1.3). But these do not elevate personal interests to the dominant 
perspective for the interpretation of the MCT schism. It is clear that more than mere personal 
interests were involved in this schism. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
The material collected thus far and insights gained from consideration of various 
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explanatory models ofthe origin ofthe AICs should make it possible to make a judgement on 
what it was that was happening in the formation of the MCT. By now it is clear that a variety 
offactors have played a role in the MCT schism and that they differed from each other in the 
matter of degree. The MCT did not fit exactly into any model. The determining factor for the 
differences between the models considered and the MCT was, to a great extent, its political 
and ecclesial contexts. 
In searching for the underlying causes of the schism, the Methodist Conference resolution to 
discontinue the practice of sending church greetings to governments and the Transkeian 
Government's desire for international recognition of its political independence underline the 
importance of understanding the background of any schism or development of an AI C. 
A consideration of the political and ecclesial contexts of the schism puts the socio-political 
factors at the top of the scale; that is, the issues considered so far eliminate any religious or 
theological factors as a prit:nary cause of the schism. Accordingly, Turner's model of religious 
fulfilment and Dan eel's model of contextualization of the Gospel do not fit the MCT. Daneel's 
model can, however, be accommodated by arguing that the MCT was an attempt to form a 
Methodist Church which would be more relevant to the unique Transkeian situation, that is, 
'-
' if one extends Daneel's framework of an African cultural world-view to apply to an African 
political world-view as well. But I think that would be stretching the model beyond 
recognition. I will therefore consider the political factors which caused the schism first as they 
provide the background to the schism. 
Even granted that ChiefMatanzima was genuinely offended by the 1977 Conference resolution 
to discontinue sending letters of greetings, the question to ask is why he did not stop at 
punishing the MCSA by banning it in the Transkei but, instead, went further to suggest the 
formation ofthe MCT. 
When one considers ChiefMatanzima's need for a Transkei Church, the greetings issue merely 
serves as an occasion or "a pretext for action it was ready to take on other grounds" (Hewson 
1978: 102) for expressing the need for an "own Church". This is probably why on 31 January 
1978 ChiefMatanzima said that what Transkeians wanted was "an 
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independent Transkei Methodist Church to be run by Black Transkeians and free from the 
foreign white domination of the Methodist Church of South Africa" (lm vo ZabaN tsundu, 
February II, 1978: 4). 
However, Chief Matanzima did not want a state church as in the case of the Church of 
England, because "this Methodist Church would be allowed to operate as an autonomous 
body in Transkei and its constitution would not be interfered with" (Daily Dispatch, 
January 13, 1978: 1). 
Chief Matanzima's reason for entering into the ''greetings issue" was the recognition of 
Transkei independence. It is inconceivable that he would have pursued the matter by 
banning the MCSA in Transkei in the face of an outcry from the very international 
community from whom he sought recognition of Transkei's independence. His use of the 
greetings issue was therefore not targeted at either the international cnmmunity or the 
MCSA. His target was within Transkei. 
Chief Matanzima, himself a Methodist,8 would have wanted to create a loyal church 
constituency within Transkei and, since the Methodist Church was the largest in Transkei, 
it would be more effective to manipulate it. It was therefore imperative for any leader to 
win the Methodists support for the legitimacy of the new independent state. For the local 
purpose and for stability, this constituency had either to be checked or manipulated. To do 
this, the most logical step was to create a new ecclesial identity (similar to the political 
identity he had created) which would not transcend the political boundaries of Transkei 
because any section of Transkei that was attached to a group outside Transkei, like the 
MCSA, would have to take positions which at times would conflict with those of the 
Transkeian Government. The way to overcome that problem was to contain a section of 
Methodism and reorientate its loyalty to this new national identity. Matanzima's political 
interests therefore played a major role in precipitating the 1978 Methodist schism in 
Transkei. The schism was a political tactic to secure religious legitimation of his homeland 
system. 
--------- --
. ·-· 
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However, the categorisation of the MCT cannot be defined solely on the basis of Chief 
Matanzima's political objectives. The role played by the Transkeian Methodists and the total 
ecclesial context ofthe schism should also be taken seriously. 
In the ecclesial context the racial practices of the MCSA had heightened the dissatisfaction of 
the Black Methodists and therefore created the possibility of a schism. Within the MCSA the 
organisation which could have spearheaded the schism was the BMC. The BMC, however, 
was not a Black Methodist Church in waiting. Jnstead, its policy was to work for the 
transformation of the MCSA till its policy of "one and undivided Church" could be realised 
practically. As part of the BC movement, it was fiercely opposed to the homelands system (see 
6.5). 
The local (Queenstown and Clarkebury Districts) BMC would not have liked to be seen as 
pursuing a goal which was contrary to the policy of the National BMC. This explains their 
unwillingness to endorse racial practices within the MCSA as a reason for forming the MCT. 
Instead they played the pragmatic card of saying the MCT would be formed because the Prime 
Minister was going to ban the MCSA in Transkei. Why they did support the formation of the . 
MCT was because they saw in it an opportunity to advance Black leadership and 
empowerment which they were denied in the South African Methodist context. 
The open involvement of a political party (Chief Matanzima) is the key to the differences 
between the MCT and other Methodist schisms. Although the Ethiopian model is most helpful 
to explain the formation of the MCT its political patronage made the difference between it and 
the classic Ethiopianism of Mokone and Dwane. 
The MCT is thus unique in that it shows a convergence of both the political and ecclesial 
wishes of the Black people in the homelands during the apartheid era. The homelands policy 
should not be understood only from the perspectives of the SA Government, who sought to 
accommodate the political aspirations of the Black people in a separate political structure, but 
also from the perspective ofBiack people who wanted a space to express their political wishes 
free from any White political patronage. The same wish was also 
-....... __ .... 
152 
obtaining in the ecclesial context. In the SA apartheid situation in which sharing anything 
on an equal footing between Black and White had become almost impossible, the bottom 
line in both the political and the ecclesial context was a wish for a space in which Blacks 
could regain their human dignity. Sharing in terms dictated only by the Whites was 
perceived as condemning the Blacks to a position of perpetual juniority and this was 
rejected by the Blacks since the advent of Black Consciousness in South Africa. The 
emergence of both Transkei as a state and the MCT was seen as an opportunity by some 
Blacks to claim such a space, even if it was a seriously limited and circumscribed space 
within what was possible in the repressive apartheid context of post-Soweto South African 
politics. 
The MCT should not, therefore, be assessed narrowly of whether Transkeian Methodists 
were supporting the formation of the MCT but in terms of whether they supported or 
rejected White patronage. The overriding concern in the debate on the formation of the 
MCT as detailed in chapter 2 was whether the issue should be decided by the (White-
dominated) top executive of the MCSA or by the Transkeian Methodists themselves. The 
process having been set in motion by the intended ban, the underlying cause of the schism 
that resulted was neither the Methodist Conference resolution nor the Transkeian 
Government's wish for a Transkeian Church but the people's wish to decide their own fate. 
Here the term '' self-determination",9 which has a notorious South African political 
connotation, is appropriate. 
The fact that this underlying desire for self-determination was not realised along the path 
of a negotiated "independence" for Transkeian Methodists but through a one-sided 
rupturing of the relationship from the Transkeian side was largely due to the political 
agenda of chief Matanzima and the open interference of his government and security 
police. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Nosipho Majeke was the pen-name of a White author, Dora Taylor, who was one of 
the founders of the Unity Movement in Cape Town (see Majeke 1986 [1952]). 
2. In Nongqause's vision, the strangers said to her: "Tell that the whole community will 
rise from the dead; and that all cattle now living must be slaughtered, for they have been reared 
by contaminated hands because there are people about who deal in witchcraft. There should 
be no cultivation, but great new grain pits must be dug, new houses must be built, and great 
strong cattle enclaves must be erected. Cut out new milksacks and weave many doors from 
buka roots. So says the chiefNapakade, the descendant of Sifuba-sibanzi. The people must 
leave their witchcraft, for soon they will be examined by diviners" (Peires 1989: 79). 
3. Although Barrett (1961) saw the "scale of religious tension" as a main cause for the 
development of the African independent church movement from the Protestant Churches in 
general, I think it is in the Methodist tradition where this tension is most heightened. This can 
be attributed to a variety of factors such as the high degree of lay involvement in the leadership 
structures ofthe church and also their training as lay preachers; the egalitarian (equality of the 
ministerial status) ministry: till quite recently the circuit superintendent had more meaningful 
powers than the Chairman (now Bishop) of a District. ProfHulley (1994) described this 
arrangement as reducing him (the Chairman of a District) and his District Synod to a "post 
boy" between the circuit and the Conference. 
4. A shilling was made up of 12 pennies, so two shillings and sixpence equalled thirty 
pennies/pence. 
5. Cases to support this observation abound but I shall consider only three: 
(1) The Palmerton Dispute of 1882-1896. Rev. Lwana was the first African 
minster appointed to Palmerton to replace Rev. Douglas in 1882. In 1884 Rev. Lwana 
was transferred and replaced by a White missionary, Rev. R. Lewis. ChiefMqikela 
rejected this appointment. The church then sent Rev. John Nomvete to Palmerton. 
When Rev. Nomvete arrived in Palmerton the congregation was already divided into 
two camps. One camp welcomed Rev. Nomvete and the other camp clung to Rev. 
Nikani who had been sent to hold the fort in Palmerton while the Church was still 
sorting out the problem of the Palmerton appointment since the rejection of Rev. 
Lewis. This dispute lingered on for 11 years. 
The Church then re-appointed white missionaries from 1896-to 1944. The local 
Palmerton community was excited (my italics) at receiving an English minister, Rev. 
W.S. Davis (Conradie 1967:110). 
(2) Rev. Charles Pamla was at Etembeni Circuit, Umzimkulu for 19 years, but 
was never accepted by the community. He himself referred to that period as the most 
difficult in his ministry. There was peace and stability in that circuit only after 
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the appointment of a White missionary who remained at Etembeni till 1951 (Mears 
1973: 29-30). 
(3) The Clarkebury District started campaigning for a Black Chairman of the 
District in the early 1960s. In spite of its very large Black majority (there were 
never more than I 0 White members of the District Synod during that period) failed 
to nominate its Black candidafe. The Annual Conference of 1968 appointed Rev. 
J. C. Mvusi as the first Black chairman of the Clarkebury District (MCSA 1968: 
242). 
(6) The earlier Church discipline directives were that a polygamous man had to put 
away all his other wives except the first in order to be admitted to full membership of the 
Church. In the early 1960s this stringent discipline was modified. The 1962 Annual 
Conference resolved to amend Laws and Discipline to read: 
"Africans who are legally married by Native Custom and who became Christians 
shall be enrolled as members on trial for a period of not less than two years" 
(MCSA 1962: 61 ). 
(7) This may have been a reference to the earlier Methodist discipline on polygamous 
marriages (see 6 above). 
(8) The name of Chief Kaiser Dr. Matanzima appears in the list of lay members of 
Committees appointed by the 1977 Annual Conference (MCSA 1977: 420). 
(9) This is a term with positive connotation in international politics enshrined by 
various UNO documents. The "right to self-determination" is therefore a recognised post-
colonial term. But the way in which S.A. used-it in the homelands system was a betrayal 
of the real intentions of the concept. 
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CHAPTER6 
MISSIOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS 
In concluding this study five areas of missiological importance highlighted by the 1978 
Methodist schism will be considered. This is to give a pertinent missiological focus to the study 
by "teasing out" the most important implications of the foregoing chapters for both the mission 
of the church and the discipline of missiology. The five areas are: 1) The research questions; 
2) Mission and unity; 3) Mission and ethnic issues; 4) Prophetic mission; and 5) Prophetic 
ambivalence. 
6.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
At the beginning of this study ( 1. 4 ), four research questions were posed. The aim of these 
questions was to delineate the different perspectives from which the schism was approached. 
6.1.1 Narrative 
The first research question ("How did the 1978 Methodism schism in Transkei unfold?") was 
answered by means of a historical narrative in chapter 2, which. told a story of the unfolding 
process of the schism. This is not "pure" narrative (as in a novel or short story), since frequent 
reference is made to sources, thus making it a kind of historical report. And yet the narrative 
element is predominant, for at least two reasons. 
The first reason has to do with the nature of the sources. Due to a variety of reasons, very little 
information on the Methodist schism is available in church or university archives. Most of the 
written information (like minutes of meetings) are in the personal archives of people who were 
the scribes of the relevant committees at the time. And yet,· these documents give only a small 
part of the picture, since minutes contain only the resolutions passed, very seldom referring to 
discussions in a meeting that preceded a decision. The minutes of the meeting of 21 February 
1978 (Fikeni Papers), for instance, 
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while providing useful information on the debate regarding the formation of the MCT, does 
not even hint at the objection of Mr K.M.N. Guzana against the presence of Mr M.V. Lila 
or the clash between Rev. W.B.S. Gaba and Dr K.E. Mgojo. And yet these tensions throw 
very important light on the motivations behind people's actions and the reasoning going 
on in their minds. Information on such issues had to be obtained from the living oral 
tradition through interviews. These written documents were therefore no more than a 
skeletal point of reference. In addition to consulting such documents, extensive 
conversations were therefore held with a variety of people involved in the schism in order 
to fill in the details. The problem was, however, that some participants could no longer 
remember clearly what had actually happened in 1978. Much care was taken to eliminate 
serious distortions - due to my own bias and that of the people interviewed - in the telling 
of the story, even though personal bias can never be eliminated from scholarly study. The 
best one can hope for is to attain "objectivity in the heart of subjectivity" (Kruger 
1982:36), which is what I attempted to achieve throughout this study. 
The second reason for the prominence of narrative relates to the purpose of telling the 
story. Perhaps the 1978 schism is still too recent for a thoroughly critical and analytical 
study to be made of it. One often needs the benefit of historical "distance" to grasp the 
complex interaction between various factors causing a church schism such as this. But with 
historical distance comes the disadvantage of not having sufficient first-hand sources. In 
the case of the 1978 Methodist schism, a thorough analytical study done ten years from 
' 
now would suffer from the serious handicap of not having enough insider's accounts 
available to it, unless the actors involved in the schism started writing down their 
perceptions and experiences of the schism, as I am doing here. In fact, some people who 
played a very significant role in the process of the schism have already died, while this 
research project was still in progress. People like the late Revs Mbabane, Mbele and 
Gwiliza, as well as Messrs K.M.N. Guzana and C.S. Mda would have been able to provide 
valuable information and insights. One of the central purposes of the present study, as 
embodied in chapter 2, was therefore to "tell a story" of the schism as I experienced it 
myself and interpreted it on the basis of the available documents and the stories told by 
other actors that were involved. 
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It is my view, however, that the use of this "unscholarly" method of writing history - in 
narrative fashion - should not only be followed in situations where archival material is 
unavailable. It should become an established alternative approach in African theology in 
order to draw the Christian oral tradition into the doing of theology. This is not intended 
as an excuse for producing "sloppy" history but to acknowledge the situation that the 
sources for writing African church history are predominantly oral (and therefore narrative) 
in character. To my mind it is a weakness of missiology as an academic discipline in South 
Africa that it has not yet reflected systematically on the oral and narrative character of so 
much of its sources in researching the mission of the church. One priority for further 
missiological research that has arisen out of this study is precisely this need to "take on 
board" the narrative dimension of theology with which other branches of theology have 
been grappling for quite some time (see e.g. Smit 1990). 
6.1.2 Contextual analysis 
The second research question dealt with the factors that played a role in the schism. It 
therefore led to an investigation into the background of the Methodist tradition of sending 
letters of greeting to heads of state, the history of Transkei as a state, and the peculiar 
characteristics of Transkeian Methodism. 
When analysing the "letters of greeting" issue, which precipitated the schism, it became 
clear that the church needs a constant renewal and revisiting of its agenda. A church 
tradition develops in a certain period of history to meet a specific need and then gets 
passed on to subsequent generations. This becomes a problem when the church hands over 
(in the classic meaning of traditio) customs to following generations who then accept and 
perpetuate them uncritically. This is a betrayal of the reformational adage ecclecia 
refomwta semper refomwnda (a reformed church must always be reforming). It also causes 
the Christian tradition to be seen as an orthodoxy claiming universal validity, rather than 
as a "series of local theologies" (Schreiter 1985) developed by churches in widely differing 
contexts (Kritzinger 1995:8). 
The theological issue raised by the Methodist "letters of greeting" to heads of state is the 
!58 
freedom ofthe church. In early 19th century England, it was important for John Wesley and 
his fellow-Methodists to distance themselves from the "republican" spirit of the French 
Revolution, and to be seen as good law-abiding citizens. This centuries-old collusion between 
the Methodist Church and the British government, dutifully transplanted by British missionaries 
to the "mission fields" of Southern Africa, seriously curtailed the freedom of the MCSA in its 
dealings with the South Afiican state. As a result, it was "trapped in apartheid" (Villa-Vicencio 
1988). Especially since the 1948 election victory of the National Party, it became more and 
difficult for the MCSA- which has had a majority ofBlack members since the 19th century 
- to continue sending letters of greeting to the South African head of state. Eventually it 
became little more than a formality, which undermined the credibility of the church's public 
witness. This is not to say that the :::hurch should be an enemy of the state, but it should be 
sufficiently free to address the state prophetically when the need arises. I return to this issue 
of prophetic witness in 6.4. 
6.1.3 Conflict of loyalties 
The process leading up to the schism, as told in chapter 2, made it abundantly clear that serious 
internal con:flict erupted among Transkeian Methodists as a result ofthe intended ban on the 
MCSA. In chapter 4 the conflict of loyalties between the "loyalists" and "nationalists" was 
analysed. This approach is not based on any recognised social science approach to the analysis 
of con:flict. It arose out of the narrative method employed in chapter 2 and was therefore part 
of the "grounded theory" approach of this study. It became clear during the narrative 
description ofthe schism that the two constellations ofloyalties evidenced by the two "blocs" 
of "loyalists" and "nationalists" presented a helpful way of describing the way in which the 
issues appeared to them at the time. Such an approach needs to be tested and investigated 
more fully, and related to social scientific methods of analysis in order to determine its 
usefulness in other contexts. 
The initial reaction of the Transkeian Methodists to give a theological response to the crisis 
presented by the impending ban (see 2.5.8) was soon superseded by pragmatic considerations. 
In this regard the MCT schism illustrates quite clearly the problems inherent in the 
development of a local theology Schreiter ( 1985: 14) sees the main 
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weakness of the development of a contextual theology m its inability to sustain a 
theological dialogue with the context it is addressing: 
The development of a contextual theology is often set on as a project, but even 
more often not carried beyond the first couple of steps. Thus problems may be 
identified, questions may be addressed to the Christian faith as found in other 
cultural traditions, but there has not been time to continue the dialogue. 
Indeed, in most cases "there has not been time" to formulate a conscious and well 
considered theological response to urgent issues in the life of a church. Insisting on such 
a cognitive or intellectualist perspective reflects a reductionist approach to theology, which 
is very common in Western theology. In a more holistic view of theology, the actions 
taken by Christians in a situation of crisis already express and embody their theology, even 
though it is not (fully) articulated. This is especially true in the African context where oral 
tradition is so powerful in the life of the church. In other words, the two constellations of 
loyalties identified in chapter 4 represent two contextual theologies at work among 
Transkeian Methodists during the process of the schism. This action-related view of 
theology is in line with t_hat expressed at the founding conference of EA TWOT in Dar-es-
Salaam: 
We reject as irrelevant an academic type of theology that is divorced from action. 
We are prepared for a radical break in epistemology which makes commitment the 
first act of theology and engages in critical reflection on praxis of the reality of the· 
Third World (Torres & Fabella 1978:269). 
While no illuminating theological formulations or declarations were produced during the 
process of the MCT schism the pragmatic concerns expressed were deeply theological in 
nature. In chapter 4 the conflict between two opposing contextual theologies was analysed, 
thus developing a way of doing a missiological analysis of theological conflicts in the 
church's struggle to be relevant and authentic in its public ministry. 
6.1.4 Typological analysis 
Although the MCT and the earlier Methodist schisms are similar in some respects there 
are also significant differences between them. The differences are determined by differing 
attitudes towards the state and towards the established church (in all cases the Methodist 
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Church) from which they broke away. These differences become more striking when the MCT 
is compared with the Ethiopian church movement. 
Although Mokone claimed that the Ethiopian Church was firmly grounded in the tradition of 
Wesleyan Methodism (Bali a 1991:7 4 ), this should only be understood to refer to doctrinal 
issues. Mokone moved away from the British tradition of Methodist polity and adopted the 
polity of the American Methodist Episcopal Church (still doctrinally within Wesleyan 
Methodism but differing from it in church polity in various ways, e.g. the appointment of 
bishops) and later a section of the Ethiopian movement (under Dwane) went all the way into 
episcopal polity by establishing the Ethiopian Order within the Anglican Church. The MCT, 
on the other hand, distinguished itself by a wholesale adoption of the polity and institutional 
character ofthe "mother" church. It adopted the Lmvs and Discipline of the MCSA with only 
minor editorial alterations. 
Another significant difference is in the relationship with the "mother" church. In spite of 
acrimonious relations between the MCT and the MCSA the Transkeian Methodists avoided 
interpreting the schism in religious, theological or racist terms, so that they could claim credal 
unity with the MCSA and trivialise their ecclesiastical (organisational) separation. The 
Ethiopian Churches, on the other hand, did not mince their words and stated quite categorically 
that they rejected the racist practices of the Wesleyan Methodist Church which were evident 
in its financial and administrative arrangements. 
In the political context the MCT was an attempt to form a national church in the political 
sense, while the Ethiopian Churches were an attempt to form a national church in the cultural 
sense. Niebuhr (1972:25) characterises a national church in the political sense as displaying 
(among others) the features of the church as "a part of the state, or as a co-ordinate with the 
state"- characteristics which were quite prominent in the objectives ofthe formation ofthe 
MCT. That is why it was so careful to minimise any possible conflict with the political and 
economic interests of the Transkeian government. The typological analysis in chapter 5 led to 
the conclusion that the Transkeian Methodists wanted to create a Transkeian Church which 
·was not only Transkeian but also Methodist, in the same sense that "the German church is not 
only German but also Lutheran ... " (Niebuhr 1972: 132f). 
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The peculiar nature of the MCT schism also ra1ses the question whether typological 
classification is an adequate framework of interpretation when there are no dispute in matters 
of doctrine or practice. The MCSA refused to recognise the MCT, not because of differences 
in matters of doctrine and practice, but because the MCSA had not conferred autonomy on the 
MCT in a constitutional way: "[It] has been formed in defiance of the constitutional procedures 
of our church and to the detriment of unity in the body of Christ" (Dimension, Nov 12, 1978). 
This raises questions concerning the ecclesiology operative in the MCSA at the time. Does this 
not represent a bureaucratisation of the church, making it into a legal rather than theological 
institution? It also raises the theological question of the nature of "church law" or, put 
differently, the role of legal church structures, especially in the African context. 
On the other hand, the question may be asked whether a faithful and sensitive application of 
Methodist constitutional procedures could not have guarded the MCT more effectively against 
intimidation b'y the Transkei state during the process leading up to the schism. Perhaps all of 
this proves that church rules and procedures in themselves cannot ensure that the church will 
act as a genuine Christian community. Without the living reality of mutual trust to sustain the 
constitutional process within the church, it can easily degenerate into mere formalism or 
(worse) into a mechanism of exclusion and manipulation.· 
6.2 MISSION AND ETHNIC ISSUES 
The review of typological analyses in 6.1.4 shows that political, cultural and ethnic issues have 
not only invaded the church but have become part of its self-understanding. When dealing with 
this issue one should first recognise the complicity of the church in this regard. Niebuhr 
( 1972: 111) points out that the supra-national ideals of Jesus and Paul were surrendered during 
the first three centuries of Christianity, when it entered into an alliance with the Roman Empire, 
because it was a "denationalised and universal empire with which they associated the 
ecumenical ambitions of their faith, and it was a relatively catholic culture which they were 
called upon to infiltrate with their pan-human ethics." 
By the time Christianity was established in Europe, however, that monolithic political and 
--
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cultural ideal had been melted away and replaced by various nationalisms, each with its own 
cultural ethos. In this regard the relatively successful inculturation ofthe church into the life 
worlds of various people was partly responsible for its supra-national and ecumenical ideals 
being overshadowed and pushed into the background. The role of Martin Luther in the 
emergence of German national consciousness is a case in point. 
The conception of people as a nation or ethnic group was part of the whole Western "package" 
conveyed by Christian missionaries and colonial administrators to countries outside Europe. 
When such a national principle did not exist, missionaries in some cases even regarded it as 
their task to create it (Maluleke 1993 :236ft). Berger et al ( 1973: 149) points out the irony of 
nationalism in Third World countries: its objective was to throw out the influences of the 
Western world and yet nationalism is itself a product of modernisation, brought about by the 
Western world. 
Were it not for the apartheid system, the evolution ofTranskei to an independent state would 
have been regarded as a successful fulfilment of British colonial policy. This is equally true of 
the MCT: were it not for the schism of 1978, the evolution of the MCT would have been 
regarded as the fulfilment of the Venn-Anderson ideal of a self-supporting, self-governing and 
self-propagating Christian community. The contextual analysis of chapter 3 revealed a parallel 
development of these political and ecclesial ideals in Transkei. In some cases there was a close . 
cooperation between the colonial and church establishments, and such cooperation helped to 
create a climate which favoured an alliance between the Transkeian state and the MCSA's 
Clarkebury District, which was the only Black-led Methodist District and eventually became 
a homeland church. 
The existence (or creation) of homogeneous ethnic communities was as essential to the 
ideological experimentation of the South African government as it was to the missionary 
propagation of the gospel. The missionary tradition in the Eastern Cape and Transkei in 
particular helped to foster ethnic consciousness by reducing the Xhosa language to writing, 
translating the Bible into Xhosa, thus creating a Xhosa Christian tradition. There was nothing 
wrong with that until the apartheid government started manipulating it ( cf. Blaser et al. 
1994: 193ft). 
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A comparison between the MCT and the Evangelical Presbyterian Church in South Africa 
(EPCSA - formerly Tsonga Presbyterian Church) provides a very interesting study of the 
ethnic factor in missiology. The development of an exclusive ethnic identity in the EPCSA 
preceded the development of the Bantustan policy, whereas in the MCT an exclusive ethnic 
identity came later, along with the Bantustan policy. Maluleke (1993) shows how the 
missionaries developed and created the Tsonga ethnic identity along with their missionary 
work. The homeland policy only conferred political legitimacy on an ethnic group which 
was already conscious of its own identity. In Transkei the ethnic consciousness was forged 
by the politics of the homeland policy an·d the MCT was an attempt to forge a religious 
legitimation for that ethnic identity. 
Although the Methodist schism in Transkei is viewed and discussed in the categories of 
politics and ideology, the underlying issue is an ethnic one. The Xhosa were the first South 
African tribe to experience Western encroachment on its worldview. Their determination 
to resist is expressed in both political and religious terms. To achieve this they needed to 
control the institutions which determined their lives. The contextual analysis given in 
chapter 3 helps to explain why the (often romanticised) "struggle against apartheid" was 
lacking in large sections of the Transkeian Methodist Church. The joint legacy of the 
British colonial policy to create national states and the Methodist missionary tradition of 
cooperating with political authorities created a positive attitude towards the development 
of a Transkeian ethnic identity with its own political and ecclesial institutions. It was this 
climate which produced the MCT schism. 
6.3 Mission and unity 
As I have indicated before, the 1978 Annual Conference of the MCSA refused to recognise 
the "breakaway Transkei Methodist Church" as it "has been formed in defiance of the 
constitutional procedures of our church and to the detriment of the unity of the body of 
Christ" (Dim ens ion, Nov. 12, 1978). In similar vein, the 1978 BMC National Conference 
declared: 
.. the banning of the Methodist Church of South Africa and the forming of the 
Methodist Church of Transkei failed to find sympathy and acceptance from Black 
brethren. For (among other reasons mentioned) it was felt that the move would lead 
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to a severance of the solidarity and fellowship of Black people in their struggle for a 
meaningful place in the church ( 1978 BMC Minutes, in Mahlasela 1986: 28). 
Both statements tell us more about the concerns of the commentators than about church unity. 
The MCSA Conference is concerned about its constitution which has been defied and the BMC 
with its Black struggle which has been betrayed or undermined. These statements are 
symptomatic of the general lack of precision when unity in ecclesial circles is talked about. 
Various conferences of the International Missionary Council have given different definitions 
of unity, to the extent that its importance has been relativised. Saayman ( 1984: 19) gives the 
different meanings of unity which have emerged from ecumenical discussions and from the 
different Christian traditions. All these understandings of unity are related to the understanding 
of apostolicity. The latter is understood in terms of: a) apostolic succession, as in episcopal 
churches; b) remaining faithful to the apostles' doctrine, as in Reformed churches; c) fulfilling 
the apostolic mission of the church in the world, as in the theology of the apostolate. The 
MCT, as a church influenced by the Reformation, did not accept the apostolic succession, but 
could hardly be accused of having violated any of the other two dimensions of apostolicity as 
they seceded from the MCSA. They remained true to apostolic doctrine and apostolic mission. 
Saayman (1984: 123) points out that in the South African context there is a tendency to be 
satisfied as long as the church unity is not undermined in the terms listed above Lack of unity 
within the same church is sometimes described as lack of uniformity so that it can be 
rationalised and justified on cultural grounds. The only unity which is sacrosanct and therefore 
should never be compromised is that of the controlling authority. 
The 1978 MCSA Annual Conference was bombarded with statements like "they [the 
Transkeian Methodists] could not wait for Conference to debate and grant them their 
autonomy" and "they should have attended Conference to apply for their autonomy" 
(Dimension, Nov. 12, 1978). That would not have been enough. The question is whether the 
MCSA church could have legislated and set in motion its constitutional procedures for 
establishing a church which conformed to apartheid boundaries. What the Conference 
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should have promised, and would have been worth waiting for in Transkei and elsewhere, 
was a commitment by the MCSA to become a catholic supra-national and supra-cultural 
church. The change of name of the MCSA from Methodist Church of South Africa to 
Methodist Church of Southern Africa at the end of 1978 shows that the MCSA became 
aware at that time of the need to express such a supra-national identity. If the MCSA had 
conferred autonomy on the MCT by legislation in the context of the ideological exigencies 
of post-Soweto-1976 South African politics, that would not have conferred legitimacy on 
the MCT any more than the schism. As a matter of fact, it would have cast even more 
doubts on the church's integrity. Having changed the MCSA 's name by legislation, what 
was needed was a change in practice. 
The real theological issue underlying the MCT schism was therefore not the defiance of 
the constitutional procedures of the church. There was never any constitutional procedure 
for establishing an apartheid [a homeland] church, as Gaba argued in the LSC meeting (see 
2.1 0.5) and there could never be one, because no [English-speaking?] church could ever 
make constitutional provisions for endorsing apartheid [the DRC did this openly, though, 
by establishing racially defined churches! Was this a case that the English did not want to 
look as "backward" as the Afrikaners? And yet they were as trapped in apartheid as most 
Afrikaners were]. 
Unity conceived of in terms of Black struggle as promoted by the BMC, on the other hand, 
also falls far short of the supra-national and supra-cultural ideal inherent in the nature of 
the church. A church which is above the political and cultural stratifications would have 
less oppressive structures and practices, thus escaping ideological manipulation. The 
existence of the BMC was, by the very nature of its objectives, provisional Once its 
objectives of the transformation of the MCSA to a truly "one and undivided church" in 
practice was achieved, there would be no reason for its continued existence. The 
approaches of the national BMC and the BMC of the Transkei Districts reflected two 
approaches to national politics in South Africa. The national BMC was waging a struggle 
for a united democratic South Africa, while the BMC of the Transkei Districts had opted 
out of that struggle by taking the "homeland" line of trying to use the system against itself 
--:_-. -
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The Methodist schism in Transkei suggests that the church in Southern Africa needs to go 
further than boasting of shared theological traditions or unity in apostolicity, so that it may 
express its catholic nature in actual practice. 
6.4 Pmphetic mission 
An important missiological dimension of this study is its emphasis on the prophetic 
mission of the church in terms of church-state relations (see 1.3 ). In 3 .4. 3.2 the point was 
made that the Methodist tradition has an inclination to influence its followers to conform 
to the wishes of the political establishment To a large extent this compromises the 
Methodist Church's prophetic mission. Prophetic mission demands that the church should 
not "fear the fury of the Fuhrer" but be bold enough to say "Thus says the Lord ... " 
In this section I shall argue that the success or failure of the MCSA in the Transkei crisis 
was decided by its response to the telegram of 10 February 1978 in which the Transkeian 
Minister of Justice banned "foreigners" from attending the meeting of 21 February 1978 
in Umtata (see 2.4). The MCSA top leadership abided by the ruling and stayed away from 
the meeting. What would have been a prophetic stand in that situation from the side of the 
MCSA would have been for the President of Conference and his delegation to attend the 
meeting in defiance of the ban (or get arrested for trying to do so). The MCSA would have 
won more support from the international community and (more importantly) from 
Transkeian Methodists, who needed a signal from the MCSA in that situation that it was 
not going to abandon them. As pointed out in 2.7.3, the sentiment was expressed at the 
Buntingville BMC meeting on 14 February 1978 that the MCSA were "abandoning" the 
Methodists in Transkei by not sending a delegation to the forthcoming meeting. 
When Rev. Hendricks and his delegation decided not to enter the lion's den they played 
into the hand of the Transkeian government and thus encouraged the process leading to the 
formation of the MCT Their decision not to attend also sent a signal to the Transkeian 
Methodists that the MCSA could abandon them, in fact, that they were as powerless 
against the Transkeian government's security establishment as Transkeians themselves. As 
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a result, the ban on "foreigners" was not even discussed or challenged on 21 February 
1978 since nobody in that category attended (or even tried to attend) the meeting. Even in 
March some Transkeian ministers were still lamenting the fact that the MCSA leadership 
had not even considered changing the venue of the meeting to Kokstad (see 2. 7. 7) to 
enable a meeting between all the interested parties. 
Had the President of Conference and his delegation attended (or tried to attend) the 
meeting, it would have pushed the Transkeian government into a "no win" situation. If it 
arrested the delegation (the worst option they could take), it would permanently lose any 
hope of international recognition. If it did not ''deal with them," as threatened in the 
telegram, it would portray the image of a "toy government" - which need not be taken 
seriously because it issued empty threats - thus losing political support within Transkei. 
The telegram was part of a systematic display of power and intimidation tactics from the 
side of the Transkeian government. In January 1978 it threatened to ban the MCSA in 
Transkei; in February 1978 it banned the MCSA top executive (as "foreigners") from 
.• 
attending a meeting in· Transkei; in May 1978 it declared the MCSA an "undesirable 
organisation;" and in June it finally banned the MCSA. 
When Rev. Hendricks, President of Conference, said in June 1978, in response to the 
eventual banning of the MCSA, "I do not accept the banning of our church," that was a 
prophetic statement. It was four months too late, however, to make a difference to history. 
Its prophetic words would have carried much more weight if they were an expression of 
concrete prophetic action taken on 21 February 1978, and at other significant points 
between January and June 1978. Through the telegram of 10 February 1978 and the non-
response to it by the MCSA, the state succeeded in increasing its power over Transkeians 
and the church in increasing its powerlessness. If it were a chess game, that was the point 
at which the MCSA lost its queen. 
The fact that there was not a single Transkeian in the MCSA top leadership who could 
attend the meeting as a bona fide representative of the church, highlighted the structural 
problem of the MCSA at the time. Dr Mgojo attended the meeting of 21 February 1978 
in his personal capacity, as a Transkeian. Had there not been such a credibility gap 
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between Transkeian Methodists and the MCSA top leadership, the developments may have 
taken a very different turn. 
As it turned out, the telegram swung the pendulum in favour of the formation ofthe MCT. The 
MCSA's failure to take a strong prophetic stand weakened those in Transkei who were 
prepared to resist state interference in church affairs. The traditionally compromised position 
of the Methodist church vis-a-vis the state led it to respond lamely and ambiguously to the 
Transkeian government's blatant interference in the life ofthe church. 
Furthermore, the MCSA statement of 21 February 1978 on the question of autonomy (see 
2.5.7) said, "there is nothing wrong with the autonomy ofthe Transkeian Methodists if they 
·wanted it" (my italics). On 21 March 1978 a majority of Transkeian Methodist leaders said 
they wanted it. The MCSA was therefore morally bound to grant it. The question is: why 
should the wishes of the Transkeians be sufficient reason for the granting of autonomy? And 
what were the implications of such a position for the unity of the church? It seems as if the 
concern for church unity was overshadowed by a concern for legitimacy, a legitimacy 
conferred to one church by another ("mother") church. 
Villa-Vicencio has argued that Chief Matanzima' s wish that the matter be referred ro Synod 
and from Synod to Conference (see 2. 5. 7), was probably meant to guarantee this legitimacy. 
Had that line of action been followed, he would have successfully forced the MCSA 
"to recognise the MCT and by implication the bantustan policy and therefore the 
apartheid policy ofthe South African government" (Dimension, August 6, 1978). 
The collapse ofthe ecclesiastical channels of granting autonomy to the MCT saved the MCSA 
from that embarrassment. 
For the Transkeian Methodists, on the other hand, it would have been a prophetic stand to 
have discussed and challenged the ban on "foreigners" at the meeting of 21 February 1978. By 
doing that they would have challenged not only their own alienation from the top leadership 
of their church, but also the introduction of the term "foreigner" in church 
169 
matters. By not challenging the concept "foreigner" at that crucial moment, they were 
allowing the Transkeian political establishment to redefine their (Transkeian Methodists) 
own membership in the MCSA as "foreigners," in the same sense in which (through 
political independence) they had been re-defined as foreigners in the RSA. 
The unrecognised devastating effect of the telegram lay in its symbolism: it brought the 
concept "foreigner" more vividly into the awareness of the people of Transkei. At that 
stage ( 1976-78), the average Transkeians had not yet assimilated the political fact that they 
had become "foreigners" in South Africa. The Transkeian government decided to drive 
this point home in a dramatic way by showing that South Africans (even top church 
leaders) were "foreigners" in Transkei. The irony of this was the fact that the state was 
using the church, with its powerful capability of transmitting symbols, to drum into the 
I 
minds of Transkeians the hard reality of this "foreigner" concept by splashing the message 
across the headlines that Rev. Hendricks, the President of the MCSA Conference, was a 
"foreigner" in Transkei. The telegram forced the Transkeian Methodists to become the first 
religious group to grant the Transkeian state the religious legitimation it so desperately 
needed. It allowed the state to get away with this blatant interference in church procedures, 
without even the faintest of challenges. 
There are two possible reasons why the Transkeian Methodists did not challenge the 
telegram. The first is that they ·were probably intimidated by this threat from the side of 
the state and therefore afraid of opposing it. From experience they had learnt how the 
Transkeian leaders used power to get their own way. It is therefore understandable that 
someone remarked during the schism: "Who does not know KD?" (See 4.4.2). If Rev. 
Hendricks himself and the MCSA top leadership did not challenge or defy the ban, how 
could they even think of doing so? 
A second reason is that they may have lacked the theological commitment to do so. They 
could not defend the policies of their own church (the MCSA) against the accusations 
l"evelled at· it by the Transkeian politicians (see 2.3). If the link with the MCSA structure 
had been stronger and had been a treasured part of their identity as Methodists they may 
have resisted this imposition of a totally unacceptable term ("foreigner") onto their church 
---. 
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practices. 
The telegram caught both the MCSA top executive and the Transkeian Methodists off guard. 
Afterwards each group accused the other of failing to exercise alternative options within their 
power that could have prevented the worsening of the situation. In the MCSA the charge was 
that the Transkeian Methodists could have offered some resistance to the Transkeian 
government. The Transkeian Methodists, for their part, blamed the MCSA top executive for 
I 
refusing to break out of stereotyped ecclesiastical procedures to address the urgency of the 
situation. 
The fact of the matter is that the telegram placed the church before a kairos moment in which 
prophetic deeds were required. Both groups allowed the kairos to slip through their fingers. 
Everything that followed was decisively determined by the ·responses to that infamous 
telegram. 
6.5 Prophetic ambivalence 
There were a number of prophetic Methodist responses to the crisis, but in this final section 
·I want to point out how each of those prophetic responses contained an element of 
ambivalence. Missiologically speaking, this underlines the uncomfortable fact that the witness 
of the church is never totally "pure" or uncompromised. 
One example is the view of Villa-Vicencio (Dimension, August 6, 1978) on the question 
whether the MCSA should recognise the MCSA: 
Any form of recognition of the Methodist Church of Transkei at this time could have 
the gravest consequences. To recognise this church is to recognise Transkei and by 
implication the bantustan policy and therefore the apartheid policy of the South African 
government. 
This statement is clear and prophetic, but it was made to a church which had already 
formulated and approved a letter of greeting to the Transkeian head of state at the 1977 
MCSA Conference when the debate erupted over the wording of the letter of greeting to the 
South African government, which led to the decision to discontinue letters of greeting 
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altogether. That letter of greeting to the Transkei State President (Paramount Chief B.M. 
Sigcau) was in itself a clear indication ofthe recognition ofTranskei and "by implication the 
bantustan policy and therefore the apartheid policy of the South African government," since 
the objections that were raised in the 1977 Conference to the sending of such a letter were not 
accepted by conference. As a result, the prophetic voice of the MCSA was severely 
compromised. But even more fundamentally, a possible prophetic stance by the MCSA against 
the homeland/apartheid system was weak((ned by the fact that there were separate Black and 
White Methodist congregations in Transkei and all over South Africa, as Mr Pamla pointed 
out in the meeting between Transkeian political leaders and MCSA representatives in January 
1978. The courageous prophetic voices of individual Methodists were constantly blunted and 
contradicted by the daily practice of a church which was itself"trapped in apartheid" (Villa-
Vicencio 1988). 
Another example of prophetic ambivalence was the stance of the Clarke bury District BMC 
branch. As pointed out in 4. 5.1.1 this BMC branch was the core of the nationalist group in the 
process leading to the MCT schism. The motivations for their support of the formation of the 
MCT were that it presented an opportunity to develop Black leadership. However, this is an 
ambivalent stance, since the majority position in the Black Consciousness movement, with 
which the BMC identified itself, was very strongly opposed to the homeland policy. This was 
clearly formulated by Biko (1978:86): 
These tribal cocoons called "homelands" are nothing else but sophisticated 
concentration camps where black people are allowed to "suffer peacefully." Black 
people must constantly pressurise the bantustan leaders to pull out of the political cul-
de-sac that has been created for them by the system. 
This total rejection of the homeland system was also dramatised by the expulsion of Temba 
Sono from a SASO conference in 1972 for supporting the "realist" approach to the homelands 
(Gerhart l978:289f), which proposed that "dummy institutions" should be used to undermine 
the system itself When the Clarkebury BMC supported the formation of the MCT, they were 
taking the "realist" option, which explains why the National BMC did not support them. The 
"realist" Black Consciousness approach in Transkei was also followed by Rev. Qambela, 
former SASO President at Fedsem, who openly supported ChiefMatanzima and urged him to 
ban all the White churches in Transkei (see 2.3). This shows, once again, that no prophetic 
stance is totally "pure" and uncompromised. 
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One of the functions of missiology is to reflect critically on the witness of the church. This 
study has provided ample material and insights to stimulate ongoing reflection on the 
ambiguities of the church's prophetic witness and the challenges facing it in its relationship 
with ethnic and political realities in Africa. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This study of the dynamics of the MCT schism has probably raised as many questions as 
it has proposed answers. I sincerely hope that other scholars will research it and enter into 
debate with the interpretations I have suggested. Further research is necessary to trace the 
subsequent developments of the MCT during the ten years of its separation from the 
MCSA, to see what light it throws (in retrospect) on the motivations for the formation of 
the MCT. It will also be necessary to interview lay members of the MCT to ascertain what 
their interpretations were to the schism, and how that differed from the views of the 
ministers and politicians. 
After the lifting of the ban on the MCSA in 1988, not all Transkeian Methodists rejoined 
their "mother" church of 1978. A number of further schisms had taken place during the 
ten years "in exile." 1 These developments indicate that the 1978 schism should not be 
reduced simply to a "Matanzima affair." The "ecclesiastical disaster" pronounced by Rev. 
Hendricks in June 1978 was latently present before the MCT schism, waiting to be born, 
and the Matanzima government proved to be the midwife of that process. All of this 
demands further intensive study. 
In conclusion, we can now thank God for the transformation we see in our church. 
Viva, Methodist Church of Southern Africa! 
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ENDNOTES 
1. A section of the silent majority of 1978 opted to remain the UMCSA (United Methodist 
Church of South Africa), which was the name adopted by the MCT in 1979. Another group 
decided to remain the "Methodist Church of Transkei." This was a group under Rev. W.B.S. 
Gaba who separated from the UMCSA in 1986 to adopt once more the original name of the 
church. To distinguish this group from the initial MCT, it is wise to call it "MCT II." 
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APPENDIX 1 
Diagram of the interaction of the parties: October 1977 to June 197R 
16.01.1978 
Executive of the MCSA 
issues its statement 
7.04.1978 
Interim Committee 
meets MCO in Durban 
25.04.1978 
Finance sub-committee of the 
LSC meets MCO in Durban 
Transkeian 
Government· 
12.01.1978 
PM's press statement 
26.01.1978 
MCSA delegation meets 
Transkei Cabinet 
12.02.1978 
MCSA delegation meeL~ 
Transkei Cabinet 
26.05.1978 
llte MCSA declared an 
undesirable organisation 
2.06.1978 
MCSA banned 
Transkei C> 
Methodists ····· ·· 
31.01.1978 
PM meets Transkeian 
Methodist ministers 
21.02.1978 
Mc.:tings of Methodist 
ministers and lay leaders in 
Umtata Interim Committee 
1204.1978 
Meeting of Methodist 
Interim Committee 
replaced by I .indikhaya 
Steering Committee 
24.05.1978 
1st Plcnarv Session of 
the LSC in Umtata 
2.06.1978 
2nd Plenary Session of 
the LSC - MCT formed 
sMs.st~r8#~p.y{. 
ueeristown District: · 
14.02.1978 
BMC meeting in Buntingvilh: 
in Umtata 
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APPENDIX II 
STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE CHAIRMEN OF DISTRICTS ON 16 JANUARY 
1978 IN RESPONSE TO CHIEF MATANZil\'IA'S PRESS STATEMENT OF 12 
JANUARY 1978 
The Prime Minister of Transkei has declared that his cabinet intends to p(l'-S a law through the 
Transkei Parliament banning in Transkei the Methodist Church of South Africa. An Act is also 
envisaged which will establish a Methodist Church of Transkei with Circuits in Transkei and South 
Africa. 
The reason given is that the Conference of 1977 did not send a message of greetings to the Transkei 
President. This has unfortunately been regarded as an affront to the integrity and dignity of the Head 
of State, Government and the people of Transkei. 
The growing complexity of the political situation in the nations served by this church has made it 
more and more difficult for the Conference to send letters of greetings in their traditional form. The 
Conference, therefore, decided to discontinue the practice of sending these letters. In the debate on 
this issue, some of those who spoke said that they themselves did not recognise Transkei. This, 
however, was not the issue bef9re the Conference and the independence of Transkei was not debated. 
We strongly reject suggestions that the Methodist Church of South Africa takes instructions from the 
World Council of Churches or any other body. The Methodist Church of South Africa is completely 
autonomous, making its own decisions in the light of its understanding of the will of God as revealed 
through Holy Scripture. 
The Methodist Church of South Africa has a long and very honourable history of loyal service in 
Transkei and other parts of Southern Africa. We believe that we can serve the people of Southern 
Africa best in the name of God by remaining undivided (Fikeni Papers) . 
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APPENDIX ill 
TRANSKEI METHODIST DISTRICT 
TRANSKEI 
0 20 
'-----"....___,, km 
[ill] 
The Kimberley and Bloemfontein District 
~ 
The Queenstown District 
~ 
The Clarkebury District 
Preamble 
'!.·. 
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APPENDIX IV 
THE METHODIST CHURCH OF TRANSKEI 
LAWS AND DISCIPLINE 
This Assembly of the Transkeian Methodist Ministers and Lay Representatives meeting in Umtata 
on the 24th May, 1978 wishes to place on record its opinion on the intention of the Republic of 
Transkei to ban the Methodist Church of South Africa in the Transkei and its avowed intention to 
pass a Bill by an Act ofParliament enabling the Methodists in the Transkei to form and constitute the 
Methodist Church ofTranskei. We have dealt with the fundamental question ofwhether a Church 
can be created by a State. We feel that as far as the envisaged Methodist Church of Transkei is 
concerned, the Republic of Transkei will not have and can never create a Church. The Church can 
be created only by Christ who is both the Foundation and the Head of the Church. 
We have been made to realise that to decide otherwise in this matter is beyond our power. We are, 
however, content to learn that only what has always been regarded as of the bene esse ofthe Church 
will be changed. 
Even in this regard we humbly admit that we know of no one method by which Christ creates a 
structure of his Church in all situations. In as much as we were called by him through various ways · 
to his Church and his Ministry which itselfis diversified (cf. Eph. 4.11 ft), we hope that he may in his 
wisdom have ordained that this is the way in which his mission can best be achieved in the Transkei. 
We pray that it be so because we are committed by our vocation to reveal him in whichever situation 
we find ourselves. 
Since the internal organisation of the envisaged Methodist Church of Transkei may differ in certain 
respects from the Methodist Church of South Africa, we have adopted mutatis mutandis the Laws 
and Discipline of the Methodist Church of South Africa. 
The- religious doctrines and usages of the envisaged Methodist Church of Transkei will in all 
substantial respects be identical with those of the Methodist Church of South Africa. We claim to 
adhere to the same Methodist doctrines, traditions and practices (Fikeni Papers). 
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APPENDIX V 
Republic of Transkei 
26 May 1978 
Proclamation 
No. 28 
by the President of the Republic ofTranskei 
No.9 
Declaration of the Methodist Church of South Africa as an Undesirable 
Organisation 
Whereas I am statisfied that the existence within Transkei of the Methodist 
Church of South Africa is prejudicial to the interests of the State; 
Now, therefore, under the powers vested in me by Section 2 of the 
Undesirable Organisation Act, 1978 (Act 9 of 1978), I hereby declare the 
Methodist Church of South Africa to be an undesirable organisation. 
Given under my Hand the Seal of the Republic of Transkei at Umtata this 
24th day ofMay, One thousand nine hundred and seventy-eight. 
Botha M. Sigcau 
State President 
G.M.M. Matanzima 
By Order ofthe President-in-Council 
-----
Order 
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Department of Justice 
General Notice No. 29 
Undesirable Organizations Act, 1978 
To the Methodist Church of South Africa 
Whereas the President of the Republic of Transkei has by Proclamation 9 of 
1978 declared the Methodist Church of South Africa to be an undesirable 
organization; 
Now, therefore, under the powers vested in me by Section 2 ofthe 
Undesirable Organizations Act, 1978 (Act 9 of 1978), I hereby order the 
Methodist Church of South Africa -
(a) to cease, with effect from the date ofthis order, all the activities 
of the said Methodist Church within Transkei; 
(b) to dispose of-
(i) all land and other immovable property situated in Transkei of 
which the Methodist Church of South Africa is the owner, 
irrespective of whether such property is registered in the name 
of the Methodist Church of South Africa or its governing body 
or any body or person on its behalf, and 
(ii) all movable property owned by the Methodist Church of South 
Africa which is situated on any land referred to in paragraph (b) 
or which is used in connection with the activities of the Church 
within Transkei, 
and to transfer, cede or deliver, within a period of six months, all such 
property to the Methodist Church of Transkei, subject to such conditions as 
the Methodist Church of South Africa and the Methodist Church of Transkei 
may agree upon. 
Signed at Umtata on this 2nd day of June 1978. 
G.M.M. Matanzima, Minister of Justice 
·- -~~-
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APPENDIX VII 
Not all the ministers in the Transkei Circuits were present at the meeting on 2 June 1978 to indicate 
whether they were for or against the MCT. The following list of the ministers who joined the MCT 
has been compiled by comparing the names which appear in the Minutes of the 1977 MCSA 
Conference with the names which appear in the 1978 MCT Minutes. Their names in the ,1978 MCT 
Minutes are indicated a~ having been in their respective circuits for two years because the period from 
2 June 1978 to October 1 978 is regarded as a year (their last year in the MC SA records). This helps 
to eliminate the names of those who joined the MCT later either from the MCSA or from other 
churches and who joined the ministry for the first time. 
The following fifty-one ministers decided to remain in the Methodist Church ofTranskei: 
1. Bam Tranquil Z.A. 
2. Bubesi Coulbert A.N .. 
3. Conjwa Tholakele 0. 
4. Dabula Doran D. 
5. Dladlama Robert 
6. Dzingwe Harris M. 
7. Fikeni Ferrier H.T. 
8. Flatela Gladstone T. 
9. Gaba Wellington B.S. 
10. Jijana Mzimkulu M. 
11. Lungu Maxwell T. 
12. Mabija Livingstone O.K. 
13. Madikiza Gilliard G.K. 
14. Maham E. de Gama 
15. Makaula Edgar D. 
16. Manitshana Abner V. 
17. Manona Captain T. 
18. Masebeni Humphrey M.S. 
19. Mavuma Humphrey 0. 
20. Mazwane Bollen B. 
21. Mbele Owen K. 
22. Mdlozini Douglas 
23. Mbiko Lameck M. 
24. Mdolo Morgenthal D. 
25. Mdolo Osman S.A. 
26. Methusi Emmanuel M. 
27. Mgcwaba Jonathan 
28. Mjali Phinias P. 
29. Msezeli Ezra N. 
30. Mtshiza Greenwood M. 
31. Ngomana Joel G.M. 
32. Njeke Joseph 
33. Ntatu Rufus 
34. Njongwe Marshall M.V. 
35. Ntloko Stanley S. 
36. Ntshinga Douglas M. 
3 7. Pepeta Archibald M. 
38. Poyo Albert Z. 
39. Pupuma William 
40. Qambela Hamilton L. 
41. Qongqo Ezra 
42. Sanqela Gideon 
43. Samka Marques S. 
44. Sihawu Thornton 
45. Sincadu Abraham M. 
46. Siswana Synod P.S. 
47. Sobuwa Sydney S. 
48. Vava Witness L. 
49. Waqu Pascot M. 
50. Yako A.C. 
51. Zihlangu Elgie S. 
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The following supernumeraries joined the MCT: 
l. Jafta Norris M. * 
2. Gwiliza Edmund D.* 
3. Mafusini Albert A 
4. Mahlasela F. de Waal * 
5. Mayosi Bassie M. 
6. Mndela Douglas 
7. Mvusi Jotham C.* 
8. Ncume Petrus 
(* denotes the supernumeraries who were involved in the formation of the MCT and were later 
appointed to MCT Circuits after its formation.) 
The following seventeen ministers decided to leave Transkei and remain with MCSA: 
l. Fadane Amos S. 
2. Hina Timothy T. 
3. Jojozi Pinkerton K. 
4. Languza ShawN. 
5. Matebesi Samuel· M. 
6. Matshiki Tom T. 
7. Matyolo Gladstone K. 
8. Mbuli Maxwell Z. 
9. Mbabane Thomas B. 
10. Mposelwa Allwell G. 
11. Mzi Christopher D. 
12. Ngcatshe Osborn M. 
13. Qobo Jeffrey 
14. Shone Paul C. 
15. Silwanyana Jeremiah N. 
16. Sincadu Abraham M* 
1 7. Zim Allie 
(Dimension, 2 July 1978: 2) 
The following supernumeraries did not join the MCT: 
l. Fikeni Abednego J. 
2. Matebese Shadrack J. 
3. Mqomo Stephen O.W. 
*Although Abraham M. Sincadu's name appears in the Dimension list of 2 July 1978, he never left 
Transkei. In an interview at Mnceba Mission he stated that he had indicated to the MCO that he 
would not join the MCT but the pressure from his Circuit (Etyeni) made him change his mind and cast 
in his lot with the MCT (Sincadu 1992). 
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